


ПАВЕЛ СУДОПЛАТОВ

РАЗНЫЕ ДНИ ТАЙНОЙ ВОЙНЫ И ДИПЛОМАТИИ

1941 год



Abstract

Unknown episodes of the operations of Soviet intelligence and diplomacy in the 30-40s of the XX century in the memoirs of the head of the intelligence and sabotage service of the Soviet state security agencies in the rear of the German fascist troops P. A. Sudoplatov.

-
- [Pavel Sudoplatov. FROM](#)
 - [THE PUBLISHING HOUSE](#)
 - [About the](#)
 - [Author FOREWORD](#)
 - [Chapter 1.](#)
 - [Chapter](#)
 - [2. Chapter](#)
 - [3. Chapter](#)
 - [4. Chapter](#)
 - [5. Chapter](#)
 - [6. Chapter](#)
 - [7. Chapter](#)
 - [8. Chapter](#)
 - [9. Chapter](#)
 - [10. Chapter](#)
 - [11. Chapter](#)
 - [12. Chapter](#)
 - [13. Chapter](#)
 - [14. Chapter](#)
 - [15. Chapter](#)
 - [16. Chapter 17.](#)
-

**Pavel Sudoplatov.
Different days of secret war
and diplomacy. 1941**

FROM THE PUBLISHING HOUSE

A lot has been written about the author of this book in our literature and press. However, the data on P. A. Sudoplatov cited in numerous publications are based only on selective mention of individual episodes of the life path. In connection with these

circumstances, the publishing house considers it important to provide a comprehensive biographical information about the author, compiled on the basis of his personal and operational files from the archives of the FSB of the Russian Federation, the Foreign Intelligence

Service of the Russian Federation and the former Central Committee of the CPSU. From these materials it follows that the author concurrently during the war and the first post-war year led the five most important structural units of the Soviet state security agencies.

It seems that for this reason, the posthumously published memoirs give a multifaceted and, in their own way, new assessment of a number of the most important episodes in the history of the war, Soviet intelligence operations and diplomacy.

about the author

Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov was born on July 7, 1907 in Melitopol. His father, a Ukrainian by nationality, worked as a miller, baker, waiter; Russian mother. He graduated from a two-year school, two courses from the Faculty of Soviet Law of Moscow State University (1933), the Military Law Academy of the Soviet Army (1953). Lieutenant general. Member of the CPSU (b) since 1928.

P. A. Sudoplatov - a participant in the civil war. In 1919, at the age of twelve, he volunteered for the Red Army, was a pupil of the 1st Melitopol Shock Regiment of the Zadneprovskaya Division, then was a homeless child. Since 1920 - a Red Army soldier of the communications company of the 123rd rifle brigade of the 41st division of the 14th army in Ukraine. Since 1921 - clerk, registrar, clerk, systematizer of the operational department of the 44th division and the Volyn province department VIIV in Zhytomyr. Then he received the first skills of secret work: he provided accommodation in secret apartments for gang leaders who entered into tacit negotiations with the Soviet government. Since 1923 he was at

Komsomol work in Melitopol. He was the head of the information department of the district committee of the LKSMU, a member of the board and commandant of the working youth club. Since 1925 - in the organs of the VIIV Ukraine: first, a matchmaker of the information department, then an assistant to the authorized Melitopol okrotdel, and since August 1928 - an authorized secret political department of the Kharkov province department, then - an authorized Info VIIV of the Ukrainian

SSR in Kharkov. In February 1932, P. A. Sudoplatov was transferred to work in Moscow in the central office of the OGPU. He was a senior inspector of the personnel department of the OGPU, supervised by the INO, worked in the apparatus of the INO OGPU.

In 1935 he was on illegal intelligence work abroad (Andrey). To identify the anti-Soviet plans of Ukrainian nationalists, their agents and saboteurs in Ukraine, the OUN's connections with foreign intelligence services, under the guise of a representative of the Ukrainian anti-Soviet underground, was in

in Berlin. Andrei managed to get to study at a special party school of the Nazi Party in Leipzig. Having won the favor of the leader and founder of the pro-German fascist organization of Ukrainian nationalists, Colonel E. Konovalov, the intelligence officer entered his inner circle, accompanied him on inspection trips to Paris and Vienna. In 1937-1938, Andrei traveled to Western Europe as an illegal courier under the guise of a cargo ship's radio operator. On May

23, 1938, on behalf of I. Stalin, in Rotterdam, he liquidated the leader of the OUN, E. Konovalov. From September 1938 Sudoplatov P. A. acted as assistant head of the 4th department of the 5th department of the GUGB. After the arrest of intelligence leaders 3. Passov and S.

Shpigelglaz, other senior officers of the department in November-December 1938, he acted as head of the 5th department of the NKVD GUGB - foreign intelligence.

In December 1938, he was appointed assistant head of the Spanish branch of the INO, but at the end of the month he was removed from business. "For communication with enemies of the people" in the leadership of intelligence was excluded by the primary organization of the department from the CPSU (b). But thanks to the intervention of the leadership of the NKVD, this decision was not approved by the party committee of the people's commissariat.

On January 16, 1939, he was appointed deputy head of the 4th department of the 5th department of the GUGB, and from May 10 of the same year - deputy head of foreign intelligence of the NKVD of the USSR. Since 1939, he led the preparations for Operation Duck (liquidation of L. Trotsky), successfully carried out in Mexico on August 20, 1940 by L. Eitingon and R. Mercader del Rio. On February 26, 1941, by decision of the Politburo

of the Central Committee of the NVKP (b), P. A. Sudoplatov was appointed deputy head of the Intelligence Directorate of the newly created People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR.

After the start of the Great Patriotic War, from June 26, 1941, he concurrently headed the Headquarters for the elimination of enemy paratroopers and sabotage groups. Then he was appointed deputy chief of the Central Headquarters of the fighter battalions of the NKVD of the USSR. On July 5, 1941, P. A. Sudoplatov was approved as the head of the

Special Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR (Andrey), 3

October 1941 - 2nd department of the NKVD of the USSR. And from November 30, 1941 to July 1, 1942, he was also the deputy head of the 1st (intelligence) Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR.

In the first months of the war, at the request of P. A. Sudoplatov, the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L. P. Beria ordered the release of more than 20 people from among the convicted employees of Soviet intelligence, including Ya. S. Serebryansky, I. N. Kaminsky and P. Ya. Zubov, who were recruited into the Special Group. On January 18,

1942, Pavel Anatolyevich was appointed head of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR. He led partisan and reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the near and far rear of the enemy, coordinated the work of the agent network on the territory of Germany and its allies. After separating the state security

agencies from the NKVD on May 12, 1943, he was appointed head of the 4th Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR. At the same time, until May 14, 1946, he was deputy head of the Intelligence Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR. Since February 1944,

he was the head of group "C" under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Supervised the generalization of materials on atomic problems obtained by agents.

In 1945, P. A. Sudoplatov was instructed to lead the joint group of the NKVD - the NKGB to compile information and analytical materials for the Yalta Conference for I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov. The task of the group was to assess the potential of Germany to continue the war, as well as to study the possible position of the allies at the Yalta meeting. The group's analysts managed to create psychological portraits of the members of the American and British delegations, to determine the motivation for their behavior, which was sometimes no less important for the Soviet leadership than undercover materials.

In 1945-1947 Sudoplatov P. A., under the guise of NKID adviser P. Matveev, participated in the preparation and conduct of confidential negotiations between the People's Commissar of the USSR V. M. Molotov and the US Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary A. Harriman and the leader of the Kurdish national movement M. Barzani.

On May 22, 1945, he became part-time head of department "F" of the NKVD of the USSR, created to work on the territory of countries liberated by the Red Army from the enemy, as well as to collect information from citizens of the USSR who were captured or interned in European countries. On August 30, 1945, in connection with the dissolution of the department, he was relieved of this position and appointed head of a special Bureau under the People's Commissar of State Security - an information and analytical service. On September 27, 1945, he was appointed head (concurrently) of the independent department "C" of the NKVD of the USSR, created on the basis of group "C", and on

January 10, 1946 - the NKGB of the USSR. At the same time, he directs the joint intelligence bureau of the Special Committee under the Council of People's Commissars / Council of Ministers of the USSR on problem no. 1 (creation of atomic weapons). He was responsible for coordinating the provision of intelligence materials to the leaders and leading scientists of the Soviet nuclear project.

On November 15, 1945 (concurrently) he became the head of department "K" of the NKGB of the USSR, formed for the operational maintenance of nuclear special facilities. After the formation on March 15, 1946, the USSR

Ministry of State Security combined the positions of the head of the 4th Directorate (until it was abolished on October 15, 1946) and Department C (May 4, 1946 - May 30, 1947).

On February 15, 1947, he headed the "DR" department (known as the Special Service or the "Sudoplatov Bureau"), formed to deploy reconnaissance and sabotage work against the US and NATO military-strategic bases located around the USSR in the event of war. On September 9, 1950, he was approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks as the head of Bureau No. 1 of the USSR Ministry of State Security for sabotage work abroad, created on the basis of the Special Services of the USSR Ministry of State Security. On January 6, 1951, he was appointed head of the Bureau as head of the Department.

From March 21, 1953, Sudoplatov was deputy head of the PGU (counterintelligence) of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. From May 30, 1953, he was the head of the created 9th (reconnaissance and sabotage) department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. After its reorganization, on July 31, 1953, he was transferred to the VGU of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs to the post of head of the department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate.

On August 20, 1953, he was fired "for the impossibility of further use", and on August 21, 1953 he was arrested. Accused of participating in the Beria conspiracy. Until 1958 he was under investigation. He pleaded not guilty. On September 12, 1958, he was convicted at a closed meeting of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR under Art. 17-58 p. 1 "b" of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR with the application of Art. 51 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR to 15 years in prison. He was held in places of deprivation of liberty (Vladimir prison).

On August 21, 1968, P. A. Sudoplatov was released. For more than 20 years he fought for his rehabilitation. Only on February 10, 1992, "due to new circumstances that have come to light, as well as the non-confirmation and refusal of witnesses to testify against P. A. Sudoplatov in court" in accordance with paragraph "a" of Art. 3 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On the rehabilitation of victims of political repression" of October 18, 1991, he was rehabilitated by the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation. He published, in collaboration with his son A.P. Sudoplatov, books of memoirs in English,

German, French, Spanish, Swedish and Russian; "Special Assignments" (published in the USA), "Intelligence and the Kremlin" (published in Russia in 1996). Died September 24, 1996

of the year.

On October 1, 1998, by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, the state awards confiscated during the arrest were returned to the family of P. A. Sudoplatov. Pavel Anatolyevich was awarded the Order of Lenin, three Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov of the 2nd degree, two Orders of the Red Star, the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree, medals "Partisan of the Patriotic War" of the 1st degree, "For the Defense of Moscow", " For the Defense of the Caucasus", "For the Victory over Germany", "For the Victory over Japan", "XXX Years of the Soviet Army and Navy", "800 Years of Moscow", as well as the badge of the Honored Worker of the NKVD.

FOREWORD

The proposed memories are the fruit of more than one year. They are my life. I write only about what I experienced, I speak about those events as a witness or a direct participant. The origin of some events, their motives were not always clear to me. It was not accepted in the system in which my professional activities took place, to be frank, open. Everything had to be restrained. Sometimes I didn't know anything about what was going on in the next room. The meaning of the words spoken as if fleetingly by Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan, Malenkov and other leaders of the country, I realized much later, after the important events that took place in domestic life and in the international arena.

The significance of this or that person, his personality, character traits are judged by his deeds. The same can be said about the state. The larger the event taking place for the benefit of the country, the more powerful the state, the greater its weight in the world. Why is the attention of millions of people still riveted on one of the greatest events of the 20th century - the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945? Yes, because many springs that led to the victory of the Soviet people in the greatest battle were hidden for a long time, unknown, only a few knew about them. Only recently did it become known about covert operations, which were carried out by our intelligence and counterintelligence, often together with Soviet diplomats.

Recently, many publications have appeared in our press with the memoirs of those who call themselves either eyewitnesses or participants in sharp turns in our history, intelligence operations and secret diplomacy. There are a lot of superficial, fictional myths and legends in these works. Those who, due to their official position in the past, as a rule through the Central Committee of the CPSU, had significant opportunities to get acquainted with secret documents from the archives of the KGB, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially sin with them. However, cited by those who disowned the past party work - V. P. Naumov and A. N. Yakovlev - the documents are always selective, not comple

way, even posthumously to compromise objectionable persons with data from falsified criminal cases that have lost their legal significance. If possible, dispel them, remove unnecessary layers - this is also my task. This is not an easy mission. But it is necessary. In order to accurately assess what happened, one must have a good idea of the true motives for the actions of the Soviet state in critical periods of our history, discarding philistine ideas. In order not to make mistakes in the future, you need to deeply know the true background of the heroism and tragedy of the past. Truths are simple, but not everyone follows them. That is why myths are born, there are omissions, understatements, and simply fictions.

A number of considerations about known events should become known only after my death.

In 1939, after P. Fitin, a young journalist who immediately came to a leading job in the NKVD, who had recently graduated from the accelerated courses of the intelligence School for Special Purposes (SHON), and I was appointed head of the Foreign Department (foreign intelligence), Beria, then People's Commissar The NKVD considered it necessary to explain to us the main directions of our state interests in secret relations with the countries of the West. His statements with references to "instructions of Comrade. Stalin" were in sharp contrast with the goals of "Soviet foreign policy" officially proclaimed at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b). I consider it necessary to reproduce them from memory. "Do not think that the liquidation of Trotsky can replace your difficult and most

important task of ensuring, through intelligence, the most important actions of Soviet foreign policy," said Beria. "We must learn to defend our positions by methods of undercover work in places where our interests are intertwined with the enemy and where, due to a number of considerations, neither the British, nor the French, nor the Americans, nor the Japanese, nor the Germans can do without us without secret cooperation. And our intelligence should accompany the actions of the Soviet diplomacy, headed by V. Molotov.

Both me and Fitin were surprised that Beria said that our ambassadors and chargé d'affaires in Czechoslovakia, China, France, Germany and the United States had completed the first part of their mission - they conducted a secret sounding of intentions in the sphere of mutual relations with

the leadership of England, France, the USA and Germany. "These gentlemen need us," he continued, "because a redistribution of the dominant positions of the Americans, Anglo-French, Germans and Japanese in Europe, China and the Far East is inevitable in the near future. Tov. Stalin believes, - said Beria, - that this redistribution will result in a military clash. For your orientation, keep in mind that we, unlike the royal fools in 1914, should stay away from the fight as long as possible. We will fight only when it suits us." During this meeting, we learned that the most deeply secret exchange of views took place in Germany, Turkey, Finland, Sweden. A. Kollontai was

the Soviet ambassador there. And although Kollontai, Beria noted, "sympathizes with the defeated opposition," we will not touch it. It is important for us to keep it as a participant in the secret negotiations that have already taken place. Keep this in mind for the next year, Beria noted, regardless of the materials that come to her. "To China," he said, "on a secret mission to Chiang Kai-shek, it was supposed to send Panyushkin as both an ambassador and an intelligence resident. But the content of the dialogue with the Americans about confronting the Japanese

in this country will not be determined by Panyushkin, but by Umansky, our ambassador to the United States. He also had to deal with maintaining relations with Benes when he came to America from Europe. Keep in mind, - Beria instructed, - that Umansky will simultaneously perform a number of duties as the chief resident of the NKVD in all of America. As for Germany, we will decide especially later, so says Comrade. Stalin." We were silent. I asked for clarification on the operation connected with Trotsky. To which I received the answer: this is an extremely important matter. Trotsky, added Beria, should be destroyed by the start of a big war in order to behead the remnants of the fifth column. Do this business every day,

Beria said, but it can and should be liquidated, given that it is both used and hated both in America and in Europe.

The book uses materials from documents: Post. PB of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. P34 / 25 dated 06/14/41 and Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated 06/17/41 "On awarding vols. Mercader K. R., Eitingon N.

I., Vasilevsky L.P. and others. Decree of the Presidium of

the USSR Armed Forces dated May 31, 1960 - closed. Fast. Council of People's Commissars of the

USSR of 06/24/41 "On measures to combat enemy paratroopers and saboteurs in the front line", announced by the NKVD of the USSR of 06/26/41. Etc. NKVD USSR No. 00882 dated 5.07.41. Fast. PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. P34 / 287 of 07/30/41 "On the appointment of senior officials of the NKVD of the

USSR", announced by the NKVD of the USSR No. 00984 of 07/31/41.

Etc. NKVD USSR No. 001435 dated 03.10.41. Etc. NKVD USSR No. 00145 of 01/18/42. Information about the states and structure of the NKVD of the USSR dated 05/20/42. Etc. MGB USSR No. 00447 dated 9.10.46. Etc. MGB USSR No. 569 dated 15.02.47. Note of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR

No. 6990 / A dated 4.08.50 to I.V. Stalin. Fast. PB of the Central Committee

of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. P77 / 310 of 09.09.50,

announced by the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 00532 of 09.28.50.

Fast. PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks No. P77 / 309 of 09.09.50, announced by the Ministry of State Security of the USSR No. 00533 of

09.28.50. Etc. Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR No. 00318 of

05/30/53. Etc. Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR No. 00601 dated

07/31/53. Note of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR No. 876 / k dated 17.09.53 to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Chapter

1. THE EVE OF THE WAR

External and internal tasks of the OGPU-NKVD

The Central Hospital of the KGB, a new building near the Schukinskaya metro station. Department of Cardiology. Small room, hospital bed. Unassuming environment. Whispering people. Behind the door, someone's unhurried footsteps are heard. The light is on all the time in the room. It is somewhat like a prison cell. However, the difference is huge. There you could only think, but here you could not only think, but also write without constant control over you. After August 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet state, one somehow vividly and clearly recalls that great and historical time when, at the cost of enormous efforts, human lives, and colossal exertion of forces, a sixth part of the earth called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic The catastrophe of a terrible collapse, a tremendous squabble, the betrayal of the military, the betrayal of the Chekists, when

no one remembered either the oath or the duty to protect the country, to protect the state, in the interests of which all Soviet people lived. By and large, no one stood in the way of the terrible bloody drama that unleashed before the eyes of the whole world. Now the fiery tongues of war, local and ethnic conflicts are approaching the very heart of Russia from all sides. The war takes place either in an explicit or in a hidden form. At heart anxiety, what will happen ahead? We are clearly entering a new world. Memory now and then returns to the eve of 1941, to the time when the danger of a merciless clash with a world hostile to us was steadily growing. The choice was

simple: either we remain a sovereign state, or we will be destroyed. Now many different stories are coming out from the pen of persons admitted to the archives, to

old secret documents that shed light on the twists and turns of our history. But it is still useful to take a look at something that is little written or talked about - which way we went to create a great power, to try to understand all this from the standpoint of what was happening at the Lubyanka at that time.

The role of state security agencies in Soviet history can only be assessed after the Soviet Union, of which they were an integral part, or rather were the backbone of that system, disappeared. In journalism and in literature there is a statement about that with the creation of the OGPU instead of the Cheka after the civil war, the main functions of our intelligence and counterintelligence agencies changed. Partly it is. The Cheka existed in emergency conditions, in

conditions of a civil war. After Lenin's death, the country's main intelligence service was reformed into a unified state political administration. However, it still remained the apparatus for carrying out political repression both at home and abroad. At the same time, it is very important to understand that repressions were considered by the party and the Soviet leadership as a necessary, forced action, the purpose of which was to suppress political opposition and strengthen the Soviet state. At the same time, the OGPU became something that was unusual for the Cheka. It performed the most important task of providing information and analytical services to the country's leadership. In the 1930s and 1950s, without an appropriate conclusion from the OGPU-NKVD-MGB on the "actual", as Lenin said, "state of affairs", the country's leadership, as a rule, did not make any decisions on the cardinal issues of domestic and foreign policy. The creation of foreign intelligence in the state security agencies was dictated by the need to conduct primarily counterintelligence work abroad among the emigration. Therefore, all operations against emigration were initially carried out by the counterintelligence department of the OGPU under the leadership of A. Artuzov. And it is no coincidence that he, the head of counterintelligence in 1930, replaced M. Trilisser as head of foreign intelligence. Until 1939, foreign intelligence solved counterintelligence tasks abroad as the main direction of its activity.

Only in 1941, after the creation of the People's Commissariat of State Security and the organization of the 1st (intelligence) directorate in its structure, intelligence was given the main tasks of obtaining information about the intentions of the governments of the leading capitalist countries, identifying the political plans of bourgeois states, and obtaining new technologies for Soviet industry through intelligence. Intelligence also had to "actively accompany" the activities of the foreign policy of the USSR

as the world's largest power. But along with this, work continued, begun in the counterintelligence departments of the VIIV, to identify conspiracies directed against the USSR and the subversive activities of foreign states, their intelligence services and general staffs, as well as anti-Soviet organizations, espionage

political

By

disclosure

of terrorist activities on the territory of our country by foreign intelligence agencies. The shift in tasks was due to the fact that by the

beginning of 1941, that is, on the eve of the war, the defeat of terrorist, insurgent and other anti-Soviet emigre organizations was basically completed. You can judge and judge about the methods of this struggle,

however, it is obvious that the active opposition, longing for war against the USSR and advocating cooperation with the leading capitalist powers, was beheaded. In particular, the leadership of the Russian All-Military Union was liquidated. It was completely disorganized and could no longer play any noticeable political role in the Soviet-German war. The same effect was obtained after the liquidation of the top Ukrainian

nationalist movement.

Inflicting the last blows in the 30s on the leaders of the OUN and the ROVS, the secret services of the USSR consistently deprived the emigration of the trust of the leading capitalist states, that is, the support that the special services and military circles of Western countries were counting on when planning a future military clash with the Soviet Union. For the leaders of the Western intelligence services, it was quite obvious that the stake on the emigration weakened by us in the fight against the USSR, although important and could cause damage to our country, but together

with that is unpromising. In a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, you will have to rely only on your own strength.

Achilles' heel of foreign intelligence on the eve of the war

The creation of an agent apparatus and agents of influence abroad, based on the Comintern, made it possible to solve the important problem of obtaining the necessary information about the intentions of the enemy. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that since diplomatic relations were limited, and the rights of ambassadors - plenipotentiary representatives of the Soviet Union abroad until 1939, especially before the arrival of Molotov - were huge, incomparable with the rights of ambassadors of the 40-50s, the importance intelligence channels acquired particular importance for the preliminary study of a number of major Soviet

foreign policy

actions carried out by the government to strengthen the role of the USSR as a great power.

It must be said that the coordination of the activities of foreign intelligence agencies and special services has always been the Achilles' heel in the Soviet state. Initially, the role of coordinator of the work of military intelligence, the OGPU, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, the Comintern and foreign intelligence was performed by M. Rosenberg, an employee of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), known as the first representative of the Soviet Union in the League of Nations as its deputy secretary general, the first ambassador of the USSR to the republican Spain. But the question of coordinating the activities of the special services was not to set before someone some tasks that complemented the functions of military intelligence, the OGPU and diplomacy, or to maintain competition between the special services. The reality at that time was that in the main capitalist countries in the 1920s and 1930s there were joint residencies of the OGPU and the Red Army Intelligence Department, closely cooperating with the international communications department, the illegal apparatus of the Comintern. At the first stage, this helped to create a powerful foreign intelligence apparatus. However, the combined residencies of the Intelligence Agency and the NKVD turned out to be very vulnerable on the eve of the war and when it began.

Messengers and couriers often knew agents belonging to various Soviet special services. And the failures of Soviet intelligence in the late 1920s and early 1930s in Poland and China generally forced them to abandon work in the framework of the combined military and political intelligence residencies in 1939.

An important point for understanding the events of that time is the correlation between the activities of the Intelligence Agency and the intelligence of the state security agencies. Let's take the fate of the famous head of Soviet intelligence, who left the counterintelligence A. Artuzov. They write somehow in passing that Artur Khristianovich Artuzov, in the operational correspondence "Alekseev", headed both the Intelligence Department of the Red Army and the INO OGPU. Why did this happen? Because the country's leadership, after the failures in Europe and China, was looking for the most appropriate form of coordination of intelligence activities.

In 1930, the Bureau for the Coordination of Intelligence Activities, headed by Rosenberg, was abolished. At the same time, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the activities of the Soviet foreign intelligence were subjected to a comprehensive critical analysis, and the outrageous work of the OGPU received an unsatisfactory assessment. After the opening of Blumkin's betrayal, Trilisser was replaced by Artuzov. In the light of the changing foreign policy situation, it was decided to reconsider the priorities in the work of intelligence. The White émigré movement, the opposition to which was the main task of the OGPU during the 1920s, ceased to pose a primary threat to the USSR. The most important areas of work of the Foreign Department (INO) were recognized as the creation of

a reliable agency, its implementation at vital facilities of bourgeois states, capable of obtaining reliable information of a political, economic, scientific and technical nature. In 1933, the structure of the central office of the Foreign Department of the OGPU was determined.

In 1934, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks again raised the question of the transcendental work of the Soviet special services: the Intelligence Department of the Red Army and the Foreign Department of the OGPU. To develop a plan for special operations abroad, a permanent commission was formed, consisting of the heads of these services. Head of INO OGPU Artuzov was

concurrently appointed deputy chief of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army.

In 1934, there were four independent intelligence services in the USSR. These are the Foreign Department of the NKVD, the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, the International Communications Department of the Comintern and the Special Special Purpose Group under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (SGON) Y. Serebryansky ("Yasha's Group"). Under these conditions, Artuzov concurrently was appointed deputy head of military intelligence. Why? Because it was about the need to cardinaly strengthen the counterintelligence support for the overseas work of our intelligence. Artuzov's experience, his knowledge of the Russian emigration, which was one of the main sources for the formation of agents, was most needed during this period. Soon Artuzov was replaced by A. Slutsky as the head of the INO. Artuzov returned to the NKVD again in 1937 as a consultant, an ordinary employee.

Take the period of repression. After all, it is no coincidence that in 1937 the Intelligence Industry of the Red Army was led by senior major of state security Gendin. The fact is that, at one time heading military counterintelligence, Gendin had a fairly good idea of the work of the military intelligence apparatus, he knew compromising materials on its main employees. During the war years, we also looked for forms of organizational interaction in the work of intelligence agencies, both in the area of state security and in the area of military intelligence. I had the opportunity to head

not only the 4th department of the NKVD-NKGB, known as the sabotage and intelligence department, but part-time throughout the war, with the exception, it seems, for six months in 1942, until June 1946, to be the deputy head of all foreign intelligence of state security. This was required by the need to coordinate the activities of the special services, because the work behind the front against the enemy was based on using the full potential of the intelligence, operational and technical capabilities of the NKVD-NKGB both inside the country and abroad.

Personification of foreign policy

On the eve of the war, a very important event, little noticed by anyone, took place - the personification of foreign policy. It focused on specific leaders of the Soviet state: Stalin and Molotov. Intelligence, as a rule, was not devoted to those foreign policy strategic tasks that were considered by the country's top leadership. Only by fleeting judgments of Molotov, Beria, Mikoyan and Vyshinsky could one sometimes judge the motives of the decisions taken. Since the pros and cons were discussed at the very top, the main task for intelligence was to supply the leadership not with intelligence analysis, but with information about the life of Soviet society and about the situation abroad. Intelligence, in addition to the data presented, was supposed to report "upstairs" only considerations about whether the source of information and its information deserved trust. Messages concerning the need to adjust the foreign policy of the state through the NKVD-NKGB were not presented to Stalin in 1939-1941. It is very important to note that this tradition, established back in Soviet times, often continues today. If we read the memos of that time sent by the leadership of the people's commissariats of internal affairs and state security to the leadership of the country, we will see that they

contain requests to obtain consent to conduct another major operation, which in military-political terms meant new nuances in relations with a foreign state or concerned the recruitment of high-value personnel and the use of certain funds.

And what initiatives did the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs or the People's Commissariat of State Security come up with on the eve and during the war, on what issues of state building? Most often, it was about the placement of personnel, about obtaining sanctions for undercover and operational activities of significant political or international significance. But more often

of the entire proposal of the NKVD and the People's Commissariat of State Security on the eve and during the war years concerned the implementation of government directives.

The hierarchical pyramid of presenting information of those years looked like this. "Upstairs" came the people's commissar, the minister. He reported and formulated the question. When there was an Information Committee under the leadership of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 1st Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Molotov from 1947 to 1949, Molotov had an independent access to Stalin. The head of intelligence came either to the people's commissar, or to his deputy. Such people on the eve and during the war years were V. Merkulov and B. Kobulov. Kobulov - Beria's deputy for the NKVD in 1939-1941, was the only deputy people's commissar of state security at the height of the war, in 1943-1945. There were no other deputies who oversaw intelligence work in the NKGB at that time. And this is despite

its enormous significance. It is also important that the head of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army, unlike the head of intelligence of the NKVD-NKGB, in a number of cases had the right to independently reach out to the top leadership, that is, to Stalin. Stalin regularly hosted the leaders of military intelligence in his Kremlin and at his dacha, and often without the participation of the Chief of the General Staff in the conversation. However, he always received the heads of foreign intelligence of the state security agencies and the outcast residents of the NKVD-NKGB together with their immediate leaders - Beria, Merkulov and Kobulov.

The main of the main

The main divisions in the NKVD on the eve of the war were: the 1st Intelligence Directorate, the 2nd Directorate, the 3rd, which did not last long, the Secret Political Directorate (SPO) and the Directorate of Special Departments. The main

direction in the work of intelligence agencies and counterintelligence was German.

The main direction in the work of special departments and military counterintelligence was also German.

The main direction in the work of the secret political direction was still the defeat of anti-Soviet political parties, the remnants of the "Trotskyist underground" and similar opposition organizations within the country. The first section of the

counterintelligence apparatus was the most important. He developed the agents of German and Polish intelligence. The second direction was aimed at Japan, which was considered one of our main opponents. The third direction - was engaged in tracking the actions of the British and American residencies. Counterintelligence officers also developed our inactive opponents - mainly the actions of the special services of neutral countries on our territory. It is very important to note that the counterintelligence department had a special unit that was engaged in the protection of the diplomatic corps.

In the organization of intelligence work abroad, again, the leading direction was German. The second is

connected with France, Italy, the countries occupied by the Germans. The third one is aimed at the USA. It also included scientific and technical intelligence. The fourth direction concerned Japan, Manchuria, Korea and China. Xinjiang, Mongolia and other territories in the Far East were considered a special direction. Along with these circumstances, it

should be noted that the counterintelligence department and the military counterintelligence department, as well as the transport department, had independent exits abroad through the appropriate agents. A great deal of intelligence work was carried out by the Directorate of the Border Troops, which had its own intelligence departments and, in accordance with its regulations, was also responsible for reconnaissance of the theater of operations in the front line. This confusion of functions was very clearly manifested in the fact that the information coming from various sources needed proper coordination of the activities of the main operational intelligence units. Often this could not be done. Let's say that the Border Troops Department came out

in 1941, from the structure of the state security agencies and transferred to the NKVD. This lengthened the terms of familiarization with the intelligence materials of the border troops of the leadership of the security agencies. The implementation of these materials has become more complicated. Supervision of the main areas of work also became more complicated, for example, transport management on the eve of the war was carried out to a large extent through the NKVD, since its chief S. Milshtein had personal access to Beria as the People's Commissar of Internal

Affairs, although he formally worked in the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of State Security. Counterintelligence and intelligence work

was supervised by Deputy People's Commissar of State Security B. Kobulov. All information flowed to him. This structure of the NKVD-NKGB gives us reason to understand two points. Firstly, there were no illusions that Germany was the main adversary, and, secondly, that the source of the war was within the European theater of operations. The work of the Secret Political Directorate (SPU) was to paralyze during the war, in special circumstances, the use of the remnants of anti-Soviet political parties and organizations - the main reserve of the enemy special services in the confrontation with the Soviet state. Another direction in the work of the SPU, transferred from the foreign department, is the prevention of armed actions by nationalist organizations in support of the main potential enemy. The main focus on operational-search activities of the entire state security apparatus played a very important role in the future war. No organized groups that would come out in support of the Germans could arise in our rear. This was the case everywhere, with the exception of the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. According to the records of the NKVD, the main persons who could cooperate with the enemy were known.

Nevertheless, the scale of assistance to the Germans during the war years was still significant. More than 250 thousand people served in the Vlasov army and auxiliary formations. After the defeat of fascist Germany, we created a powerful accounting apparatus. With his help, we knew well the members of the formations who remained in exile, as well as those who were captured. After the war, we had all the real possibilities to prevent

the use of this force en masse against the Soviet state. We knew people who could be recruited by Western intelligence agencies for their own purposes. And this ensured the localization of the so-called rebel actions in the Baltic states and Western Ukraine in 1944-1950. The possibility of the transition of the armed struggle to the interior regions of the country was excluded.

Who was in charge of counterintelligence?

Coincidentally, my appointment as deputy head of the foreign department in May 1939 was associated with significant personnel changes in the apparatus of state security and military intelligence. Who headed the main areas of work of

state security in the pre-war period and during the war in the field of counterintelligence? First of all, it should be noted the change of heads of operational units. The 1st department of the GUGB, which was responsible for Stalin's security, was headed by Vlasik in 1939, who rose from an ordinary security worker to the post of chief of Stalin's security. But I think we should focus on those who directly supervised intelligence and counterintelligence work. Among the figures of this trend of that time, one should first of all single out P. Fedotov, who initially headed the secret political department of the GUGB of the NKVD, that is, the 2nd department, as it was then called, and later the same Fedotov headed the 3rd department of the GUGB - control intelligence. L. Raikhman was his first deputy.

Pyotr Vasilyevich Fedotov is a personnel officer of the security agencies, a very balanced person, a hallmark of his character was slowness in making decisions. The tandem of his initiative deputy Leonid Raikhman and the sluggish Fedotov, who scrupulously carried out all the instructions that came from above, existed for quite a long time and the community of these people, which began in 1939, continued until 1946, when

Fedotov has already headed foreign intelligence, initially in the USSR Ministry of State Security, and then in

the Information Committee. I must say that Reichman in 1946-1951. continued to lead counterintelligence work, becoming the first deputy of E. Pitovranov, head of the counterintelligence department since 1946, and later deputy minister of state security. In fact, all this work was initiatively directed by Reichman until his arrest in October 1951. He was an outstanding person who knew intelligence work very well, and quite sincerely considered his activity to be a special area of party work. Raikhman himself carried out a number of important undercover combinations, he had a powerful apparatus at his disposal. Initially, a special department, that is, military

counterintelligence, was headed by V. Bochkov, a graduate of the Frunze Military Academy, who came through party recruitment. He had a fairly broad military outlook. In 1940, he was unexpectedly nominated for the position of Attorney General. The fact is that M. Pankratiev, having replaced Vyshinsky, accused Beria of terminating cases against "enemies of the people", of releasing persons for whom the prosecutor did not see any grounds for terminating criminal prosecution. Two commissions have been set up on these issues. Why two? Pankratiev wrote statements against Beria twice. One statement was written in 1939, immediately after Pankratiev became the Prosecutor General. According to this statement, a commission worked, which did not find abuse of official position and negligence in the discontinued cases. In 1940, Pankratiev again wrote a statement in which he claimed that the cases initiated against the enemies of the people were again being terminated, and, in his opinion, their termination was unreasonable, insufficiently coordinated with the prosecutor's office. The second commission also checked and again found no evidence. After that, Pankratiev was removed from the post of Prosecutor General, and Bochkov, a legally completely unprepared person who graduated from a military academy, was nominated for his position. Nevertheless, it was believed that he could implement all the necessary law enforcement directives.

Tragic events are connected with the circumstances of V. Bochkov's resignation from the post of Prosecutor General, namely the murder of the daughter of the USSR Ambassador to Mexico K. Umansky and the suicide of the son of the Minister of Aviation Industry Shakhurin. A criminal case was initiated. The investigation was personally conducted by the Deputy People's Commissar of the State Security Service B. Kobulov and the head of the secret political department, the predecessor of the ideological counterintelligence of the KGB, N. Sazykin. Bochkov sought to hush him up. But Stalin ordered to give it a go and to consider it as an example of the everyday decay of the members of the families of the Soviet leadership. The case quickly took on political overtones. The children of other senior officials, in particular Politburo member A. Mikoyan, were drawn into it. The families of Mikoyan, Shakhurin and other people's commissars lived in an atmosphere of constant tension and fear. The children of responsible workers, who belonged to the "golden youth" of that time, were convicted of illegal possession and use of someone else's firearms. Bochkov, who tried to hush up this case, was removed from the post of Prosecutor General and returned to serve in the escort.

V. Mikheev left a much larger mark on military counterintelligence. I remember him as an enterprising worker who understood that the main task of military counterintelligence was to protect our armed forces from the penetration of enemy agents and disrupt reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the near rear of our border military districts. However, it was not easy to realize this task, since a very large trail of old cases of 1936-1937 stretched behind the military counterintelligence. Entire areas of work were aimed "at working out the remnants of the Trotskyite Bukharin underground and military conspirators - supporters of Tukhachevsky in the army and navy."

Military counterintelligence, to the detriment of monitoring the combat readiness of the Red Army, was intensively engaged in rechecking the testimony of accomplices and evidence of the so-called military conspiracy of 1937-1938. Mikheev told me and Fitin more than once about the depressing picture of compromising testimonies against most of the command staff of the Red Army, requesting foreign materials on our military leaders.

L. Reshin, an employee of the Department of Political Repressions of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, who met with me many times, showed me a number of materials stating that after the mass arrests of 1937-1938, the Soviet leadership individually decided on the reliability **and** seriousness of these materials. According to the then strict practice, extracts from compromising testimonies against the command staff of the Red Army were reported to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks without fail. But "at the top", it seems, were aware that the reliability of these materials was in doubt.

The practice of reporting incriminating signals on high military personnel exists at all times. The military apparatus is well aware of this, as well as the fact that these documents are used only for reasons of political expediency, except in cases of obvious failures in work or specific blame for extraordinary events. At the middle level of the NKVD, there was some bewilderment that the materials went "up", like in the sand. So it was not only with the military, but also with a group of prominent figures of our creative and technical intelligentsia. Despite the "compromising" facts, according to the NKVD, they were awarded orders and medals for services to the Motherland, for their contribution to the development of science, literature and art.

Speaking about the work of Raikhman, Fedotov, Mikheev, one cannot help but dwell on those structural areas that ensured the functioning of the state security apparatus. In the system of the NKVD and the MGB there was another organization, usually associated with the darkest deeds that were carried out during the period, one might say, of the Stalin era of the VChK-NKVD. We are talking about the so-called Special Bureau under the People's

Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Many note that in the NKVD system and in the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies at the beginning of the war there were no information and analytical units, so the information of the agents very often received a subjective assessment of Stalin and Molotov. But it is not so. The special bureau under the people's commissar of internal affairs was precisely the center of information and analytical work. It included a special department for systematization and generalization of information sent to the government. This great

Deputy Head of the Special Bureau A. Kossoy, who later became a prominent Soviet economist. At the final stage of the war and until the end of 1946, I had to head the Special Bureau concurrently. We were engaged in the preparation of methodological manuals, the distribution of instructions, the generalization of information about the work of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of the enemy, and the generalization of the experience of Chekist work. The reference file of the Special Bureau for statesmen of foreign countries was an important tool for the operational departments of intelligence and counterintelligence. The information work of the analysts was carried out clearly and often the materials of the Special Bureau, at the request of the government, were submitted in a shorter time than the certificates that were obtained from the intelligence and counterintelligence units of the NKVD NKGB. The

transport department, which provides counterintelligence in transport, was headed by S. Milshtein, who at one time headed the secret political department of the NKVD. He was a rather literate person, of unusual capacity for work, who had experience not only in state security agencies, but also in agriculture and railway transport. For some time he headed the agricultural department of the Central Committee of the Party of Georgia. Milstein was one of the few who, during operational meetings, could afford to talk with Beria on "you". We must pay tribute to the apparatus headed by Milstein. Not a single major sabotage was carried out by the enemy on transport on the eve and during the war. Milstein's operational work was built very efficiently, the system functioned flawlessly.

Encryption and decryption work and radio counterintelligence, headed by Kopyttsev, Shevelev and Blinderman, became a powerful help in the activities of the leading operational units. On the eve of the war, we read the cipher correspondence of the Japanese embassy in Moscow and the Japanese Foreign Ministry. This was due to two activities that we successfully implemented. The Japanese Foreign Ministry sent its diplomatic mail to Moscow by our trains without escort. It was delivered to Vladivostok in special bags. The 3rd Special Department of the NKVD managed to arrange things in such a way that a

a small laboratory, whose employees opened the Japanese diplomatic mail, photographed it, resealed it so that no traces of the opening were left.

I cannot fail to note how modestly the staff of leading state security officials was formed in quantitative terms. The top leadership of the NKVD in 1939 consisted of four deputies of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. One of them is Merkulov. He led the Main Directorate of State Security. I. Serov, and then B. Kobulov, was listed as the first deputy of Merkulov for a short time. In February 1941, as you know, an important decision was made to create the NKGB, which was supposed to perform the functions of state security and government protection. He was singled out from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. The people's commissar was Merkulov, the first deputies were Serov and Kobulov. It should also be taken into account that at the very peak of his work from 1943 to 1945, Merkulov had only two deputies, and one of them was deputy for personnel. All this suggests that the staff of executives did not swell. Worked beyond human strength.

Special agents from foreigners

When we talk about the personnel of Soviet intelligence and its illegal apparatus, it is important to highlight the following circumstance. What was the 20-30s for her? The formation of the Soviet state with the use of the personnel of the Comintern inevitably raised the question that foreign citizens and nationals as special agents and sources of information often turned into full-time operational officers of the Red Army Intelligence Department, the INO OGPU NKVD and the Serebryansky Special Group. Suffice it to recall such figures as former Polish officers in the counterintelligence and later in the intelligence departments of the OGPU - Sosnowski and Bodesko. Outstanding personalities were illegal residents, now widely known Hungarian Theodor Mali, Austrian St. Deutsch. A prominent role in the development of Soviet intelligence of the security agencies was played by the Austrian Lieutenant Colonel Georg Miller, a member of the labor movement,

organizer and creator of the "passport office" - cover documents for Soviet illegal immigrants in the 30-40s. Repression did not touch him, since he was a unique specialist. He gave a start in life to Soviet officers - masters of passport business, in particular, Colonel P. Gromushkin, who during the war years produced excellent cover documents for the famous throughout the country Paul Siebert - Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kuznetsov. Finally, the head of the foreign department, Artuzov, was also a Soviet citizen of foreign origin. It should be noted that in the states of the OGPU and the Intelligence

Department of the Red Army, many high-ranking employees turned out to be citizens of foreign origin. However, in the 1930s, in connection with the "refreshing of personnel" proclaimed by Stalin, a natural check began on the circumstances of their enrollment in the personnel of Soviet intelligence. The vast majority of OGPU special agents abroad, who became full-time employees of intelligence apparatuses in the center and on the periphery, turned out to be in the position of persons subject to careful verification. Among them were those who played a huge role in the development of the intelligence service. But after the Soviet state strengthened its position, after the defeat of the Trotskyist opposition inside the country and abroad, relations with the leading capitalist countries changed and, finally, their own cadres appeared who received professional training and higher education, the question was put by the country's leadership in a different way. . Persons of foreign origin and having relatives abroad did not have the right to be in active service in the Soviet military and foreign intelligence agencies and in the system of security agencies. This allows us to understand why, say, Theodor Mali, who died in 1937, a number of prominent foreign-born intelligence workers, etc., as career employees, drew a peculiar line under themselves. Neither Philby, nor McLain, who came to the USSR later, nor Katherine Harrison, aka Kathy Harris, except for agents and sources, being foreigners, despite receiving Soviet citizenship, did not become personnel officers. And the point is not that someone fled here after going through prison, someone was more successful and ended up in the Soviet Union without being formally exposed by foreign counterintelligence. The thing is

that the leading and operational personnel were selected in a completely new way. The selection took place through a system of special educational institutions, which appeared back in the 30s and which, in relation to intelligence, took shape at the direction of Stalin in the School for Special Purposes. Therefore, the cessation of the existence of the Comintern in 1943 was logical, first of all, from the point of view of the creation of a completely new personnel filling of both the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and the apparatus of military intelligence and the apparatus of state security

agencies. Another important issue that deserves special coverage. These are sources of information. A lot is written about the fact that the repressions paralyzed the work of Soviet intelligence. It's right. But they also had other far-reaching consequences. The fact is that many do not realize that there were two stages in the work of Soviet intelligence. Initially, there was autonomy, independence both abroad and within the country, when residents and major workers had the right to recruit people in a number of cases without the approval of the Center. This period began to end under Artuzov in the mid-1930s. If a source of information appeared, then appropriate records were drawn up, a file was automatically opened in which all materials on the agent were filed. But there are no perfect agents. In any case, positive and compromising materials accumulate. The transition to bureaucratization in the mid-1930s was associated with the establishment of lengthy affairs. Both the arrest and the dismissal of quite prominent

people from the intelligence agencies automatically raised the question of trust in the sources of information and acquired agents. In addition, now, when discussing how it

was possible to cast a shadow of distrust on such important sources of information as Philby, McLane, Burges, Arvid Harnack and Harro Schulze-Boysen, to question the existence of cadres loyal to us, who, in the underground, supplied extremely important information? Here we should note the most important circumstance. In addition to repressions and falsified cases against foreign intelligence officers, in relation to the Cambridge Five group, temporary distrust of them was due to the presence of a real defector V. Krivitsky, whom they are trying to raise to the shield of the "fight against

Stalinism" and defector Orlov-Nikolsky. V. Krivitsky, who collaborated with the British and American intelligence services, gave them a general tip on Philby and McLane. Orlov-Nikolsky knew the details of their work. And no one could guarantee that, having fled to the West, he did not betray these people. It was also not excluded that Orlov Nikolsky could take the path of cooperation with the enemy and provoke the re-recruitment of these sources. For anyone with experience in intelligence work, it is an axiom to stop contact with agents if they were in touch with an operative who disappeared and then showed up in the West. It should also not be forgotten that Philby, MacLane, Burges grew into exceptionally valuable agents only during the war years and in the last period of their activity. Finally, there is another very important circumstance. One of the people close to these people, widely known in our country and abroad, Victor Rothschild, had a more or less clear idea about intelligence work and cooperation with us by the famous Cambridge Five. Occupying a prominent position in British intelligence, he

actually acted as a "double" - we received important information from him. Proximity to Rothschild cast a shadow of suspicion on the nature of this information that came to Moscow from Philby and Burges. Rothschild as a source of information and as a channel of disinformation through our residents in London A. Gorsky, I. Chichaev, K. Kulin, we used throughout the war. Having left the service in British intelligence, V. Rothschild, as I was told, until the 80s was regularly invited to all official receptions at the Soviet embassy in London.

Significant event

In February 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was divided into the People's Commissariat of State Security and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Military counterintelligence at the same time was formally transferred to the subordination of the People's Commissariat of Defense. This event can be considered

iconic. Apparently, Stalin, it seems to me, has matured a decision to separate the functions of the special services in order to get one person, Beria, out of control and to directly subordinate to himself various aspects of activities in the field of state security and law enforcement. What was the basis for the fact that the military counterintelligence became a special body, which was attached to the People's Commissar of Defense? As far as I know (V. Merkulov told me about this), the main reason for this decision was that Voroshilov, People's Commissar of Defense, received little documents directly about the real combat readiness of the troops, about the real state of affairs in the districts. Why? Yes, because the main consumers of information were the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the personnel department of the People's Commissariat of Defense. Moreover, they were interested in rather peculiar information - the presence of compromising materials and verification of the leadership of the officer corps. Oddly enough, it was not Voroshilov who was more interested in information about the combat readiness in the districts, their mobilization readiness, about the real state of affairs in the Red Army, but Stalin and Molotov as Chairman of the Council of People

The NKVD was headed by Yezhov, secretary of the Central Committee, a candidate member of the Politburo. Yezhov and his predecessor Yagoda built their reports as a correspondence with Stalin. The administrative chain of bringing information to the People's Commissar of Defense, verified through agents, about the actual combat readiness of the troops was automatically lengthened. When Beria became People's Commissar, the order did not change. Beria was also a candidate member of the Politburo. And again, correspondence on these issues, even reports on combat readiness, etc., were presented first of all to Stalin and Molotov, and only secondarily reached Voroshilov. After all, only Stalin, and later Khrushchev, Brezhnev, personally made the decision whether to send out the information that came to them from the state security agencies "round" among other members of the Politburo. In addition, in the list of reports that were sent to the NKVD "upstairs", the issues of the combat readiness of the Red Army did not stand as a priority. After the failures in the winter war with Finland, the country's leadership was looking for the most rational options for supporting the activities of the People's Commissariat of Defense with the necessary operational information.

But I think it's something else. A half-hearted decision was made - in fact, on the dual subordination of military counterintelligence agencies. Firstly, they reported directly to the People's Commissar of Defense, bypassing the General Staff, that is, it was a channel of information about the real state of affairs, including in the People's Commissariat and the General Staff. Secondly, there was the so-called interdepartmental council, which regulated the interaction of military counterintelligence with other security agencies - with the territorial and central apparatus. The military counterintelligence itself could not work independently. Why? She did not have her own pre-trial

detention centers and operational and technical support. For successful work, she had to borrow units of outdoor surveillance, operational and auditory control. She had a very, very limited base. At the same time, the allocation of military counterintelligence revealed the need for additional instructions, regulations on the procedure for interaction of all operational services of state security agencies. Unfortunately, it was not possible to do this before the war. Organizational changes in the structure of the state security agencies, if they are not previously worked out in terms of the operational interaction of individual services, adversely affect the effectiveness of the work of intelligence and counterintelligence. However, the separation of military counterintelligence from the NKVD-NKGB on the eve of the war was short-lived - from February 1941 to July 1941. But even this time was enough to make it clear that this kind of reorganization had a detrimental effect on the performance of the military counterintelligence function and

interaction with foreign policy and military intelligence. As a leading official, I don't remember that the military counterintelligence, being subordinate to the People's Commissar for Defense Tymoshenko, put any fundamental questions before him, with the exception of questions of personnel verification. Meanwhile, the data received by the country's leadership about what was happening in the districts, about changes in the staffing of the Red Army, its replenishment,

about the deployment of the reorganization of mechanized corps, the construction of airfields, and the storage of ammunition, needed a thorough intelligence check. TO

additional

armies,

unfortunately, this was done only sporadically. And the country's leadership - Stalin, Molotov, and the People's Commissar of Defense himself - had no real information about the combat readiness of the troops of the border districts.

Perhaps the most tragic chapter in this part of history is connected with the special departments of the Red Army. Looking back, one can make huge claims to military counterintelligence. Until now, the role of military counterintelligence materials in carrying out those repressions that were later recognized as unfounded and criminal in relation to the leadership of the army immediately before the war and at its very beginning remains a blank spot. However, it must be said that those materials that dealt with the combat readiness of the Air Force, about aircraft accidents, are used only when imposing penalties on the leadership of the Air Force, not only for the removal of officials, but for accusations of a political nature, accusations of sabotage in the Red Air Force Army. To what extent these materials were connected with the rivalry among the commanders of the Red Army, it is difficult to say, since a lot of time has passed. However, they were a formal reason for the arrest and execution of the Air Force and Air Defense Command of Smushkevich, Stern, Rychagov and others, for the arrest and reprisal of senior officials of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army.

New time - new challenges

What was the background against which, in the spring of 1939, the activity of Soviet intelligence was sharply intensified? Thanks to the closed nature of society, all attempts of intelligence work against us by Germany, England, Poland, using national cadres - Poles, Germans and other foreigners and members of their families - were under the unremitting supervision of Soviet security agencies. Why did I want to highlight - and rightly - 1939, an important year on the eve of the war and an important year of perestroika in the work of the security agencies. It was in this year that the country entered into a clear

pre-war period and new active tasks were set for the first time before the intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. From a conversation that took place

in Stalin's office in the spring of 1939, during which there was talk of the need to deploy Operation Duck to eliminate Trotsky, Stalin spoke of a change in the priorities of work in general. What were the reasons for these changes? Here it makes sense to recall the myth that the appointment of Molotov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs meant an alleged "coup" in the foreign policy orientation of the Soviet leadership, which meant a transition from an attempt to counteract German aggression to collusion with Hitler. In particular, I. Ehrenburg and other publicists during the so-called perestroika in 1988-1991 wrote groundlessly that Litvinov consistently opposed this line and was a supporter of maintaining cooperation with the leading Western powers, which supposedly should be our partners in ensuring security in Europe. But everything was a little different. In January 1939, when our residency actually stopped working in Germany, signals were received from there that the German leadership had influential supporters of the development of normal relations with the USSR, that, despite deep ideological differences and differences, Soviet-German cooperation was possible. By the way, such statements, for example, by the influential industrialist Shakht, were known in the Kremlin and to Litvinov as early as 1935. It seems to me that the situation at that time assumed mutual maneuvering of all the major powers of the world, as well as mutual probing of positions in the upcoming battle for the redivision of the world. There is a lot of confusion in assessing the probing conversations, the approaches of politicians and prominent diplomats to each other, and the conversations

of that time. In this regard, the New Year's reception of 1939 in Berlin is recalled. Then Hitler showed certain signs of attention to the Soviet side. Speaking with our ambassador Merikalov, he made it clear that the German side was by no means blocking any economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, it was ready to discuss even political issues of relations between countries and the future of Europe.

Then, already in the spring of 1939, authoritative German figures spoke out with a rather frank probing of the possibilities for resolving differences between the USSR and Germany. Some historians believe that the role of officials of the German Foreign Ministry, in particular the head of the economic department, Schnurre, played a great role in this. But at the same time, they underestimate the role of the former German Chancellor von Papen, appointed by Hitler as ambassador to Turkey. It was he who first came up with a program for the settlement of Soviet-German relations in April-May 1939, and this was the subject of relevant reports to the top, including this gave rise to a special request to the NKVD about the role von Papen plays in shaping German policy and expressing the thoughts of the ruling circles in Germany. Von Papen came up with a broad program of German-Soviet cooperation built on the basis of long-term interests. They were based, in his opinion,

on opposition to the Anglo-French diktat in Europe. In itself, this information, which came from Germany and Turkey, deserved the closest attention.

Von Papen was undoubtedly acting on behalf of Hitler. It was not by chance that the Germans chose Turkey as a place for probing conversations. Until 1938, the Turkish leaders took upon themselves the fulfillment of a number of delicate instructions from the Soviet leadership to clarify the intentions of the leaders of the Western countries regarding the Soviet Union, which were important for the Kremlin. Through Turkey, we carried out a number of important foreign trade operations in the West, in which it was undesirable for us to be "exposed" directly. The Germans, having a strong position in Turkey, undoubtedly knew about this. And although our relations with Turkey began to deteriorate since 1938, the Germans preferred to take the first probing steps towards establishing a trusting exchange in this country through their authoritative representative.

opinions.

It is impossible to imagine the situation in such a way that since the spring of 1939 the Soviet government was guided by an agreement with Hitler against England and France in the situation that was developing in Europe. The situation was completely different. Our diplomacy and intelligence in deep secrecy acted on two fronts. Now, against the backdrop of the spread of all sorts of versions about Stalin's policy

on the eve of the war, the main thing is overlooked. For the USSR, participation in the military conflict that broke out in Europe in 1939 was unacceptable. And not because we were afraid of Hitler or the Anglo-French. A military clash would have been exceptionally dangerous for us if the West had acted unitedly against the USSR.

As the head of the unit, not only during the war years, who led reconnaissance and sabotage work, but even after the war, headed the apparatus, which was specially created for operations in a special period, I can say with all responsibility that the Soviet leadership has always set itself the goal of preventing drawing the country into a major military conflict with the leading capitalist countries. At the same time, the main problem was not to cross the dangerous line of a "big war", when local conflicts and our operations to destabilize the situation in a number of areas important for the capitalist world could develop into large-scale military operations. Such a danger existed during operations in Western Ukraine, Poland, Finland and Moldova in 1939-1940, in Iran in 1946, in Korea and Manchuria in 1950-1953.

Since the 1930s, Soviet military and political intelligence, supporting anti-English, anti-Japanese and anti-German forces in the Balkans and the Far East, solved the important task of diverting attention from the Soviet Union, which forced the ruling circles of the West to get involved in protracted local conflicts. This did not allow England, the USA, Japan to throw all their resources and reserves against us. Stalin was never a theoretician and organizer of the world revolution. On the contrary, our support for the revolutionary movement in the capitalist and colonial countries was entirely based on geopolitical considerations of strengthening the positions of the Soviet Union as the leading world power. In other words, Soviet diplomacy and intelligence in the 1930s and 1940s had to successfully solve an exceptionally difficult task - to use for the good of the country the fear of the ruling circles of the West of a military danger in Europe and the Far East due to the aggressive policy of Hitler and Japan.

<i>Unreached goals</i>

Few people know about the attempt by Stalin and Molotov to create three "buffer zones" of relations with the capitalist world. Soviet intelligence and diplomacy acted in three areas of secret negotiations on the division of spheres of influence and countering the aggression of Germany and Japan - in Central Europe, Scandinavia and China. In Finland,

we actively supported the political parties, in particular the petty proprietors, who advocated that Finland and Sweden become intermediaries between the countries of the West and the Soviet Union in opening a permanent corridor for the supply of Soviet raw materials to Europe. Our ambassador to Sweden, A. Kollontai, has repeatedly spoken out in confidential conversations about the need to establish special relations between the USSR and Scandinavia. In exchange for guaranteed benevolent neutrality, our country was ready to provide serious economic benefits for Sweden and Finland, including even the right to re-export timber and oil products from the USSR to third countries. In addition to the channels of

the Foreign Department of the NKVD, which had strong intelligence positions in Scandinavia, there was no other way to enter into unofficial and informal negotiations with the Finnish leadership. It is significant that the resident in Finland, B. Yartsev Rybkin (Kin), conducted secret negotiations with the Finnish leadership in secret from the Soviet ambassador to Finland, Derevyanko, who, after their unsuccessful completion, about probing out to the Finns, together with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov, was put in fame.

Another direction is Czechoslovakia. The first coordinator of the activities of the Soviet special services, M. Rosenberg, using his trusting relationship with the largest and most authoritative publicist in Western Europe, Genevieve Tabui, achieved a major turning point in Soviet-French relations - the signing in 1935 in Paris of the Soviet-French agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance. However, the general public is still not aware that the driving force behind this agreement was the President of Czechoslovakia, E. Beneš. It was Czechoslovakia that initiated the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations.

We found special approaches and fruitfully cooperated with President Benes. Now many people write and there are a lot of illusions and myths that Benes succumbed to the German trick of a conspiracy in the Red Army against Stalin, warned the Kremlin about the "betrayal" of Tukhachevsky and allegedly entered into contacts with Yezhov for this. It is overlooked that it made no sense for Mr. Beneš to enter into secret negotiations with Stalin in 1937, because back in 1935 an unprecedented secret agreement was signed on cooperation between the intelligence services of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union on the joint implementation of a number of foreign policy actions and the exchange of information in connection with the increase military danger in Europe.

Specifically, this cooperation led to the fact that we were able to use Czech channels for the supply of weapons to Republican Spain, through the Czechoslovak representative, Rosenberg agreed that the Czechs would raise the question of our entry into the League of Nations. The Soviet-French agreement with P. Laval was signed in opposition to Germany, the strengthening of Hitler's influence. Beneš's plans included, relying on the Soviet-French agreement, to strengthen the position of the Balkan countries in opposition to Hitler. Our

intelligence carried out special events to test the loyalty of Beneš. Beneš's inner circle, recruited by the NKVD, Lyudmila Kasparikova and Jaromir Smutny, had an escape from Czechoslovakia arranged. Money was allocated for this, while we took from Prague to Moscow a significant part of the Czechoslovak archive and special correspondence, including about Beneš's special relationship with the leaders of the West.

After the Germans occupied Czechoslovakia, Beneš fled initially to America, then to England. The Soviet ambassador to the United States, Umansky, on instructions from Moscow, received Benes and had confidential conversations with him. Because, in the conditions of the temporary curtailment of our intelligence work in Washington in 1939, on the instructions of Moscow, he assumed the performance of a number of functions of the chief resident of the NKVD in America. He was appointed to the post of ambassador after successful work as a correspondent for TASS and in the press department of the NKID. I knew Umansky well personally. He could often be seen in 1941-1942 in the corridor of the 7th floor of the NKVD building on Lubyanka, where the Intelligence

management, and in the reception room of Beria and Merkulov. He was a very capable, erudite man, whose importance was well understood by the American government, some of whose representatives allowed themselves to have informal conversations with him. Curiously, when US Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau received it, he removed the stenographers and translators, and the discussion of delicate issues of joint American-Soviet opposition to Japanese aggression in China in 1939-1941 went one on one.

Umansky not only talked with Beneš in the United States, but also reported on this to two authorities at once - to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the NKVD. What questions did they discuss? First of all, it was about the future of Europe. Benes expressed gratitude for our position, because we did not recognize the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Germans. Benes asked informally to confirm whether the Czechoslovak correspondence and archive had been received by the Soviet side. He also raised questions about the future role of Czechoslovakia in the impending war, spoke about the Czechoslovak army, which would participate in the war, that it would be formed in England. Notice that all this was said before the war even started, before the Germans delivered their ultimatum to Poland. Beneš also spoke of the need to preserve the "foreign legion of the Czechoslovak army", which would be in Poland or in the USSR. The war has not yet begun, and it is already clear to him that the future war will necessarily be between Germany and the Soviet Union. As allies, he believed, the United States and England would act. He also talked about the Eastern Front, about the fact that two or three Czechoslovak divisions would be deployed there. The famous Ludwig Svoboda, then an unknown lieutenant colonel, was sent to Poland with the Czechoslovak Legion, where he was interned by the Poles. The Legion held out just in case. When the Soviet troops occupied Poland, the Czechoslovak legion was interned, and the only thing we did was disarm it. Nobody was subjected to any repressions.

The head of the counterintelligence department of the NKVD, M. Maklyarsky, worked directly with Svoboda. Svoboda was settled in the dacha of the NKVD and kept in a special reserve. They kept him not because there was any special attention to him, but because he

was a Benes man, and the people of Benes were treated at the direction of Stalin with very great attention and tact.

Then fruitful cooperation, an active exchange of intelligence information was carried out by us with a colonel, later a general, Moravec, the head of Czech intelligence. But not as with a recruited agent, but as with a person who fully carried out the orders and instructions of Beneš.

Until now, the history of secret Soviet-Czech relations continues to be hidden, although there is nothing secret in this, if you look at things soberly, after the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of socialism in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps the opening of the archives is only unprofitable for those who idealize and extol Beneš, Masaryk and other leaders of liberal-democratic Czechoslovakia. The revelation of their secret connections with the Soviet leadership in the pursuit of the goals of Soviet foreign policy confirms the obvious truth. The small countries of Europe necessarily fall into someone's sphere of influence and actively seek to use their position as an intermediary in big political games, but only to their advantage, regardless of ideological sympathies.

Among the Soviet diplomats of the pre-war period, K. Umansky, our ambassador to the United States, was a relatively young promoter. Previously, important probing assignments were carried out by diplomats of the first generation - J. Surits, B. Stein, I. Maisky. There were relatively few representations of the USSR abroad, and the significance of the Soviet ambassador abroad, his powers were immeasurably wider than those given to our high-ranking diplomats during the war, not to mention the post-war period. In key areas, where it was necessary to conduct soundings, not professional diplomats were placed, but representatives of the NKVD intelligence or persons closely associated with it, such as Umansky in the USA, Red Army Commander Luganets-Orelsky and who replaced him in 1939 resident ambassador of the NKVD A. Panyushkin in China. Where it was about a temporary freeze of relations, and not

about working out some issues, people were sent who had no diplomatic experience. Take, for example, the situation with the leadership of our embassy in Germany in 1939, when

Merikalov, a simple factory director, found himself in the role of ambassador to Germany. The fate of Merikalov is unique. He ended his life as a plant manager without publishing his memoirs of the most interesting period of 1939.

What was the connection between diplomacy and intelligence? Their interaction is characterized, in my opinion, by two stages. Until 1939, one can speak of a special period of Soviet foreign policy and intelligence activities, largely due to the foreign policy isolation of the Soviet Union. This was not only a consequence of the policy of the Western powers. England, France, Germany, the USA, Italy, and Japan blockaded the Soviet Union, seeking to deprive us of the possibility of using international economic relations to create industry using the proceeds from the sale of raw materials on the world market. But the isolation of us from the world was also due to our conscious policy of maintaining the closed nature of Soviet society. It is important to understand the new course proclaimed by Lenin in

Genoa to refuse to pay the royal debts from the point of view of a voluntary refusal of foreign economic cooperation on our part with the powerful economic groups of the West hostile to the USSR. In the 1920s and 1930s, the leadership of the Soviet Union feared that broad economic ties with the capitalist world, combined with the presence in the USSR of a strong anti-socialist opposition, the remnants of the white movement, and the intensification of the struggle for power in the upper echelons of the party, posed a huge potential threat to the Soviet state. . Intelligence and diplomacy focused only on "local" breakthroughs in ensuring the economic ties of the USSR not with all Western countries, but with those states that were actively in conflict with the main powers of the capitalist world or played in it a subordinate role of states that had recently lost the war. We developed good economic relations with Germany and Turkey. First of all, intelligence was aimed at exploiting the split among the powers of the West and the contradictions that existed between them. In conditions of

external political isolation, we also counted on active diplomatic activity, persistently sought recognition from the leading countries of the West. important in this

communications were attached to the work of intelligence and the conditions for preliminary diplomatic diplomats By clarification of the USSR cooperating recognition with it. This period ended by the beginning of 1939. The threat of war put the Soviet Union in an exceptional position.

Hence the essence of our position - support for Afghanistan, Turkey, our participation in the civil war in Spain, etc. We probed and loosened the weak links in the capitalist system. But they never allowed themselves to get directly involved in a military conflict that would go beyond the local. The leadership of the country solved, first of all, internal problems of an economic and political nature.

Molotov, Vyshinsky, Potemkin, on the one hand, Beria, Merkulov, on the other, became directly at the helm of diplomacy and intelligence when the Soviet Union, having signed the well-known non-aggression pact with Germany and secret protocols to it, turned into the largest world power, whose actions since 1939 in the international arena predetermined the outcome of the Second World War and the entire character of world development in the 1940s and 1950s. The two stages of Soviet policy abroad and the people who served these stages should be soberly assessed.

Chapter

2. EMIGRATION IN THE SERVICE OF THE SOVIETS

Operation Corridor

A lot has been written about the Russian emigration, about the most complicated relations with it of our political and military intelligence. In particular, Soviet writers Nikulin and Ardamatsky devoted their works to this. Operations of the Cheka "Trust" and "Syndicate" are the most famous. Thanks to them, many people know about the fight against white emigration, about the introduction of our Chekists into it in order to paralyze its activities directed against the Soviet state.

However, the same cannot be said for all emigration. Part of it, having breathed enough of the foreign air of Europe, and, perhaps, out of nostalgic feelings, turned to face us. With the help of these people, we began to acquire valuable sources of information, which made it possible to ensure the security of the state in preventing terror from the remnants of the white underground.

In the late 1920s, and especially in the early 1930s, established links with emigration became an indispensable channel for us, facilitating penetration into the most important civil, governmental and state structures of the leading capitalist countries in order to study our main opponents.

Under Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, Operation Corridor was launched, which was supervised by assistants to the head of the Foreign Department of the OGPU Valery Gorozhanin and Max Steinberg. Vladimir Mayakovsky dedicated his famous poem "To Dzerzhinsky's Soldiers" to the city dweller. Later, the head of the INO department, the hero of the Syndicate operation, A. Fedorov, and M. Steinberg, who soon replaced him, supervised the work on relations with emigration. We actively took our trusted people abroad. Indeed, until collectivization, the procedure for leaving the country was very simple. International passport

could be obtained from the county police. At that time, keeping records of trips abroad of our citizens in connection with the stay of their relatives became essential for the operational work of the state security agencies. And when, at the direction of Menzhinsky, measures were taken to intensify work with emigration, we first of all turned to these data.

In emigration, a significant political role was played by former employees of the diplomatic departments of the Russian Empire. There was such a situation that after the liquidation of the Russian embassies, their former employees were used as consultants to the foreign ministries of France, England, the USA, and Germany in developing policy towards the Soviet Union. This was the so-called second line of our work on the recruitment of prominent emigration figures. The activities of significant emigrant colonies, as well as their

leaders, were taken under our control. Among them was V. Shtrandman, who before the revolution headed the Russian embassy in Yugoslavia. In April 1918, the Kolchak government appointed Strandman as envoy to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in Yugoslavia. In the 1920s and 1930s, he worked in Belgrade to help Russian refugees. He was elected a delegate to the Nansen Committee, named after the famous navigator. In 1934, Strandman became a commissioner of the Russian Red Cross in Yugoslavia.

In his entourage, we managed to create strong positions, which made it possible in 1938 to establish very important contacts with the military circles of

Yugoslavia. Another prominent emigration figure who was under our control was Evgeny Vasilievich Sablin. This man, living in London, had great connections among the English. He was a diplomat, secretary of the Russian mission in Tehran. In 1915 he was appointed first secretary of the Russian embassy in London. After the February and October revolutions, he remained the second person in the Russian Embassy in London. Sablin died in the English capital after the Second World War. He was a member of the British Foreign Office - the British Foreign Office. Been there for a long time

freelance consultant on Russian politics and Russian issues. Thanks to the activities

of foreign agents Dyakonov and Tretyakov, we picked up the keys to two more Russian emigrants - Milyukov and Maklakov. Miliukov is a well-known figure. This is a major political figure, whose authority in emigration circles was very high. Even Soviet diplomats met with him after the end of the war. Maklakov is a major statesman of pre-revolutionary Russia. In October 1917 he was the ambassador of the Provisional Government. We managed to completely control all his mail, in which the Kremlin showed a completely legitimate interest. For Maklakov's correspondence with Sablin and Shtrandman gave assessments of major events of that time. Moreover, the comments were not only based on materials from the open press, but also on the most important sources of the French and British foreign ministries. After the recognition of the USSR by France in 1924, Maklakov headed an emigre committee that united various Russian and foreign organizations. He also directed the central office for Russian refugees in Paris, which was recognized by the French authorities and the League of Nations. All his activities could not remain out of our field of vision.

But work on emigration is not only about studying the situation and analyzing the situation. Working with emigrants, establishing relationships with them, forming approaches and positions, we always remembered that this is an extremely delicate matter. Using the craving of Russians living abroad for communication, we received political and economic information, which not only helped in assessing a particular political situation, but also made it possible to influence the development of events through these people. Here it should be

recognized that the political struggle in our country was largely inspired by an artificial exaggeration of the role of emigration in creating internal opposition. Related to this are the political processes in relation to the Industrial Party, the Labor Peasant Party (TKP), the process of the Allied Bureau of the Mensheviks, which were initiated by the Soviet foreign intelligence. Our agents often exaggerated the scale of ties between the Russian military and political emigration with foreign

government officials and intelligence agencies. There was another aspect as well. The incoming intelligence information from the secret services of Germany, France and England uncritically stated the assertions of monarchists, industrialists from among the Russian emigration that they have many supporters in Soviet Russia, especially in the circles of the scientific and technical intelligentsia and among military specialists.

There is one unfortunate event connected with this. Our prominent foreign agent Tretyakov was shocked to learn that his correspondence with professors Kondratiev and Ramzin, who were involved in the Industrial Party case, on charges of "organizing a counter-revolutionary conspiracy," was presented as evidence in open court. Tretyakov's name flashed in official Soviet publications. Thus, it was deciphered. He was shown a corresponding interest on the part of the German and French intelligence services. Tretyakov was forced to turn to our resident in Paris and express legitimate indignation about this.

However, it must be admitted that the reports of the OGPU and the NKVD from behind the cordon did not reflect the presence of an organized opposition in the Soviet Union, but rather a fairly widespread anti-Soviet sentiment, mainly among the intelligentsia and specialists. Yes, these hostile moods took place, there was an oppositional attitude towards the Soviet government and the rejection of five-year plans, industrialization, but all this was presented to the leadership as the existence of an organized counter-revolutionary underground. Thus, the investigating authorities, relying on instructions coming from above in connection with information that came from abroad, drew certain conclusions. All this initiated the first wave of repressions against the scientific and technical intelligentsia in the early 1930s. Such a moment is curious.

The undercover work of the British and French intelligence services against the USSR until 1938 also concentrated on the use of Russian emigration. The British even appointed the Russian emigrant V. Bogomolets as a regional resident in the Balkans and Romania for operations against the Soviet Union. And only in 1939, after mass arrests and purges in the USSR, the leadership of the British, French and German special services,

especially after the kidnapping and removal by us of the head of the "Russian All-Military Union" Miller, it was realized that the Russian emigration was stuffed and decomposed by agents of the OGPU-NKVD. The aggravation of the struggle between emigrant groups, largely provoked by our penetration, caused the enemy's special services to distrust the Russian emigration, restraint in using their personnel. For this reason, in a future war, she could not play an important political role, which was initially expected in the leading circles of Germany, England, France, the USA and Japan. And at the same time, the British, French, not to mention the Germans and Japanese, had no other personnel to organize intelligence work in the Soviet Union, except for emigrants and their relatives, given the anti-Soviet sentiments of many of them, as well as knowledge of the language and the real situation in the country.

How controversy was fueled

After the abduction of Miller and Kutepov, the Germans, of course, realized that the "Russian Combined Arms Union" was controlled by us. Later, German directives came to us, from which it was clear that Germany was very cautious in its approach to cooperation with both Russian and Ukrainian emigration. I must say that we did a lot of work to split the OUN underground. We knew that in Hitler's aggressive plans, the OUN organization came out on top to create a German protectorate in Ukraine. We sent a Ukrainian agent to this organization. The goal was set before him - inciting contradictions in the two clans that had developed in the OUN. One of them was headed by Melnik, the other by Bandera. Until August 1939, the organization of Ukrainian nationalists was headed by the former manager of the estate of Metropolitan Sheptytsky, Colonel Andriy Melnyk. Melnyk claimed to be the leader of the Ukrainian nationalists. Another leader of the OUN Bandera was released by the Germans from a Polish prison, where he was serving a term for organizing the assassination of Polish Interior Minister Peratsky.

Our actions were aimed at causing a sharp conflict between them. Melnik arrived for negotiations in Krakow. Bandera offered him one of the leading positions in the main branch of the OUN, which he intended to head himself. But they did not come to an agreement, since this did not suit Melnik. Bandera gathered around him a group of well-known nationalists who staffed the Nakhtingal battalion, which subsequently carried out punitive operations in Ukraine. Over time, Bandera accused Melnyk of not using the favorable environment to create an independent Ukraine at the time of the fall of Poland, and also contributed to the contamination of the OUN by Polish police agents. So, Yaroslav Baranovsky, who constantly accompanied Colonel Konovalets, for being late on one of his trips (using which I liquidated Konovalets), was declared an agent of the Polish secret police and shot by Bandera themselves. In fact, it was Bandera who created the split in the OUN. He was, according to

Melnik, primarily "a saboteur with manic tendencies." The Melnikovites even spread rumors that he was an agent of Soviet intelligence. In this they suspected a member of the Bandera wire, lawyer Gorbovoy, and "surrendered" him to the Germans. After the war, he was recruited by us and played a big role in the destruction of the Bandera underground in Lvov. There were different trends in emigration. She did not represent a single fist opposing the

Soviet regime, which we actively used. There was a confrontation between the Ukrainian, Russian and Caucasian emigration. For example, for Russian emigrants, the number one irritant was the activity of Ukrainians to create an "independent state". This mood was contained in emigrant correspondence, which was intercepted by the NKVD. We learned that Ukrainian nationalists, with the support of the Germans, in the event of the defeat of the USSR, want to recreate an independent Ukrainian state, in which they were not supported by the White emigre wing of the anti-Soviet emigration in the West. The same applies to the Caucasian emigration. "Independent Georgia", created by the Georgian Mensheviks and hiding as an emigre

government in Paris, also caused great concern in the white emigre wing of the Russian

monarchist emigration, which did not feel any sympathy for the division of Russia and considered this activity anti-Russian, anti-state. Our agents tried to use this mood. The confrontation between the emigrant groups was very strongly felt

by our enemy. He was disoriented in the directions of their activities, carefully concealed his contacts with them and constantly got into trouble; British and French intelligence officers were not very clear about the peculiarities of our relations with the Baltic states and Ukraine. And only after the war, when the question arose of fighting the USSR on a completely different basis, did the Americans decide to create an anti-Bolshevik bloc of peoples headed by the last prime minister of the Provisional Government, Kerensky, who then settled in the United States. But nothing came of this venture. The submission to the great-power Russian nationalists was opposed first by the Ukrainians, and then by other emigrant nationalist organizations.

Around Czechoslovakia

Along with materials from London, from Cairncross, through the channels of the Russian emigration, were received from Stradnman and Sablin, confirming data on the immediate plans of the Western powers to resolve the Czechoslovak crisis, on their betrayal of Beneš, and on France's refusal of the guarantees given to Czechoslovakia in 1934.

In connection with the events in Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1938, we were informed through emigration that the Western Powers intended to firmly pursue a line towards an agreement with Hitler. The message was received three weeks before the signing of the famous Munich Agreement. The same information made us aware of another important circumstance that prompted Stalin in 1938 to take active steps in Czechoslovakia - support for Beneš's action to overthrow the government of Yugoslavia, which was then headed by Milan Stojadinovic. The crux of the matter was

next. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, with the support of France, signed an agreement on the creation of the so-called Little Entente, the purpose of which was to protect the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. When the situation began to escalate in 1937 and the so-called problem of the Sudeten Germans arose, we received information that the government of Milan Stojadinovic was not going to fulfill its obligations to Czechoslovakia. The front of support for Czechoslovakia from the south was exposed, and there was no need to rely on strong rears. Benes tried to convince the Yugoslavs and decided to resort to our help. We succumbed to the tricks of the paramilitary Association "Unification or Death" and the Serbian extremist group "Black Hand", their ability to overthrow Stojadinovic turned out to be small. However, the fact that the Czech and Yugoslav circles, interacting with each other, resorting to the tacit support of the USSR was very useful for us. It must be said that a secret agreement between the USSR and Czechoslovakia was concluded as early as 1935, and with the Yugoslavs in 1940, when a secret communication channel between the Kremlin and Belgrade was created in Moscow.

In January 1940, through emigration, we received a memorandum from General Denikin on the Russian question, presented to French Prime Minister Deladier, which contained an assessment of the "international policy of Bolshevism." Emigration and Denikin in January 1940 were the first to assess the realities of Soviet foreign policy, pointing out that "great-power, geopolitical considerations of protecting global Russian interests dominate the principles of Bolshevik internationalism and support for the world revolutionary movement."

For us, this information was very important. From it, we not only learned the enemy's train of thought, but also saw (although I perceived it quite naturally) that Denikin's note clearly formulated the general directives of Stalin and Molotov on foreign policy issues, in particular that the world communist movement must first of all act in the direction of supporting the USSR, and not class confrontation in the capitalist world. But the most important was the circumstance that the world communist movement, the activity of the communist parties

Europe, reliance on our foreign friends and sources - all this was subordinated to the main goal of Soviet foreign policy - the establishment of the USSR as a leading power in the international arena. Thus, ideological considerations in the practical activities of the Comintern from the second half of the 1930s were relegated to the background. We considered the communist parties abroad as our military reserve in the future military confrontation. Working with emigration allowed us to reach the most

valuable sources of information that tacitly shared our ideology and views. These people made a huge contribution to our victory in the war against fascism. They became over time, as they say now, agents of influence. We didn't use that term then. We considered them sincere friends and the backbone of the Soviet Union. The question involuntarily arises: why did the emigrants cooperate with our

intelligence? By this time, Soviet Russia was already playing a different role in world politics. This was especially felt after the entry of our state into the League of Nations, its transformation into a great power. It was these events that prompted the leaders of the emigration to official and covert contacts with Soviet representatives. We must not forget that emigration was heterogeneous. Among it were monarchists, Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, nationalists. One important circumstance, a well-known paradox, should be singled out here. Stalin personally knew prominent figures in the emigration, especially the Georgian Mensheviks. The French, British intelligence and counterintelligence services also paid increased attention to the Georgian emigration, believing that through it one could reach the Georgian entourage of Stalin or Beria. Such an interest in the Georgian emigration on our part and Western intelligence agencies led not only to active confrontation over a long period, but also determined the importance of the Caucasus and especially Baku oil in the military and foreign policy activities of the Soviet Union, England and France in the 30-40s. th years.

We also succeeded in establishing close ties with the emigration settled in the Far East. This work was initially led by J. Minsker, then S. Shpigelglaz, and after I. Chichaev and the head

eastern branch of INO M. Yarikov. Current intelligence historians are not particularly open about their role, with the exception of Chichaev. But in vain! The reason is simple. Shpigelglaz, and then Yarikov, were repressed on slanderous charges. Not only Beria and Kobulov had a hand in this, but, unfortunately, their colleagues, colleagues, who later occupied important posts in the intelligence apparatus, had a hand in this. For example, V. Pudín, a veteran of the Cheka, a participant in the operation against Savinkov, actively denounced Yarikov and Shpigelglaz for espionage, while at the same time being their subordinate in a number of operations in the Far East. And later Pudín prevented the rehabilitation of Yarikov and Shpigelglaz by the military justice authorities.

Military intelligence and emigrants

The state of work on emigration largely predetermined the nature of the interaction of Soviet intelligence agencies abroad. In particular, military intelligence also kept in touch with emigration. But at the same time, she could not solve many issues without the data of operational records of the NKVD. It was for this reason that initially in the USA, Germany, France, and China, joint residencies of the INO-OGPU and the Intelligence Department of the Red Army were created in the 1920s and 1930s. A new stage

began after the failures of the Intelligence Agency, when the intelligence department of the Red Army was “strengthened” by A. Artuzov, who knew the emigration perfectly, who brought with him and appointed Steinbrueck and Karin, prominent employees of the Foreign Department of the NKVD and having vast experience in undercover work. Military intelligence began to evaluate people more carefully when using emigrants of Russian origin, taking into account their connection with foreign special services and counter-revolutionary organizations.

This stage of work with emigration led us to realize the need to check not only emigrant agents of the first wave. We began to attach importance to the family ties of emigrants with

major government officials in the administrations of England, France, the United States and, to a greater extent, Germany.

Since the mid-1930s, a new psychological climate has developed among emigrants in relation to our country. This happened under the influence of events related to the war in Spain, with the invasion of the Japanese army into China. The global crisis of 1929-1933, as well as the unprecedented growth of the prestige of our country, information about scientific discoveries, technological achievements, and labor enthusiasm also affected. Many people began to look at the new Russia with different eyes thanks to the trips to us of prominent foreign figures - Bernard Shaw, Herbert

Wales. The emigrants were motivated to cooperate with us by the West's recognition of the Soviet state as the most important factor in world politics, its role in Germany's revision of the Versailles agreements.

It was on an ideological basis, on sympathy for communism, that the famous "Cambridge Five", a group of prominent figures in the scientific and technical intelligentsia of the USA, England, France, etc., began secret cooperation with Soviet intelligence. Involving them in intelligence work on an ideological basis, we tried not to at the forefront of ideology in contacts with them. Although all information sources, attracted on an ideological basis, were certainly considered the most reliable. The emigration's cooperation with

the Western secret services created a backdrop for the information that came both through military intelligence and through the NKVD to the Kremlin. And this information already on the eve of the war, before the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact in 1937-1938, at the height of the war in Spain and the discussion by the great powers of the tragic fate of Czechoslovakia, raised the question of establishing contacts with Germany and a possible Soviet-German agreement.

Emigration, as a sensitive layer, on leading questions of employees of the German, British and French secret services felt that it was increasingly turning into a bargaining chip in relations between the West and the Soviet Union. But she was already drawn into this life and, as they say, got a taste. Probing the

positions of the major European powers on the eve of the war was reflected in the mood of the Russian emigration, inevitably

involved her in the labyrinths of intelligence operations and secret diplomacy in Europe and the Far East.

Anti-Semitism or struggle for power?

In the work of Soviet intelligence on emigration in the 1930s, a new direction emerged - the struggle against Trotskyism. Here it was necessary to rely primarily on the Comintern's reserves, especially at the initial stage. We did not set the task of liquidating Trotsky before our émigré agents, but used them primarily to organize external surveillance of the Trotskyites. It was important for us to infiltrate the Trotskyist émigré organizations that were looking for ways to establish ties with their like-minded people in the Soviet Union. To do this, secret agent cells of the apparatus of the Communist Parties, which had spun off from the Comintern, were effectively used. A classic example is the use of the Lithuanian group of brothers Dmitry and Alexei Sezemanov, Y. Aidulis and others. This group separated from the Lithuanian Komsomol and was redirected to infiltrate the headquarters of the Trotskyist organization in Paris.

It should be noted that the Trotskyist groups in the West for the most part consisted of persons of Jewish origin. Therefore, we needed agents that would have connections with their relatives, acquaintances, and so on. We had to use the outlets to the Jewish petty-bourgeois and social democratic organizations, with which the persons of interest to us entered into communication. We used, in particular, special agents from the Zionist organizations in Palestine, recruited by Y. Serebryansky at the direction of Dzerzhinsky back in the late 1920s.

It was these groups that most effectively acted to decompose the Trotskyist movement and destroy its leaders. The theft of the Trotskyist archives in Paris, the liquidation of the secretary of the executive committee of the Fourth International would have been impossible without the participation of these agents.

The same can be said about the defeat of the Jewish nationalist underground on the territory of the USSR on the eve of the war. Now all this is presented from the standpoint of anti-Semitism. You can often hear that in the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky there were also anti-Semitic motives. However, this is not quite true. There was a struggle for power, there was personal rivalry, and only then anti-Semitic nuances were added to all this, if they really took place. At least in the 1930s, there could be no question of any anti-Semitic attitudes or sentiments in the work of the Soviet intelligence apparatus. Now you can often hear a naive

question: how did you manage to set Jews against Jews? This implies the assassination of Trotsky. On this occasion, I can say that in the work of intelligence, the stake has always been placed on internal split and rivalry among the enemy, which was typical for nationalist organizations. It is impossible not to take into account the fact that the Zionist organizations and Jewish groups of the social-democratic persuasion, adjoining the socialist International, waged a mortal struggle with each other. During the war years, it even went so far that the Zionist leaders, in unofficial secret conversations with Soviet representatives, in particular with M. Litvinov, K. Kuzin and intelligence officer V. Khangulov, made it clear that they did not consider the execution of the leaders of the Bund by the Soviet authorities - Jewish Social Democratic Party - G. Alter and W. Ehrlich, now rehabilitated, as the problem of "persecution of the Jews" and in no way participate in the Bund's anti-Soviet propaganda on this issue.

Chapter

3. THE SOVIET-GERMAN NON-AGGRESSION PACT

Hitler, not Stalin, was the first to reach out

There is an opinion that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was allegedly due to Stalin's gesture, which was expressed in the replacement of Litvinov by Molotov as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. There were also rumors that a relative of Stalin, Kandelaki, who worked in our trade mission in Berlin, probed questions with the Nazi leadership about the normalization of Soviet-German relations as early as 1935-1937. And on this basis, unofficial ties were maintained in the field of economic cooperation and the search for common interests in the spheres of international politics with Germany. Very often the non-aggression

pact with Germany is depicted in abstraction from its meaning. At the same time, the inevitability of settling controversial issues of the redivision of the world, conflict situations in international relations at the end of the 30s is not taken into account, and the nuances associated with moral aspects in the practice of international relations are not taken into account. But I would like to recall

what Churchill said. He wrote that in "the history of the diplomatic relations of the Western powers, carried away by Western democracy, one can easily see a list of continuous crimes, follies and misfortunes of mankind ... after the most careful search, we are unlikely to find anything like such a sudden and complete rejection of the five or six years of a policy of benign appeasement and an expression of readiness to go to a clearly inevitable war in much worse conditions, on the largest scale.

I am not going to go into the whole background of these relations, because in our literature, especially on the history of intelligence and diplomacy, all this is described in some detail. But I would like to point out the following. In the spring of 1939 (then I became one of the leaders of the foreign intelligence of the security agencies) the very period began when all the leading powers of the world turned towards determining their position (mutual agreements, conclusion of secret, open, any kind of deals) in connection with the war, the inevitability of which was a foregone conclusion.

The American, British and Soviet ruling circles, using their intelligence and diplomatic channels, were the most knowledgeable in the sphere of secret contacts, which culminated in the signing of the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR on August 23, 1939 and the beginning of the Second World War on September 1, 1939. The

Germans had strong access to the ruling circles of the USA, France, England, but did not understand the secret springs of American and British politics. This happened because, according to our intelligence data, Hitler overestimated the connections that he had in the environment of the Prime Minister of England, N. Chamberlain. The success of the Munich agreement, which decided the fate of Czechoslovakia, turned his head. He believed that the tacit consent of the British regarding the occupation and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 predetermines their non-intervention in the upcoming war, therefore, without thinking twice, he announced his claims to Poland. Thus the traditional line in British foreign policy—to appease Hitler and send him to the East—was broken. However, it is overlooked

that at that time Hitler had not yet determined the terms for unleashing the war. As follows from our intelligence materials, on March 25, 1939, he was inclined to believe that a peaceful solution to the conflict with Poland was possible, but on March 29 his cards were confused, because England, having swallowed a statement about the occupation of Czechoslovakia, unexpectedly took the initiative to provide guarantees to Poland. Immediately, those who were at the helm of European foreign policy, the question arose: what would these guarantees cost, and it was after this that the well-known round of Soviet Anglo-French consultations began.

Information available from Naslednik, a very reliable source other than the Cambridge Five, as well as materials provided by the notorious banker Victor Rothschild, who went under the pseudonym "Jack" in our operational correspondence, confirmed that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was not became a deterrent for England and France, which Hitler counted on. It was obvious that, despite the existing pro-German influence in the English ruling circles, England would not compromise on Poland, which meant that she would get involved in the war. The pact with the USSR for Hitler was a respite. As for Poland, he, relying on the real combat capabilities of the Wehrmacht, counted on its lightning defeat.

The phenomenon of the "strange war" that unfolded in the West from September 3, 1939 to May 1940, was nothing more than the successful implementation by the Germans of a plan to prevent a full-scale war on two fronts, since the German armed forces were not ready for this. This explains Hitler's line on peaceful economic relations with Russia.

Very often, Stalin is credited with the initiative to negotiate with Hitler. In fact, Hitler was the first to probe the position of the Soviet Union back in the spring of 1939, when M. Litvinov headed the Foreign Ministry. In this regard, two areas of activity of our foreign intelligence should be singled out, which are associated with the names of the head of the INO branch for Turkey and the Middle East, V. Khangulov, and the deputy head of the INO, N. Melnikov. They concentrated materials on the first probing approaches of German diplomats to Soviet officials. In the spring of 1939, we received the first signals from the French residency about

changes in Polish-French relations as traditional allies. The French ruling circles, reported our agent, recruited by Serebryansky and working in the office of the French Prime Minister Deladier, are very irritated by the zigzags and shyness in Polish foreign policy and that their foreign minister, Beck, does not enjoy serious confidence in them.

Thus, as early as the spring of 1939, we were aware that Polish-French and Polish-British relations

are in limbo. And consequently, the sounding that was launched with us about the commonwealth and guarantees of the Western powers in relation to Poland, when Hitler made open territorial claims against her, was already perceived by us with great restraint. At the same time, Poland expressed a much

greater desire to negotiate with Hitler on the settlement of the situation that had arisen. In this regard, I recall a meeting in the office of the head of INO Fitin regarding reports received from Turkey, at which Khangulov was also present. It must be said that as soon as the German embassy in Turkey was headed by von Papen, he raised a number of acute political questions before our representatives. I had to deal with this seriously, because, on the one hand, our ambassador reported on the conversations that he had with Papin, on the other, while the residency informed us of another important circumstance, Palen's main goal was to achieve in any variant of an unofficial meeting with Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Potemkin, who was then in Turkey. (The significance of these events is now underestimated.)

I must say that at that time we developed special relations with Turkey: through this country, rather delicate issues of relations between the USSR and the countries of the West were worked out. The Turkish leadership sought to play the role of an unofficial mediator between the Soviet Union, Britain and Germany in discussing contentious issues. The message from our residency that

the Germans were asking the Turks to contact the Kremlin leadership through their connections in Moscow came almost simultaneously with the information about the conversation that our ambassador to Turkey, A. Terentyev, had with von Papen. I remember

that Khangulov and Melnikov reported these materials to Fitin, and then to Merkulov. Interestingly, the recording of the conversation between the USSR Ambassador to Turkey Terentyev and Papen was recorded by an employee of the Foreign Department of the NKVD, who worked undercover at the embassy. The German leadership, through Papen, put before us very important questions. They concerned policy in the Balkans, the future of the countries of Eastern Europe, the stabilization of the situation in the Cau

The second conversation between Terentyev and Papen took place at the initiative of the Soviet side. The question was discussed concerning the settlement of the conflict between Germany and Poland. At the same time, Papen was quite accommodating. But at the same time, he outlined Germany's concept of its obligatory presence in the Balkans and the need to establish new relations with the USSR. Papen repeatedly repeated that there were no insoluble contradictions between the Soviet Union and Germany that would prevent their rapprochement, that relations must be built in a completely different way, on new foundations. The ciphers even contained such statements that ideological differences should be put aside and return to the former Bismarckian times of friendly relations between Russia and Germany. I must frankly admit

that, despite these materials, it could not have occurred to me that soon, in just three months, the most important treaty on non-aggression and economic cooperation would be signed with Germany. I didn't understand then that Papen's considerations echoed the thesis that Stalin had already expressed at the 17th and 18th Party Congresses in his final reports on the delimitation of ideological contradictions and the need to maintain appropriate interstate relations. Thus, it became obvious that the Soviet leadership, giving instructions to Terentyev to further probe Papen's positions, considered him not just as an ambassador, but as a former chancellor, head of the German government. It was clear that on his own initiative Papen could not make such statements (we received confirmation of this from Berlin) and that he was sent by Hitler to Turkey as an ambassador with broad powers. His task was to turn Turkey into the most important neutral country, a powerful buffer zone through which all possible turns in Middle East politics should be probed. Now there is a lot of talk about Soviet-German secret negotiations, about secret protocols, they are trying to assert that the chance to reach an

agreement with the Western powers was lost overnight, that Stalin preferred an agreement with the Germans to relations with the British and French. This is absolutely not true. Just two weeks later, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Potemkin turns out to be

involved in secret negotiations with the British, who were also interested in the position of the Soviet government on peaceful cooperation. And finally, at about

the same time that Potemkin was talking to the British ambassador in Turkey, Molotov had a historic meeting in Moscow with the German ambassador to the USSR, Schulenburg, who raised the question of improving Soviet-German relations. Schulenburg was talking about an economic agreement, but Molotov replied that economic negotiations should be preceded by an appropriate political base and that the Soviet side was interested in receiving specific clarifications in this area. The contradictions between Germany, England and the Fraction actively drew the USSR into the most key problems of international relations. The foreign policy activity of the Soviet Union gradually acquired a crucial significance for the future of Europe and the world. In 1990, M. Gorbachev and A. Yakovlev held a broad discussion about the Soviet-German

non-aggression pact and secret protocols to it. The farce of organizing hearings on this issue at the Congress of People's Deputies is striking. In critical periods of world history, secret diplomacy and secret protocols are inevitable attributes of foreign policy. Unlike ordinary parliamentarians, both Gorbachev, and Yakovlev, and Shevardnadze, who at that time secretly negotiated with the leadership of the United States, England and Germany about loans, loans in exchange for the withdrawal of the USSR from Eastern Europe, were well aware of this. All the fuss around the secret protocols to the Soviet-German pact was started by people very experienced in matters of secret diplomacy in order to divert public attention from their own failures in foreign policy, from unilateral, unjustified strategic concessions to the Western powers. Nothing but "sincere" stupidity and professional incompetence can explain their calculations that Western countries will economically help the revival of "democracy" in the USSR in exchange for foreign policy concessions and a unilateral end to the Cold War. Behind all this, in my opinion, was a naive belief that the West would help Gorbachev to stay in power during the crisis in the Soviet Union.

"Editor", Benes and Roosevelt

In the summer of 1939, the activity of our agents in the USA became more active. K. Umansky played a big role in the new turn of Soviet policy, who, being ambassador to the United States, simultaneously served as the chief resident of Soviet intelligence there after the withdrawal of NKVD and Red Army intelligence officers in 1938. In our correspondence, he was listed as "Editor". At the direction of Moscow, Umansky established personal close ties with the President of Czechoslovakia, Benes, who is in exile in the United States. At the same time, Benes acted as an intermediary between Roosevelt and the Soviet leadership. Unfortunately, this fact has not been adequately covered in our country. And he, by the way, deserves serious attention. Meeting with Umansky, Beneš outlined Roosevelt's position on a number of key problems in the development of the situation in Europe. Umansky reported to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov and the NKVD about negotiations and meetings with Beneš. Sometimes his messages with Beria's

or Merkulov's resolutions were sent to Fitin and me. Despite the fact that Beneš ended up in exile and Czechoslovakia was occupied, he considered it his duty to regularly continue to work to maintain secret Soviet-Czechoslovak relations. Even in difficult times for himself, he was very responsible in fulfilling his obligations to us. So, in September 1938, on the very eve of his flight from Czechoslovakia, he instructed the Czech military concern, which was fulfilling an order for the manufacture of weapons for Republican Spain, to transfer 1.5 million pounds sterling received from the USSR to the account of a Soviet commercial bank in Paris. At that time, this order could no longer be fulfilled, since there was a real threat of the occupation of Czechoslovakia. These funds, on account of the Spanish gold deposited in 1936, played a big role in removing the republican asset from the blow of the Nazis at the final stage of the civil war in Spain.

At a meeting with the "Editor", Benes said that his European, including German agents, confirm the previously transmitted data about Hitler's plans without waiting for the end of September to capture the Danzig corridor, and then strike at Poland. Benes named three directions of the main attacks and the concentration of German troops, which were subsequently fully confirmed. This is a throw from East Prussia to the southwest, then to Poznan and operations in Upper Silesia. The calculation of the

Germans, according to Benes, was that for the British and French their maneuver would be unexpected, so they would not react immediately. Using their confusion and lack of agreement with the Soviet Union, the operation can be continued for two to three weeks, after which they open a "next peaceful offensive" against the Anglo-French and achieve their non-intervention, as with Spain. Further, Germany was to move to the southeast. If the calculation of Anglo-French non-intervention is not confirmed, the Germans plan to carry out an air attack on England. According to Benes, the first victims of the southeastern stage of aggression will be Greece, Albania and Croatia. Initial plans for the uprising and intervention in Dobruja (Romania) are frozen.

Benes also reported on the intense pressure of the Germans on Poland, demanding to prevent the presence of Czechoslovak formations on their territory and to give them the most prominent of the Czech military who had moved to Poland. Benes noted that in the event of the events he expected, he would give a signal for the deployment of a resistance movement in Czechoslovakia.

Another message from Umansky was addressed only to Stalin, Molotov and Beria. It raised the question raised by Benes about Soviet assistance in the formation of the Czechoslovak legion on the territory of Poland, about new forms of cooperation between Soviet and Czech intelligence services within the framework of the Moscow agreement of 1935. Umansky informed that Beneš had given instructions to Colonel Moravec, who had arrived in London and was in charge of Czech agents, to establish working relations with a representative of Soviet military intelligence in London.

All this information refutes irresponsible claims that the Soviet-German non-aggression agreement was impromptu Stalin and Molotov.

Subsequently, Colonel Moravec kept in touch with our ambassador in London, Maisky, a military attache and later a resident of the NKVD. Benes, during meetings with Maisky, discussed plans for Czechoslovakia to participate in the creation of the Eastern and Western fronts against Germany in the event of the expected outbreak of war.

It must be said that the American and British ruling circles were aware of the dual role of Beneš. For example, after Benes returned from the USA to England, Churchill directly asked him whether he had come to him as an independent political figure or as an agent of Stalin: "Is it more convenient for Stalin to talk to me not directly, but through Benes?" Practically through Beneš, an indirect but very important channel of communication with the British and American ruling circles was established. This is a completely unexplored, but reliable fact in the history of our intelligence and

diplomacy.

Thanks to Beneš, for the first time, something else became clear to us: it is futile to reach an agreement with the British and French ruling circles in the face of disagreements between them over rapprochement with the Soviet Union and a return to the idea of collective security in Europe. This situation spurred our leadership to find an effective political solution. And, of course, in the search for it, no one was preoccupied with considerations of abstract morality. For us, what must be emphasized, never meant any common interest in the world revolution. We clearly understood that the victory of the world revolution could be achieved only on the basis of strengthening the material might of the Soviet Union. And for the sake of this goal, for the sake of strengthening our country, we did not face the question of whom to use. Why is the knot around relations with Umansky becoming very important during the first stage of probing negotiations with the Germans in the early summer of 1939? The fact is that Umansky had a constant close relationship with US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, the right hand of US President Roosevelt. And one of Morgenthau's chief advisers was an assistant minister, a member

of the secret apparatus of the US Communist Party Gary Dexter White, he is also the "Cashier" in our correspondence. Under the guise of settling debt issues with the Soviet ambassador and recognizing tsarist debts, Morgenthau and White often, in an informal setting, conveyed extremely valuable foreign policy information to the Soviet side about the attitude of the US ruling circles to unleashing a war in Europe and Japanese aggression in the Far East.

The role of Roosevelt in this informal unofficial dialogue is also curious. He was extremely frank with Benes, did not hide his ambivalent position from him, that he was not going to use the leverage he had on the British and French. For example, he spoke frankly of his interest in the success of our negotiations with the British and French, while at the same time using strong language against them for their inconsistency. In other words, through Beneš and Umansky, we received clear information, in addition to that which came from England, about the unwillingness of the ruling circles of England and France to come to an agreement with us about repulsing fascist aggression. Thus, knowing about this double game of the Western countries, Soviet diplomacy had no choice but to simultaneously negotiate with the Anglo-French and German sides. We also had verified information about Poland's ambivalent, rather than anti-Soviet, position, which sought more

precisely to provoke a military clash between Germany and the Soviet Union. The warming of relations with Germany was noticeably influenced by one episode connected with the release from Spanish captivity of a group of sailors from the crew of our ship "Komsomolets", sunk by the Germans, or phalangists, and the captain of another ship - "Tsyurupa". Intelligence of the NKVD was actively involved in this. We turned to the Germans with a request to assist in the release of the sailors, which they did not refuse us.

It must be said that the improvement of our relations with Germany took place against the backdrop of a large-scale conflict between the USSR and Japan in May-August 1939. It was during a period of intense fighting, when the outcome of the battle at Khalkin Gol was not yet decided, that the Germans made a very important statement that we should not overestimate the threat of a military conflict on the borders of Mongolia escalating into

big war. And they offered their help in settling Soviet-Japanese relations. To reach a compromise on this issue, they believed, the Soviet Union needed to support China. Molotov initially kept silent about this. But the Germans made it clear that the complication of relations between Britain, the USA, France and Japan was a significant reason that did not contribute to the involvement of the USSR in the war with Japan, which was too bogged down in China. At the same time, we were confidentially informed that none other than Joachim Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, had a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Berlin and spoke in favor of normalizing relations between Germany, the USSR and Japan.

At a critical moment for us, even before the victory at Khalkhin Gol, thanks to the Germans, we learned about the most serious contradictions and disagreements between the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Oshima, and his Japanese counterpart in Moscow, Togo. Through the NKVD, the Soviet government received confirmation of this information. Our radio counterintelligence and agents controlled the correspondence between the Japanese Embassy in Moscow and the Japanese Foreign Ministry. It is symbolic that it was from this second source that Stalin and Molotov received confirmation that the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, who eventually became Japan's foreign minister, takes the position of a peaceful settlement of Soviet-Japanese relations. This was very important information, since the military events in the Far East tied the hands of the Soviet leadership in a rather difficult situation on the part of the West.

Kandelaki - trade representative and Stalin's emissary

In foreign literature, many materials were published about the secret mission of David Vladimirovich Kandelaki, the trade representative of the USSR in Berlin in 1935-1937. It has been suggested that he was instructed to probe the position of the Germans with a view to improving relations with us. Kandelaki was known in the West as a major figure involved not only in foreign policy activities.

Prior to that, he was a trade representative in Sweden, worked with Plenipotentiary Kollontai, was a member of circles close to Stalin, and possibly met with

him personally. However, the role of Kandelaki is unduly exaggerated. He was tasked with maintaining economic relations with Germany established in the 1920s. It was for this reason that Kandelaki met with the top German financial and industrial circles. There are some traces of his connections in our archival documents. L. Bezymensky, our leading historian of Soviet-German relations, told me about this.

It should be noted that the fate of Kandelaki was tragic. But the fate of all the people involved in informal negotiations on improving Russian-German relations turned out to be tragic. Kandelaki was sacrificed due to the fact that the Kremlin elite tried in every possible way to dissociate itself from those who knew about our great interest in economic relations with Western developed countries, regardless of their political system. Kandelaki was in fact one of the witnesses of a specific line of Soviet policy pursued by people of a very average nomenklatura level, outside the top political leadership. Someone was allowed to know about it, and someone was involved in these operations, not being a member of the special services, but being in diplomatic work or doing foreign trade.

activity.

Kandelaki turned out to be, as it were, a fellow traveler in the execution of special assignments. And since information about his contacts with the Minister of Finance, the largest banker of the Nazis, J. Schacht, surfaced in Germany, in the Western press, Kandelaki's fate was a foregone conclusion. He was declared a German spy and shot in 1938, although he was not a spy. It was a deliberate crime of the Soviet leadership, which thus swept

footprints. However, it is important to note something else. Schacht's personal statements about the interest of influential German financial and industrial circles in economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, confirmed through intelligence, contributed to the fact that Stalin and Molotov had the illusion that

long-term peaceful coexistence with Germany on the basis of economic ties. Such people really were in Germany, but, as it soon turned out, their economic and political influence on Hitler was, unfortunately, not so significant.

M. Rosenberg: "My aspirations for operational work are obvious..."

The second victim of secret contacts that pursued the intentions of influential German circles was Marcel Rosenberg, the first coordinator of the work of the Intelligence Agency and the Foreign Department VIIV, our Charge d'Affaires in France, later Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations and the first Soviet ambassador to Republican Spain. In the history of our diplomacy, he, unfortunately, is completely ignored. But it was Rosenberg who provided the work to complete the signing of the Soviet-French pact of mutual assistance in 1935. He brilliantly coped with the assignment to find out from the French banker Taneri about the real intentions of Germany, which was hatching plans to divide Soviet Ukraine with Poland.

Rosenberg also played a key role in organizing the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, relying on his extensive connections among the progressive public and influential diplomats of France, Romania, Spain and Czechoslovakia.

I cannot fail to quote the dramatic lines from his letter of December 13, 1937, addressed to Stalin. It miraculously survived in the archives of the NKVD and was attached to his criminal case. A copy of the letter was handed over to the Russian Foreign Ministry by the ambassador's widow, Marianna Yaroslavskaya.

Here is the text:

"My relations with my colleagues at work were principled and sustained. At any job, I thought that I was fulfilling the task, I have the right to receive

directives to defend their point of view on specific issues, without trailing behind this or that departmental leader. It is precisely with this that my relations with Chicherin are connected, when they were not cloudless, they were fundamentally undermined by the analysis of Turkey's positions, which I gave as a charge d'affaires of Turkey. Even before that, I gave signals about the policy of the Afghan government, which did not correspond to Chicherin's romantic idea of our policy in the Middle East. Comrades Litvinov and Surits are aware of this.

My relationship with Krestinsky deteriorated during my stay in Paris. He, as a rule, tried to systematically thwart all the proposals that came from me regarding French affairs. From comrade Litvinov, I rarely disagreed on specific issues, but I often had to disagree with him on essential issues of our diplomacy and diplomatic policy. And comrade. Litvinov, probably, did not consider that my desire to appear original, or any moments of a personal nature, were visible in this. I have never made a career as an official. In 1926, no one forced me to leave the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for the apparatus of the Central Committee, for grassroots work. By the time I left the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, I was the head of the auxiliary bureau. This bureau was specially created for the development of secret materials of the VIIV and the intelligence department of the Red Army. In addition, in this position, I had access to all the secret correspondence of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. I left the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, because at this job I had nothing to do with a living cause. Because of this, my aspirations for operational work were obvious. I asked the Central Committee through Comrade. Litvinov to reconsider the decision to send me to work in the League of Nations. Through com. Litvinov, I, starting in 1934, repeatedly raised the question of transferring me to any kind of work within the Union, orally and in writing.

Working in Geneva, I was aware of all the ups and downs of our foreign policy - thanks to the frequent visits of our delegation during that period and thanks to contact with the Paris embassy. I sought release from work in Geneva, as I was basically only in the role of an observer among the leadership. The

realization that there is nothing in my present, or in my past, because of which I should have been expelled from the party, prompts me to turn once again directly to you, Comrade Stalin.

It is worth adding to this that Rosenberg, together with the agent of Soviet intelligence, TASS correspondent in Paris, V. Kin, carried out the most difficult work to identify the real position of the fascist banker Shakht in relation to the Soviet Union. But nevertheless, Keane, and Rosenberg, and the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the former ambassador to Berlin, N. Krestinsky, did not escape the tragic fate. They were arrested and executed, allegedly for espionage and treason.

The monstrous accusations brought against Krestinsky and Rosenberg in an attempt to establish secret contacts with the German authorities had a secret background, but the country's leadership knew perfectly well that all the accusations against these people were sheer falsification and fiction, that all their actions abroad were based on the strict observance of instructions government of the USSR. Speaking of Rosenberg, one

cannot fail to note his outstanding abilities as a diplomat and intelligence officer. It was he who attracted the well-known journalist Genevieve Tabui, who consistently exposed the pro-Hitler and anti-Soviet policy of appeasing fascist aggression, to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Thanks to her, Soviet intelligence published materials about the crimes of the fascist legions in Ethiopia and Spain in the authoritative not only leftist, communist press. Tabui's book "They Call Me Cassandra" is one of the best works of anti-fascist journalism. Tabui was also actively involved in

our intelligence work during the preparation of the Soviet-French non-aggression pact signed in 1935.

Rosenberg's activities and contacts developed significantly in the 1940s. His confidant, a prominent French public figure, minister of the government of the Popular Front and the anti-fascist coalition in the 40s, Pierre Cot, comrade "Dedalus", played a large role in the supply of aircraft to Republican Spain, in the anti-fascist struggle. Helping Litvinov in the USA, our resident Zarubin, conducting important correspondence with us, "Dedalus" worthily continued the work of his colleague and teacher.

Georgy Astakhov

And finally, another most worthy person is Georgy Astakhov, an adviser to our embassy in Berlin since 1938, who also became a victim of repression. It was he who bore on his shoulders the brunt of maintaining secret Soviet-German relations and preparing all the agreements signed on August 23, 1939. Despite Astakhov's leading role in the initial stage of negotiations on the non-aggression pact and the fact that it was adopted at the highest level, in the fall of 1939 he was removed from work in the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and in February 1940, on the special instructions of Molotov, Astakhov was arrested and charged with double game. Georgy

Alexandrovich Astakhov was, however, not just a diplomat. He was the first to pave the way for the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. Since November 1938, he was entrusted, like Umansky in the USA, with a number of duties as a resident of the NKVD intelligence in Berlin. Astakhov was primarily engaged in political intelligence, but he maintained agent connections. At the same time, his messages about the political situation in the country, addressed to Beria, did not go down to the INO apparatus. As far as I remember, all telegrams, two letters signed by him were subject to mandatory return to the secretariat of the NKVD. Astakhov courageously held himself during the investigation, in nothing

pleaded not guilty. He repeatedly turned to Beria, reminding him of the fulfillment of important assignments by him through the NKVD. Initially, he was kept in prison "just in case" if needed, as he knew the German leaders well. And only in 1941 Astakhov was convicted in droves, when the military collegium, under the conditions of the impending war, stamped out sentences for those arrested in 1938-1939. Astakhov died in the camp. Materials about his activities are not only in the criminal case, but also in the archives of Beria, Molotov, as well as in the archival fund of the secretariat of the NKVD-NGKB.

Chapter 4

WINTER WAR WITH FINLAND

Secret Dialogue

The years 1939-1940 were a period of testing agreements with Germany, testing the endurance of the Germans in connection with the deployment of our military operations in Finland. As you know, many mistakes were made in the planning of military operations in Finland. But disassembling them is not my business. I just want to touch on the so-called Finnish question in connection with the fact that our intelligence was tasked with speeding up the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Finns in March 1940. This was entrusted to B. Rybkin (Yartsev) and his deputy and wife Z. Rybkina, who was recalled to Moscow in 1938 and returned to Moscow in 1938 in Helsinki. For this operation, Rybkin (Yartsev) was subsequently awarded the Order of the Badge of Honor, and his wife was awarded the badge of honor and the diploma of Honored Worker of the

NKVD. In January-February 1940, after the failure of our first offensive on the Karelian Isthmus, they traveled to Stockholm, where our intelligence, through the mediation of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Sweden, Sadler, began preliminary probing contacts. Rybkin conducted secret negotiations. To control negotiations and communications with Finnish and Swedish agents of our residency, one of the active participants in the "purge" in the INO NKVD in 1938-1939, a party nominee A. Graur, was sent to Stockholm at the same time. Subsequently, for some time in 1941 he headed the Swedish residency of the NKVD, after which he was recalled to Moscow. Working in the central office as the head of the foreign intelligence department, Graur was distinguished by a special suspicion of people, which played a tragic role in the fate of some of our intelligence officers. Only after the war, Graur was fired when it became clear that he was seriously mentally ill: having come to an appointment with the boss

intelligence P. Fedotov, he "confessed" to his work for American

intelligence. So, Rybkin, who conducted secret negotiations, was entrusted with an exceptionally responsible mission. The war with Finland caused a sharp negative reaction in the West. The Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations. Despite the ostentatious German neutrality, we were well aware that if we got bogged down in this conflict, it would weaken us and push us onto the path of confrontation with the Nazis, who had serious interests in the Baltic Sea, although Finland was recognized by them as a zone of our interests. Z. Rybkina in

Stockholm in January-February 1940 did a great job of preparing secret negotiations. However, they were secret only for the general public. The Finnish leadership was well aware that H. Vulioki, a well-known writer and confidant, "an agent of the Soviet government", was involved in the preparation of a peace agreement with the Russians. Vulioka's trip to Stockholm and the meeting with the "spouses of the Yartsevs" (in order to discuss the terms of a preliminary peace agreement) actually took place with the knowledge and blessing of the Finnish authorities. The history of these negotiations is an interesting example of how the agent of Soviet intelligence from the late 1920s "Poet" turned from an informer into a political intermediary, whose activities ultimately brought great benefits to both countries.

However, the Finns did not know what considerations Rybkin reported to the government and the intelligence leadership about the prospects for concluding a peace treaty.

Rybkin's messages were so important that they were sent not only to the NKVD, but also to the People's Commissariat of Defense. Rybkin's main conclusion was this: the conclusion of peace is absolutely realistic, but subject to the infliction of a rather serious defeat on the front on the Finns, which will make it impossible to further delay the negotiations. He insisted on continuing the bombing of Finnish military installations, in particular the Manerheim Line, which was supposed to demonstrate the unconditional superiority of the Red Army air forces, given that Finnish aviation was its Achilles heel. Breakthrough of the Manerheim Line and the exit of our army

to the operational space, Rybkin believed, would predetermine the inevitable capitulation of the Finns. He quite accurately pointed out the insignificance of the threat of Western landings in Finland. As it turned out, the West laid its main plans on the Anglo-French landing operation, which was planned to be carried out not in Finland, but in Norway, in order to reach the Finnish border and influence the development of events from there. In the

light of the current situation, it should be noted how significant the success of Soviet diplomacy and intelligence was at that time. The beginning of Germany's military operations against Norway, the clash of the Germans with the Anglo-French fleet and landing took place two weeks after the conclusion of a peace treaty with Finland. Thus, the Soviet Union managed to avoid being drawn into a full-scale military conflict of the Second World War, which unfolded on land and at sea in Scandinavia. The Finnish campaign revealed major

shortcomings in the conduct of hostilities and in the organization of intelligence of the Red Army. The issue of personnel renewal in the armed forces and in the state security agencies was on the agenda. This also affected our intelligence work in the main capitalist countries. We, unfortunately, in 1938-1939. were forced to resort to the conservation of a number of important sources of our intelligence in Germany, France, England, the USA, Manchuria in connection with the flight and betrayal of a number of senior officials, residents of Soviet intelligence and security agencies in 1937-1938 - Orlov Nikolsky, Krivitsky, Poretsky-Reis , Steinberg and Lyushkov.

"April 7th Case"

Let's go back to the beginning of the Finnish events in April 1938. There is a lot of talk about the failures and failures of Soviet policy and miscalculations in the Finnish war. My meetings and conversations with our resident in Finland, Elisey Tikhonovich Sinitsyn, which took place in 1987-1988 (at the time when he was working on the book

memories), gave me the opportunity to take a slightly different look at what happened on the eve and during the hostilities. What was the role of intelligence in ensuring the foreign policy goals of the USSR in relation to Finland? How did intelligence work during the war? How did military and foreign policy intelligence interact?

In September 1939, I happened to join the Finnish events, which were significant for our foreign policy. There is a point of view that after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the hands of the Soviet Union were untied with respect to Finland. However, despite the recognition of the Baltic space as a sphere of our foreign policy interests, which was recorded at the Soviet-German negotiations, the leadership and command of the German armed forces were not informed in advance of our plans for Finland. Nevertheless, the Germans found out about them. We learned from a reliable source through the German Foreign Ministry that

the Finns had informed the Germans about Rybkin's secret probe in April 1938. In our archival materials, as far as I remember, this appears under the code name "April 7 Case". I think it is worth telling about this in more detail, as well as about the phenomenon of Rybkin, who

then transmitted the proposals of the Soviet government to the leadership of Finland, and in secret from the Soviet ambassador in this country. Back in 1937, the leadership of the NKVD, in particular, Yezhov as

People's Commissar, put forward proposals for a peaceful settlement of relations with the Finns and the need for behind-the-scenes negotiations with them. Rybkin was appointed as a secret representative of the Soviet government, since it was he who initiated these proposals.

A certificate was prepared for Stalin and Molotov, which assessed the policy of Finland and determined the ways of cooperation with it. The certificate stated that the Finnish government was not Germanophile and that there were real conditions for paralyzing German influence in Finland and drawing it into the orbit of the USSR influence. The document proposed to put before Helsinki the question of concluding a pact on

mutual assistance subject to the inviolability of borders. It was proposed to guarantee the Finns the supply of Soviet weapons and equipment. The reference also gave the characteristics of the leading figures in Finland, indicated the possibilities for active covert, but important for us, cooperation with the Agrarian Party of Finland. (Subsequently, to create a party of petty proprietors, Rybkin was given about 10 million Finnish marks in cash. This money was used to strengthen our position mainly through the Minister of the Finnish government Pekalla and his brother, an agent of Soviet intelligence.) The certificate prepared by Rybkin recorded the presence in the country of a powerful undercover apparatus of the Soviet intelligence, capable to a certain extent of influencing the domestic and foreign policy of Finland.

By the way, about the possibility of Rybkin's arrest. There were a number of testimonies of repressed employees of the INO against him. As a leading worker, he was recalled to the Center in 1938, but since the "April 7 Case" was entrusted to Rybkin, any action against such a person could only be taken with the consent of Stalin. And the Finnish topic remained a priority, despite the unsuccessful completion of secret negotiations for us in the summer of 1938. By the way, Rybkin, in a conversation with Stalin, Voroshilov and Molotov, expressed doubt that the Finns would agree to a secret agreement with the Soviet Union. As a valuable worker, who proved himself back in 1929 in intercepting the secret correspondence of Trotsky and his supporters in the German Communist Party, not involved in any political games and factions, he continued to work at the Center and enjoyed the full confidence of the leadership. Yes, and it was not 1937 already in the yard. And perhaps the most important thing. Due to the fact that Rybkin retained his position in the Center, the active agents in Finland were not called into question. When the leadership of the NKVD was changed, only the usual measures were taken to additionally check it in the new political situation on the eve of the

war. For the USSR, the military solution of the Finnish question was a forced step, because peace negotiations with the Finns on the transfer of borders ended in nothing. Thus from September to November 1939 we began military preparations and were able to keep this secret from the Germans and Finns.

Nevertheless, the tension in the autumn of 1939 in the Soviet-Finnish relations grew, and the Finns defiantly worked to strengthen their border, which, as it seemed to them, strengthened their positions in negotiations with us. Circumstances were connected with this, which at first surprised us - the Finnish counterintelligence did not oppose the Soviet military attaché in studying the future theater of military operations near Vyborg and on the Karelian Isthmus. We regarded the penetration into these areas as the success of the reconnaissance operation. The Finns, demonstrating to us the power of their fortifications, made it clear that we would need a long preparation for military operations.

However, as you know, everything did not happen as we expected. Our military leadership made a mistake in assessing the military capabilities of Finland. It was believed that it would be possible to cope with it by the troops of the Leningrad Military District. The surprise attack, which was launched in November 1939, caught both the Finns and the Germans by surprise, since they did not record any emergency transfers of our troops. Nevertheless, the grouping of the Leningrad Military District was defeated in an attempt to immediately break through the Finnish defenses on the Karelian Isthmus. The war with Finland taught a lesson that is not sufficiently taken into account even now. The secrecy and surprise of a military attack should not be the end in itself of a military or special operation. It is necessary to carefully calculate the balance of forces in the theater of operations and, in particular, work out the organizational mechanism for the deployment of a military campaign.

It should be noted that before and during the hostilities in Finland, our military intelligence and the NKVD had a large amount of intelligence data. This was also explained by the fact that the repressions practically bypassed the heads of intelligence in Scandinavia, who worked in the INO. The office of the military attaché, which worked without interruption in Finland in the 1930s, was not subjected to repression either. However, information about the enemy, his tactics and weapons, which was reported to the top leadership, for unknown reasons, did not descend to the level of commanders of armies, corps and divisions who were to conduct combat operations. Is it because the command of the Red Army in

battles on the Karelian Isthmus expected very big and unpleasant surprises?

The understanding of this did not come to me immediately, only on the very eve of the Patriotic War, when we were already preparing in anticipation of Hitler's attack. Then L. Eitingon explained these elementary truths to me. I must say that the role of Eitingon in the history of Soviet intelligence during the war years is unique. This was the only head of intelligence of the state security agencies (except for N. Melnikov) who had a higher military education. But Melnikov had on the eve of the war only a little experience in intelligence and operational work. Eitingon studied at the Academy of the Red Army Headquarters together with future famous military leaders - Marshals V. Chuikov, Ya. Golovanov and others. On the eve of

the war, a new resident in Finland was appointed - Elisey Tikhonovich Sinitsyn. Unlike Rybkin, he was at the same time the charge d'affaires of the USSR, that is, he acted as ambassador. Sinitsyn graduated from intelligence school, during the events in Poland he participated in ensuring the activities of our task force. Thus, he had experience of working in an extreme situation of hostilities, although not very large. But on the other hand, he was fluent in German and showed extraordinary abilities for intelligence work.

Intelligence and diplomacy are often contrasted. In my opinion, this comes from a misunderstanding of the very essence of this work. During periods of military conflicts, we always kept residents in hot spots, who at the same time were the highest officials of Soviet diplomacy. So it was with Sinitsyn when he worked, as they say, on two fronts in Finland, so it was with A. Panyushkin, the resident and plenipotentiary of the USSR in China, when there was a civil war, then a war with Japan. And not exactly an old example. A veteran of the INO NKVD, who graduated from the intelligence school of the first graduation, A. Alekseev, aka Shitov, at a decisive moment became the Soviet ambassador to the Republic of Cuba. And this was done in those cases when it was necessary to concentrate the efforts of diplomats and intelligence in the same hands and carry out active diplomatic actions, relying on agents that were personally known to the chief resident in the country.

A few words about our shortcomings and omissions in the Finnish events. It is known that militarily the operation to break through the Mannerheim Line was poorly prepared. Start dates kept moving forward. There were also big mistakes on our part. Sinitsyn took with him 10 million Finnish marks to Finland to finance the activities of the Communist Party and the departure of the Finnish Communists to Sweden, who later, as we planned, were to enter the Kuusinen government. Before leaving, Sinitsyn received an incorrect orientation from Beria that the war would begin no earlier than in three days. However, the military conflict unfolded on the day of his arrival in Helsinki. With his apparatus, Sinitsyn fell under the bombing of our aircraft. Bombs were falling nearby

with the Soviet embassy.

I recall the episode when Sinitsyn was summoned to Moscow in October 1939 for an urgent report to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov as a temporary chargé d'affaires. Representatives of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs met him and brought him from the station to Molotov's office. This caused Beria's sharp dissatisfaction: why didn't he, as a resident, first come with a report to his immediate superior ?! After that, a rather impartial conversation took place in Beria's office. I was present at this together with Fitin. Sinitsyn reported to Beria. He, as a person not sufficiently experienced in apparatus conventions, began with the information that he had just reported to Molotov and how he perceived it. To stop Sinitsyn, I twice stepped on his foot under the table. That was the only way to stop him. After all, Beria was not waiting for a report on the political situation in Finland, which he knew well without Sinitsyn, but wanted to hear proposals for the involvement and use of agents at his disposal, not only among the Finnish leadership, but also in the Foreign Ministry, agrarian and social Democratic parties in Finland. Another curious moment. Since Sinitsyn failed to take Kuusinen's relatives out of Finland before the start of hostilities, and also due to great illusions about the successful outcome of the campaign that had begun, in mid-December 1939, the leadership made an unprecedented decision - to send

resident of the country with which the war is going on, on vacation until the end of January 1940! And this at a time when some information was urgently needed, given by his personal observations. However, everything went well. Fitin, an exceptionally benevolent and sensitive person, arranged everything so that Sinitsyn, God forbid, would not catch the eye of the responsible officials of the international department of the Central Committee, who were eager to punish him "for the failure of the party order."

Another important episode in the history of intelligence is connected with Sinitsyn. He managed to establish the presence of new small arms in the Finnish army. These were the famous Suomi assault rifles, which had a rather dense fire coverage. They were especially effective for fighting in wooded areas. We managed to export samples of machine guns to the USSR using Sinitsyn's landmarks through Sweden. However, when this was reported, the government regarded this information as the desire of the NKVD to equip its troops with automatic weapons. The People's Commissariat of Defense issued a conclusion: machine guns are effective weapons only for law enforcement agencies. Unbelievable, but it is true: it never occurred to anyone to immediately use them to rearm the rifle troops of our army on the eve of the war.

Analysis of the lessons of the war with Finland

The main conclusion for Soviet intelligence after analyzing the hostilities in Finland was the need for a regular exchange of intelligence information between the NKVD, the Intelligence Department of the Red Army and the intelligence department of the People's Commissariat of the Navy. At a meeting on the results of the war with Finland, Stalin threw sharp reproaches to the head of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army I. Proskurov, after which he was removed from his post. This was due to information from the military intelligence and NKVD residency from London and Paris about the intentions of the British and French in April 1940 to start bombing the Baku oil fields. Information about this, by the way, was reliable, but with one significant caveat.

regarding the timing. Stalin immediately decided to increase our Transcaucasian military grouping by 3 times. Immediately after the armistice, troops with combat experience began to be transferred there from the Finnish front, including air defense and air force forces and means. These measures were generally justified. Stalin, of course, understood that the change in the military situation in Europe frustrated the Anglo-French plans regarding our oil fields, but he used unconfirmed bombing warnings to criticize the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense for what he considered unsatisfactory intelligence operations and as a pretext for removing the head of military intelligence. However, reports of the threat of an

Anglo-French landing in Scandinavia and the bombing of Baku had another important consequence, when intelligence information was quickly implemented by the People's Commissariat of Defense. Intelligence was instructed to carefully study the Middle East theater of operations. Then, for the first time, not only representatives of military intelligence, but also officers of the operational department of the General Staff were acquainted with the materials obtained by intelligence. As I said,

later it became the rule - the most important reports on military issues through the NKVD were sent to the intelligence department of the General Staff for evaluation. A special department of military-technical information was formed in its composition. In addition, we at the NKVD began to receive regular reviews from the intelligence departments of the General Staff and the Navy.

And finally, I want to clarify one more point. It would be wrong to assert that only military-diplomatic intelligence played a key role in ending the war with Finland. It is more correct to emphasize the objective situation that created favorable opportunities for intelligence in the preparation of a peace treaty with Finland. Firstly, the Germans did not directly support Finland, they were interested in the Finns concluding a peace treaty with us, ceding territory on the Karelian Isthmus, and they were advised to do this more than once. Secondly, neutral Sweden found itself between two fires. Most of all, she was afraid of losing her neutrality in this war. Therefore, Swedish diplomacy provided us with all possible support in this

peaceful settlement. Of course, our serious intelligence positions in the Swedish diplomatic department also did a lot.

In conclusion, speaking about the lessons for intelligence in the Finnish campaign, it should be emphasized that the People's Commissariat of the Navy most fully implemented intelligence information about the situation in the North. As far as I remember, on the eve of the Anglo-German hostilities in Scandinavia, Admiral N. Kuznetsov, People's Commissar for the Navy, issued a special directive to the fleets on how to act in conditions when England seeks to restore lost lines for an attack on the USSR, and is preparing for a landing operation in Norway, with the aim of creating a military defensive alliance of the countries of Scandinavia and Finland. Unlike the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, N. Kuznetsov managed not impromptu, but in advance, on the basis of a well-thought-out system of measures, to ensure the high combat readiness of his formations to repel the attack of the Nazis.

I cannot but say that when Germany attacked Norway and the Anglo-German skirmish began, we breathed a sigh of relief. For us, this meant a prolongation of the war in the West. But, as subsequent events showed, the forces of the opponents, their plans were not sufficiently known to us. To this it should be added that the experience of military operations on the fronts of Western Europe after the Polish campaign was also not properly analyzed and used by us.

Chapter

5. SPECIAL OPERATIONS OF THE NKVD IN THE WEST OF THE COUNTRY IN 1939-1940

Our steps towards the enemy

Many years have passed, but the material that was accumulated by the state security agencies during important military operations in western Ukraine and Belarus, Bukovina and Moldova, carried out by the Red Army in 1939-1940, has hardly been summarized. Very little has been written and said about the experience of intelligence and counterintelligence work in the territories occupied by us in accordance with secret protocols. Meanwhile, it was at this time that we directly encountered the activities of German intelligence in the future zone of front-line operations. The agent positions created by us at an exceptionally fast pace made it possible already at the end of 1940 to form a fairly clear idea of the future theater of military operations.

At the beginning of August 1939, after my return from a short business trip to Western Europe, according to the important information received, the approach of a military clash became more and more obvious. When distributing duties among Fitin's deputies, and there were several of them, I was instructed to prepare all the necessary measures in case hostilities began.

From the very beginning, the General Staff singled out two main directions in a future war. The first is the West, where Germany and Poland were the main opponents.

The second is the Far East, where Japan, no doubt, seriously threatened the Soviet Union. By the way, the defeat of Japan on

Khalkin-Gole coincided with the conclusion of the Soviet-German agreement on non-aggression. It should be noted that the prospect of the development of hostilities in the Far East was a matter of great concern in the Kremlin, and here one cannot fail to pay tribute to the skilled work of our counterintelligence, especially the radio counterintelligence and its decryption unit, which was successfully led by Shevelev and Blinderman. We managed to get close to the Japanese ciphers thanks to undercover sources in

the Japanese embassy and the painstaking work of our cryptographers. Unlike the Soviet embassies abroad, as well as the American and British ones, Japanese diplomatic missions and military intelligence agencies working under their cover exchanged current information among themselves, bypassing reports to their headquarters in Tokyo. For example, the Japanese embassy in Moscow regularly maintained contact with the Japanese consulate in Vienna, the Japanese embassy in Helsinki, and the Japanese representations in Bucharest, Turkey, and Italy. Thanks to this, we had wide access to Japanese cipher communications and intelligence information, thus obtaining unique information. For example, from messages from the Japanese consulate in Vienna, intercepted at the end of August 1939, it became known that Japan's reserves at Khalkhin Gol were exhausted and the Japanese command had no real plans to transfer military operations to the Far East and Transbaikalia. The conclusion of the Soviet-German pact

non-aggression finally cooled the Japanese.

Information about this, reported to the leadership of the country, untied our hands. According to the Soviet-German protocol, we could take active steps in Europe, but the situation in the Far East forced us to do everything with an eye on Japan. Now we could reinforce our grouping in the Western direction at the expense of the Far Eastern reserves without much concern. It was also important that this circumstance made it possible to develop measures for a wide maneuver of our forces and means in the conditions of the limited possibilities of railway transport. Moreover, at that time the leadership of the NKVD reported to Stalin and Molotov about major shortcomings in the work of the People's Commissariat of Railways, which could not but affect

mobilization plans of the Red Army. The situation was rectified only during the war years, when transportation on the railways was literally put under the "hourly" control of the transport department of the NKVD.

In August 1939, as the agent apparatus reported, organizational and mobilization work in the border military districts was carried out very poorly. The low combat readiness of a number of units of the troops of the Belarusian Military District was noted, which was repeatedly reported to both the government and People's Commissar of Defense Voroshilov, as well as the heads of independent units of state security agencies. This was the reason for the dismissal of the commander of the Belarusian military district, I. Kovalev, and the appointment of K. Timoshenko, who at that time headed the Kiev military district, to this position. (Subsequently, he showed himself to be a collected, strong-willed organizer of the interaction of various branches of the military during the operation in Poland, in connection with which he was appointed commander of the troops in the Finnish war, and then headed the People's Commissariat of Defense.) Seeing Voroshilov's obvious mistakes as the People's Commissar of Defense and Commander-in-Chief, Stalin, probably wanted to place people with experience in leading military operations in the new conditions in key

positions in the People's Commissariat of Defense. It is impossible not to mention the major shortcomings and organizational confusion during the Polish campaign and when troops were sent to the Baltic states, which the country's leadership was aware of. Military counterintelligence regularly sent important messages about the unfavorable situation in the Red Army Air Force, which was expressed in the poor organization of interaction between various branches of the military and the Air Force, the poor state of air defense, especially in

the border military districts, which were deployed to the fronts. It is now known that the order to prepare for the deployment of troops to the territory of Eastern Poland and Western Belarus followed immediately after the first days of the German attack on Poland, however, except for the command of the border troops, none of the leaders of intelligence and counterintelligence of the NKVD was informed about this. The mobilization of reserve officers along the line of state security and an additional recruitment from among the military and party activists for service in the N

training fees and staff expansion in connection with the aggravation of the international situation. It is noteworthy, however, that training camps from the NKVD reserve line were used for the subsequent recruitment of reconnaissance and counterintelligence operational groups in the process of advancing our troops to the West.

Particularly noteworthy is the fact that in the conditions of the outbreak of war, experienced operational personnel dismissed as a result of the purges of 1937-1938 returned to service from the Chekist and general military reserves, and sometimes directly from imprisonment. These are now widely known A. Korotkoe, V. Fisher, R. Abel, E. Zarubina, G. Kheifits, K. Kukin, F. Parparov and others. Together with Y. Serebryansky, I. Kaminsky, N. Belkin, M. Yarikov, P. Zubov, who joined them from prison and reserve, they also passed on their wealth of experience to young cadres who joined intelligence work after graduating from a special school. Thus, Soviet intelligence fulfilled its tasks during the war years, despite the heaviest losses in the line of repression.

During this period, the role of territorial security agencies in orienting the government regarding the events taking place in Western Belarus and the Baltics increased sharply. The organs of the NKVD of Belarus and Ukraine, the transport department reported on the real situation in the adjacent territory, on the advance of German troops, on the reaction in Poland in connection with the defeat of its troops on the main fronts. Our action against the Poles was inevitable, since we had to meet the German troops at the lines defined by the agreement and block their way to invade the western territories of Belarus and Ukraine. We took into account the fact that the "Carpathian Ukraine" was played by the Germans and the French on the eve of the war as a trump card against the USSR. Therefore, it was impossible to allow German troops to occupy the territory where an independent Western Ukrainian Republic could be proclaimed.

And finally, one more circumstance. The events in Poland showed the exceptional importance of cooperation between territorial security agencies and military command. In 1939, for the first time, the orientations of the General Staff and the Intelligence Agency began to be sent to the NKVD bodies, in particular, detailed reports on the situation in Latvia,

Lithuania, indicating the characteristics of military units that can oppose the movement of the Red Army and cooperate with the German military authorities.

The directive of the NKVD on the tasks of work in the "liberated regions of Western Ukraine and Belarus" obliged all operations of the NKVD to be made dependent on the actions of the military command. Speech

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counterintelligence agencies, primarily with the military command of the Red Army. Our independent tasks were aimed at identifying and detaining members of the counter-revolutionary White Guard formations, such as the Brotherhood of Russian Truth, the Russian Combined Arms Union, who were on operational records, since these organizations continued to be the base for anti-Soviet work and espionage in territories ceded to the Soviet Union.

The directive also stated that in no case, unless absolutely necessary, with the exception of participants in riots and criminal offenses, should we not detain the German population living both in Western Ukraine and in Poland. A number of German officers who were captured by the Poles were released and handed over by us to Germany. The events taking place on the western borders of the USSR have radically changed the operational situation and the conditions of our

activities. The farther along with the troops we moved to the West, the more tangible became direct contact with a potential enemy. We have already established visits by the leaders of German intelligence - the Abwehr - to the Baltic states. The Germans proceeded from the fact that the presence of Red Army units in the Baltic States, in Belarus and in Eastern Poland since 1939 in the zone that is familiar to them created very great opportunities for studying the Red Army, its organization, structure, means of communication, the level of combat readiness of troops. In this they relied on the nationalist and paramilitary organizations of the Baltic states.

The arrivals of the chiefs of the Abwehr, Canaris and Pickenbrock, further intensified the wide agent network. Nevertheless, in the Baltic countries, we had a good opportunity to detect the activities of German intelligence, since their

the main intelligence centers were known to us. In September 1939, our services managed to penetrate the German intelligence network on the territory of Western Ukraine. Appeared

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nationalist organizations, which at that time were engaged in a fierce struggle for power. The creation of the Soviet-German repatriation commission opened up the possibility for our agents to penetrate the territory occupied by the Germans under the guise of refugees or persons of German origin. The agreement concluded between us and the Germans allowed the refugees to freely move to the territory of the Warsaw General Government and even to Germany, which was especially important for us. We oriented our agents to a long stay there, with the aim of actively studying the German population living in the Baltic states and Western Ukraine, as well as planting and recruiting agents from those who moved to Germany. This operation was approved by Beria and Merkulov. When it came to preparing the withdrawal of a number of our agents to German territory, I was also involved in this.

On the eve of 1940, we were faced with the question of a new recruitment of personnel for state security agencies. A special government decree was adopted, according to which persons from indigenous national minorities living in the territories of Poland, Ukraine, and Romania liberated by us were recruited to serve in the bodies. Of course, those who have passed a thorough check were meant. The best recommendation was to work underground, in the Komsomol, interaction with underground party organizations. Among the Chekists of the draft of 1940 was Yu. Kolesnikov, Hero of the Russian Federation, who went through the school of underground work in Romania, and later became a partisan and illegal intelligence officer.

In the liberated territory

At the end of 1939, the stay of Soviet troops in the Baltic states and in Western Ukraine was formalized by the signing of international agreements with the governments of Lithuania and Latvia. The issue of filtering and checking refugees who moved to these territories was streamlined, instructions were approved for interviewing violators. And most importantly, we uncovered the enemy's attempts in every possible way to intensify the study of everything related to the future military operations of the Red Army. We seized valuable materials and archives of Polish intelligence agents who had direct access to Germany. They were immediately sent to Moscow, where work began on using their contacts and connections, which were supported by Polish consulates in the territory of the Soviet Union.

After the end of hostilities in France, German intelligence sharply intensified its actions against the USSR. We detected the concentration of German troops near the Soviet border, which, naturally, aroused corresponding alertness in Moscow. After the first signals were received, a directive was adopted that reports on the actions of the Nazis in the occupied territory should be sent every ten days. This directive was sent to the border troops, to local territorial security agencies and to military counterintelligence agencies.

Enemy intelligence sought to coordinate the activities of German settlers and colonists who settled in Western Ukraine, in Romania. Connections stretched to the German colonies located on the territory of Ukraine - to Odessa and the Crimea. The center of their activity, as it turned out, was Chernivtsi.

A great achievement of our counterintelligence agencies was the disclosure of the so-called "German People's Administration", which was engaged in espionage in the territories liberated by the Red Army. Moreover, we became aware of the heads of the departments of this "people's administration". Our new employee, Yu. Kolesnikov, reported that the "German People's Council of the Germans in Bessarabia" was headed by an Abwehr officer. The main direction of his work was the rural colonists-peasants, who were run by a special agent of the German army intelligence, agronomist Raymond Arthur. He also had a special department for work among women. It was also led by a certain B. Alma who collaborated with the Abwehr. German residency

tried to expand its activities to the entire territory of Moldova and Ukraine. Branches of the council for work among youth and schoolchildren were created.

We were especially interested in the head of the cultural department, Professor Koch Herbert. When the German consul from Chernivtsi arrived at this German council, we sent a task force there, which, to strengthen the disguise, included an unspoken employee of the Soviet security agencies, a German by birth, the famous composer L. Knipper. With his participation, the activities of the German agents were largely brought under our control. We managed to get the Abwehr questionnaires, which were used in the preparation of German agents.

Valuable information about the activities of German agents began to come through the transport department. The transfer of German troops by rail from Western Europe to Poland, Hungary, Romania has been constantly in our field of vision since 1940.

On the eve of the war, the desire of German intelligence agencies to plant their agents in the services of the Kiev Special Military District from among the local residents was also recorded, especially in the service of military units, the material and technical supply of our troops that entered the territory of Western Ukraine. The achievement of agreements with

Germany on the occupation of the territory of Western Ukraine, and then Moldavia, also intensified such a phenomenon as the mass transfer of Polish and Romanian intelligence agents to our side, which significantly improved our ability to study the enemy. Major operational games played on the eve of the war by the Ukrainian and Moldovan NKVD were based largely on defectors, which included agents of the Romanian intelligence. One of these defectors in Bessarabia, a certain Melnikov, being connected with Romanian intelligence, transferred a significant number of agents to our territory. He gave away several contacts who worked for the French intelligence services. Moreover, one of the French intelligence agents "Gebrov", captured by us, gave very valuable testimony about the activities of the French intelligence agencies. He knew many agents of the Polish and Romanian intelligence services and identified them. At the request of the NKVD,

his death sentence was commuted to twenty years' imprisonment. Later, even in the post-war period, "Gebrov" was used as an identifier for agents of the German, Romanian and French intelligence, and also actively worked in the camps of German

prisoners of war.

Another problem arose during the Polish campaign. It was associated with updating and streamlining the interaction between intelligence and counterintelligence agencies, since all intelligence work in the new territories was initially based on the old counterintelligence records.

But this was clearly not enough. In a short time, exceptionally valuable materials from the captured archives of the Polish, Romanian, Latvian, and Estonian special services that fell into our hands were analyzed. The Germans showed great interest

in recruiting Soviet citizens and displaced persons. The main criterion for their recruiting approaches was the so-called "principle of German blood". German nationality was considered the main pass for establishing ties with the intelligentsia living on the territory of the Soviet Union. The centers we discovered for training agents and for carrying out operations against the Red Army made it possible to draw a very interesting conclusion that the Germans concentrated their attention mainly on conducting purely military espionage. They showed an increased interest in the states, documents, deployment and armament of the Red Army troops.

However, we did not understand then that all the intelligence activities of the Abwehr and the Gestapo were subordinated to the performance of reconnaissance and sabotage functions in order to prepare the first crushing blow against the Red Army. Now it is obvious that the task of obtaining economic and political information by the enemy was largely underestimated by us. We, fixing the relatively weak work of German political intelligence, were inclined to assess this circumstance as an omission of our counterintelligence, which did not find "enemy agents' outlets" on the leaders of the district level, collective farms, state farms, and obtaining information in their environment. As it turned out later, for this

the Germans used agents of from numbers activists
the nationalist underground.

A few words about how the apparatus of the state security agencies was completed in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states. Initially, all the states were staffed with task forces that arrived either from the central office or from the periphery. The question arose about strengthening the interaction of our residencies located in Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, with local bodies of special departments of the Red Army, which was rather weak due to the unclear distribution of operational responsibility between them. At the same time, materials presented by the 5th (intelligence) department of the General Staff played a significant role in assessing the situation on the ground. Intelligence of the NKVD and military intelligence revealed the military preparations of Germany as early as 1940. The activities carried out by the German government in the occupied territory during this period until the spring of 1941 concerned the strengthening and development of new territories by the German army. They were carried out consistently, and they did not see anything that would speak of the creation of powerful strike groups for waging a full-scale war.

The leadership of intelligence through the NKVD and the General Staff did not sufficiently understand that the active actions of the Germans in Poland in 1939 had two stages - consolidation in the occupied territory and the transfer of troops for the spring offensive in the West. But the situation changed for them after we occupied the Baltic states, Bessarabia and entered Chernivtsi. At this time, it became clear to the Germans that the Red Army had reached completely different frontiers. On the eastern border of Germany, we deployed three powerful groupings - in the Baltic states, in Belarus and Ukraine, as well as in the Odessa region. For the Germans, in fact, this was nothing new. After all, the occupation of the Baltic states in the course of the Soviet-German secret agreements was stipulated. However, we did not disclose our plans in detail, and the Germans believed that the Soviet side, in accordance with the signed agreements, would limit itself only to the introduction of cover troops into the territory of the Baltic states. The events that took place in June-July 1940 took the Germans by surprise, moreover, at a time when their war machine

was launched to the West and it was impossible to reorient aviation, ground forces, and navy in order to counteract our assertion in the Baltic and Bessarabia. Therefore, at that time, Hitler was forced to put on a good face in a rather unsuccessful game. The German side sent a

telegram to its diplomatic representatives, which was intercepted by us. It stated that the unhindered strengthening of Russian troops in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and the reorganization of governments carried out by the Soviet leadership with the intention of ensuring close cooperation with these countries concerned only Russia and the Baltic states. A warning was made to avoid any complications in Russian-German relations. Getting information about this directive was extremely important, because it gave us additional

opportunities to feel confident in carrying out all actions in the Baltics. The information intercepted from the German Foreign Ministry was also confirmed by Yuna's source in the German Foreign Ministry, with whom E. Zarubina, who returned to operational work in the spring of 1940, kept in touch. However, after the end of the military campaign in France in June 1940, the intelligence department of the General

Staff sent a report to the NKVD and the government about the changed position of Germany. This information was also received by the INO. Her source was "Aryan", a military intelligence agent, adviser to the German Foreign Ministry Shelia, who was quite close to Ribbentrop. According to him, the Germans agreed that the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian governments accepted the Soviet demands, while pointing out that the accession of the Baltic countries by the Soviet Union was a temporary phenomenon.

Janusz Radziwill

Among those whom we captured upon entering Poland was the well-known Polish politician Prince Janusz Radziwiłł and his

relatives. Radziwill was not our paid agent. But, being an influential figure close to Goering, he nevertheless actively cooperated with us. For some reason, the facts of Radziwill's cooperation with the Soviet authorities and personally with the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Beria are especially unacceptable for the chief historian of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, General V. Kirpichenko. He apparently does not know that the Polish side, which was interested in why Radziwill's relatives were not shot, was shown documents confirming these secret ties with the Soviet authorities during the investigation of the Katyn case. Then Radziwill's statement was raised, written on February 13, 1946 in the name of Beria with a request for release as an interned Polish citizen. I was among those who prepared documents on the transfer of interned Polish citizens to the Germans - the Radziwills, Zamoyskis, Bronickis, Krasickis, together with their families. There were 16 in total.

Radziwill, of course, was a valuable source. But he was not trusted. When our resident in Berlin A. Kobulov announced a visit to the embassy of J. Radziwill in 1940, Beria decided to preserve relations with him "until better times", formal relations on the basis of a subscription for cooperation with him were not established. As a rule, this practice was not applied to persons from the aristocratic nobility who were members of the royal court of European countries, unlike representatives of the service personnel. For those interested in details, I advise you to look up the correspondence of our residency in Berlin with the Center, this is about the visits of Radziwill to our embassy in 1940-1941.

The Baltics are the sphere of our interests

I will not speak in detail about the events that took place in 1940 in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. But I would like to note the main thing - our troops entered there completely peacefully, on the basis of special agreements concluded with the legitimate governments of these countries. Another question is that we dictated the terms of these agreements, and not without

active participation of our diplomacy and intelligence. I must also say that we would hardly have been able to achieve mutual understanding so quickly if all the heads of the Baltic states - Ulmanis, Smetona, Urbshis and Pāts, especially the Latvian leadership - Balodis, Munters, Ulmanis - were not with us in confidential secret relationships. They were always received in the Kremlin at the highest level as the most dear guests, they were courted, curtsies were made in front of them, as they say.

Our operational materials also played a significant role, especially for the preparation of Stalin's and Molotov's conversations with the leaders of Lithuania and Latvia, Urbshes and Munters. We could afford to negotiate with them on the deployment of our troops, on the new government, on the next compromises, since they did not even hesitate to accept money from our residency and from proxies. All this is confirmed by archival documents. Thus, no annexation of the Baltic States actually took place. It was a foreign policy action of the Soviet government, completely justified in the period preceding the German attack, connected with the need to strengthen our borders, and with the solution of geopolitical interests. But they could not be carried out so effectively without secret cooperation with the leaders of the Baltic states, who bargained for themselves personally, and not for their countries, the appropriate conditions. Some of the leaders of that leadership, having contacted the Germans, went to the West.

Therefore, when claims are made against Russia as the legal successor of the USSR, it would be worthwhile for the leadership of the Baltic Fronts, activists and radicals from these movements to bring charges not against the mythical leaders of the so-called conspiracy in Vilnius or Riga in 1991, but to present an account to the former governments of Latvia and Estonia and their close associates, who, wanting to sit on two chairs between Moscow and the West and head national governments, betrayed, as the Balts now say, their national interests. However, in principle, this is

not so, because the fundamental interests of the Baltic states at that time were more inclined towards our country than towards fascist Germany, which always considered the Baltic countries as a "resort zone", therefore there could be no question of

the transfer of Klaipeda or Vilnius and other territories to Lithuania. The special relationship to the Soviet Union, laid down by the leaders of the Baltic countries, has always continued, because the national independence of the Baltic republics, their statehood was actually preserved and ensured by unprecedented rates of economic development. In any case, the potential was created, which they still use.

Our positions in Latvia were much stronger than in other Baltic republics. Here we relied on the Communist Party, on a powerful labor movement, and also used the differences in the ruling circles. Vilhelms Munters, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia, and Janis Balodis, Minister of War of Latvia, actively cooperated with us. We also maintained a trusting secret relationship with the President of Latvia, Karl Ulmanis, the great uncle of the recent President of Latvia, Guntis Ulmanis, providing him with significant financial support. For these purposes, the resident of the NKVD in Riga, I. Chichayev, had a special financial office in Riga. In 1934, Ulmanis, as you know, carried out a coup d'état. Despite his services to the NKVD, he was repressed by us in 1940-

the years.

But perhaps the most impressive cooperation was established by our resident V. Yakovlev in Estonia. The President of Estonia, Konstantin Päts, although he did not sign a recruitment obligation to cooperate with the NKVD in 1930, nevertheless was on our payroll until 1940. On this occasion, as far as I remember, there was even a special decision of the government of the USSR. Päts was repressed, but fate kept him. He lived in Russia for a long time and died after the death of Stalin. Undoubtedly, he was a morally broken man and spent the rest of his life in one of the psychiatric hospitals. The fact that the leaders of the Baltic states were secretly collaborating with the Soviet Union dealt a severe blow to the attempts of the British after 1940 to create an authoritative Baltic government in exile. The

Germans generally abandoned this idea, and the British were never able to do anything. Because the emigrant political centers, although they relied on stocks

Latvian and Estonian gold in British banks, however, did not have the proper authority in political circles. In addition, there was a split in

Except movement in the Baltic Part of it was guided by the Nazis, the other - by the British. Thus, they could not come to political agreement and unity.

I would like to note the special role of V. Munters, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia until 1940, and J. Balodis, Minister of War of Latvia. These were large and bright political figures. In the summer

of 1940, at the dacha in Majori, where Merkulov, who arrived there as an authorized representative of the government and the NKVD in connection with the entry of the Baltic countries into the USSR, was located, a series of confidential conversations took place with both Munters and Balodis. Munters cherished the dream of leading the Latvian state within the USSR. It was I who had these conversations with him. At first, we kept our word, because it was not clear how the events with the elections in Latvia would unfold, how much it would be possible to completely master the situation. Later, Munters was sent as a teacher to Voronezh University, where he headed the Department of Foreign Languages. They arrested him before the war or immediately after the German attack. Munters was kept under arrest, but was convicted only in April 1952 by a special meeting at the MGB and sentenced to 25 years in prison. They released him after Stalin's death.

Munters was our trump card. We did not

rule out that we would have to return to negotiations with Germany and Britain on the question of the status of the Baltic countries. At the same time, a certain stake was made on Munters.

I visited Munters when he was teaching in Voronezh, and I presented myself to him not as an NKVD worker, but as Molotov's assistant. The content of our conversations boiled down to the fact that the Soviet government sees in him a major retired statesman and, giving him the opportunity to engage in pedagogical work, keeps him in reserve for foreign policy initiatives. This game with him continued throughout the war, although he was under arrest. Being in Vladimir in the settlement, he spoke in the central newspapers, in particular in Izvestia, on

the subject of reconciliation with the Latvian emigration, adhered to a firm position of cooperation with us.

Balodis was awarded the rank of General of the Red Army. He advocated military cooperation with the Soviet Union and was opposed to the Aisargs, paramilitary fascist organizations created at one time by Ulmanis, the leader of the Latvian Peasants' Union. Meanwhile, the Aisargs had a powerful branched organization. About 40 thousand people united in about 21 self-defense regiments. In fact, they formed the basis of the punitive military formations later created by the Nazis in the occupied territory of Latvia. Almost all of them joined the German SS Legion. It was Balodis who had the merit in disarming the Aisarg detachments in 1940.

He openly opposed the policy of Ulmanis, not hiding that he was in favor of rapprochement with the USSR. Judging by the operational information we received, the conflict on this issue was major. Ulmanis, suspecting Balodis of collaborating with Soviet military intelligence, under the guise of a sick leave removed him from his duties as minister of war. He gave the order to arm the Aisarg detachments and bring them to full combat readiness in the spring of 1940. All this was done taking into account the fact that the Germans encouraged the Latvian nationalists in their opposition to the Soviet Union. At the same time, they explained that they could not openly provide assistance, but they considered the main task for the nationalists to enter the new power structure in the USSR, to establish a compromise with the Russians, which would make it possible to influence the solution of important political and life issues in Latvia. The British tried to play the Baltic card. British Foreign Minister A.

Eden, who visited the Soviet Union after the defeat of the Germans near Moscow, in a conversation with Stalin, said that the British did not recognize the fact that the Baltic countries had joined the USSR. But after we got involved in the war with Hitler, took upon ourselves all its brunt, and when the British and Americans began to need us as allies, for the Soviet leadership all questions related to a compromise settlement of the special status of the Baltic states within the USSR disappeared.

It is curious that the Nazis paid much less attention to the Baltic nationalists than to the Ukrainian ones. This was explained by the fact that the German leadership was afraid to conduct active conspiratorial work with Aisarg formations and refugees from Estonia and Latvia, assuming that they could be recruited by British intelligence. Between the secret services of Western countries there was a kind of division of labor. British intelligence considered Latvia and Estonia to be their fiefdom. Therefore, German intelligence combinations in these countries were mainly associated with the study of the theater of operations, the preparation of sabotage. The Germans did not trust the nationalist leaders of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. For them, who considered themselves masters of the situation in the Baltic states, political cooperation with persons who enjoyed the tutelage of the British was completely unacceptable.

Only Smetona managed to escape from Lithuania to Germany, the rest of the Baltic political figures fell into our hands. Part of the Latvian and Estonian governments, their elites ended up in exile in England. The gold reserves of these countries were also stored there.

The events in the Baltics are an example of a multi-way combination of Soviet foreign policy. Our arrival in the Baltics largely depended on the defeat of the Anglo-French troops in Western Europe, since the Baltic states were guided not only by the Germans, but also by the British. The collapse of illusions about support from England and France was no less a blow for them than Germany's cession to us of their territories as a sphere of interests of the Soviet Union. But the orientation of the Baltic states towards England was not in vain. The resistance to Sovietization here took on the most fierce and long-term character after the end of the war. The British perceived the withdrawal of the Baltic states from under their sphere of influence as a temporary phenomenon. Emigration from the Baltic countries concentrated in England. Therefore, we were forced to fight both with the nationalist elements who relied on the Germans, and with those who maintained close ties with the British and French.

Unfortunately, the peoples of the Baltic states, not only in the eyes of England and Germany, were a bargaining chip in strategic relations with the Soviet Union. Similar was the attitude towards them and with

side of the Swedish government. By the way, Sweden was the only capitalist power that "responded" to the Soviet Union's annexation of the Baltic states by providing us with a large-scale loan for a period of five years, which was extremely important for the modernization of industry. In exchange for guarantees of their neutrality and renunciation of the occupation of Finland, the Swedish leadership and business circles recognized the Baltic countries as a de facto organic zone of geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union.

And one more important circumstance. Events in the Baltics coincided with the intensification of activities around the liquidation of Trotsky. It was in May-June 1940. I was going on a business trip to the Baltic States. Beria's first deputy Merkulov was already in Riga. But after the meeting at Stalin's dacha, I expressed to Beria doubts about the advisability of my immediate flight to Riga, since we were expecting urgent information from Mexico on Operation Duck, my presence in Moscow might be necessary. To which Beria replied that a business trip to the Baltic states, our assistance in removing the fascist nationalist Ulmanis from power, this is the task of Comrade Stalin and it is now extremely important for cardinal strengthening the country's security. And Comrade Eitingon, continued Beria, is vested with all the powers to make decisions on the spot and we will not interfere in his actions. After a little thought, he added that it was extremely important for us to resolve the issue of Riga as the main center of Soviet power in the Baltics, where the Baltic Military District should be relocated. This, Beria stressed, is of paramount national importance. As for Trotsky, he will be eliminated in any case.

As already mentioned, the Baltic States, in terms of its territorial position, has always been a sphere of intersection of many powers. She was interested in Germany, England, the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is also paying increased attention to it. And today the question is different: whose interests will dominate there in the near future? Moreover, regardless of the forms of socio-political structure. However, in any scenario, two significant factors will have to be taken into account especially, since the situation today is completely different compared to what it was in 1940. At that

time, the economic dependence of the Baltic countries on the USSR was very insignificant. Now she is dominant. And the second factor is the Russian population. The Baltic countries gained independence in 1991 in an accelerated manner due to the gross miscalculations of Soviet foreign policy. Gorbachev, realizing his doom, made additional concessions to Europe, hoping to get support from it at a critical moment in the fight against Yeltsin, that the West would help with financial and material resources, and would help keep him in power in the confrontation with the Russian leadership. The Russian population of the Baltic countries was forgotten. It turned out to be moved away from power structures, lost citizenship, and moved to secondary roles. But nevertheless, it cannot be squeezed out of the Baltic states. This is a significant factor of instability in this region. And apparently, it will exist for quite a long time. He will have to be reckoned with. The Germans placed much greater emphasis on cooperation with the OUN, an organization of

Ukrainian nationalists. Their directive "On a unified master plan for the insurgent headquarters of the OUN", adopted on December 22, 1940, was coordinated with German intelligence. In it, as we know, it was said that "Ukraine is on the eve of an armed uprising, immediately after the appearance of the German army, millions of people will take up arms to destroy the Soviets and create their own Ukrainian state. Therefore, it is necessary that an organized political national force operate in Ukraine, which would lead an armed uprising and lead the people to victory. We have such a force, the directive stated, it is the OUN in alliance with the Germans. It acts, organizes the Ukrainian masses, leads them to fight." The directive set tasks of a terrorist and sabotage nature, it was about the creation of a center for political and military leadership, as well as the training and education of personnel. "We must seize the military points and resources of the Donbass, seaports, enlist the youth, workers, peasants and the army. We must strike everywhere and at the same time to crush the enemy and disperse his forces. Ukrainian military uprising in all Ukrainian lands, in all Soviet territories, in order to bring the Moscow Soviet prison of peoples to complete collapse.

In the installations of the OUN, a merciless war was declared on all Ukrainian and Russian people supporting the Soviet government, "the requirement to eliminate the enemy was recorded, the functions of the security service were indicated", which was supposed to identify the communists. These documents also contained gross political errors. For example, they pointed out that the largest partisan actions took place in Ukraine in 1924, that the cornet general of the Ukrainian nationalist formations Tyutyunik "is a great partisan." In fact, as a result of a brilliantly conducted operational game by the Ukrainian VIIV, Tyutyunik was withdrawn from the territory of Poland along with its formation to the territory of Soviet Ukraine, amnestied ... and declared recognition of Soviet power. Subsequently, however, he was repressed in connection with opposition to the policy of collectivization.

Fight against Zionist organizations

On the eve of the war, there was a struggle not only with open militant nationalism, but also with the Jewish nationalist movement, which, on the whole, took a wait-and-see attitude. It should be noted that later, when developing several operational lines for the liquidation of Zionist organizations in the Baltic States, in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus and Bessarabia, it was revealed that they had no ties with prominent figures of Jewish culture, the intelligentsia, who actually participated in the process of assimilation of the Jewish population in Kiev, Leningrad, Moscow and other large cities.

The results of operational developments, such cases as "Utopians", "Zhabotintsy" (Ukraine), "Restless" (Baltic states), showed that if there is a base for using the Zionist movement against the Germans, then it must be absolutely independent, that is, not have no connection with the Zionist movement already existing on the territory of the Soviet Union. Nationalist organizations were uncovered and, most importantly, their

connections with Rosen, a prominent figure in American Zionist circles. (But these circles, by the way, issued through Morgenthau the first loan to the Soviet government for raising collective farms in the Crimea.)

These operations were led by the head of the secret political department N. Gorlinsky. It was possible to identify the so-called leftist direction, which included the youth organizations "Gordonia", "Gashomer-Hatsoir", "Geholuts", then the general "indiscriminate" Zionist organizations that united the youth cells "Onib" and "Geholuts", as well as the "Beitar" associations, "Brit-Ahayal" and "Galil". As it turned out, they were actively recruiting among the most proven Zionists, of which, for the purpose of conspiracy, small groups of 4-5 people were formed. All their activities were aimed at pro-British and pro-American agitation, conducting extensive propaganda work to introduce the ideas of Palestine among the Jewish youth and tear them away from the Komsomol.

The publication of Jewish nationalist literature was organized. We managed to liquidate one of the printing houses for the production of anti-Soviet leaflets in November 1940 in Lvov. This was the impetus for the seizure of the Zionist asset, during which it turned out that there was an illegal residency and emissaries of the American organization "Joint", sent to establish ties with the nationalist structures of the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The underground Zionist printing house that existed in Vilnius was especially active in producing fictitious documents, so-called visas, issued as if by the British consulate for travel to Palestine. In this case, Menachem Begin, the future prime minister of Israel, was arrested. As the leader of one of the large nationalist Zionist cells, he was expelled from the Baltics along with the Zionist activists a few days before the start of the war.

During the operation "Nomads", which was carried out by the People's Commissariat of State Security of the Byelorussian SSR, more than 20 people were arrested, who were members of the carefully conspired Zionist organization "Svoboda". Before joining, each of its members took an oath and paid dues. The organization published an illegal newspaper and had duplicating machines.

The nationalist Zionist movement did not enjoy the support of the Jewish population on the territory of the Soviet Union, mainly because the leadership of the Zionist organizations was repressed back in the 1920s in Volhynia, Leningrad, and Kharkov. But as compact masses of the Jewish population began to accumulate during the evacuation in 1941, some of them united with refugees from the Baltic states, Western Belarus. Therefore, immediately after the formation of the Jewish anti-fascist committee, the leadership of the NKVD issued a special directive signed by Deputy People's Commissar B. Kobulov, which ordered to continue an active fight against Jewish Zionist organizations. However, I have gotten ahead of myself in my account of these tragic events.

Chapter 6

Events in the Balkans

On the eve of the war, the Soviet leadership possessed comprehensive and reliable information about the development of the situation in the Balkans. Our most important source of information was the prominent Bulgarian diplomat Ivan Stamenov ("Heir"), who had collaborated with the INO OGPU-NKVD since 1934. He was recruited to work with us by an experienced INO employee, P. Zhuravlev.

With the appointment in 1940 of Stamenov as the Ambassador of Bulgaria to the Soviet Union, contact with him was transferred to me. We have access to documentary information about the real intentions and correspondence of the ruling circles of Bulgaria with the German leadership. It is significant that at the negotiations between Hitler and Molotov in November 1940 in Berlin, the Bulgarian question provoked a very sharp reaction from the Germans. We then had all the information about Hitler's actions and the intentions of the Bulgarian government. Our knowledge was based on documents and cipher correspondence, as well as on Stamenov's messages, since he received instructions from the head of government and from the royal family, to which he was a member.

But what is paradoxical? Our awareness of the evolving situation, the proposal to conclude a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria, made by us, by the way, at the prompting of Stamenov, who referred to the confrontation in its ruling group, did not give the proper results. And this despite the fact that we came up with very favorable proposals for Bulgaria not only to conclude a pact, but also to provide it with additional territory in Thrace in the event of an unfavorable outcome for Greece in the war with Italy and Germany.

The beginning of work with Stamenov also included the establishment of my close working relationship with A. Vyshinsky, at that time Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. In assessing

the crisis in Soviet-German relations, which began in the autumn of 1940 in connection with the events in the Balkans and the growing threat of war in this area, it is important to keep in mind the following circumstances regarding the use of our agent capabilities. The official position of the Soviet Union, as Vyshinsky explained to me, was that the USSR, on the one hand, sought to sign a pact of mutual assistance with Bulgaria, and on the other hand, this pact did not imply Bulgaria's withdrawal from the sphere of special relations with Germany and Italy. It was practically about the fact that we are in no way going to conflict with the Germans and oppose the entry of the Bulgarians into any treaty

allied relations with them.

At first glance, it may seem that this is a half-hearted and unprincipled position. However, this was extremely important for us, because it was about using Stamenov, with whom I had repeatedly met with the development of Germans and their allies, in order to compromise agreements with the to delay the war. Our attempt to influence the royal family in Bulgaria through Stamenov was an important point in the political line, since we thus bound the freedom of action to the Germans in the Balkans. The head of the Comintern, G. Dimitrov, was actively involved in Bulgarian affairs and interaction with Stamenov, and he did not entrust these matters to his deputies.

From conversations with Stamenov, I got the impression that the Bulgarian ruling circles were frightened by our proposal for a mutual assistance pact. The left opposition and labor movement at that time in Bulgaria were quite powerful. Therefore, the ruling circles were afraid that the improvement of relations with the USSR would help strengthen the position of the Bulgarian Communist Party. This pushed not only Tsar Boris, but also his entourage into an alliance with the British and Germans.

The establishment of an important contact with the Bulgarian ambassador in Moscow in the autumn of 1940 was, however, the prologue to another dramatic episode in the actions of intelligence and diplomacy in the Balkans.

direction in anticipation of the inexorably impending German-Soviet war. At the end of October

1940 or at the very beginning of November, on the eve of Molotov's trip to Berlin, Beria unexpectedly summoned me, in whose office I found P. Fedotov, the head of counterintelligence, and ordered us to urgently report to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyshinsky. The essence of the instruction was to enter into informal trusting relations with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, Milan Gavrilovich, in contact with Vyshinsky. The latter, on his own initiative, contacted Vyshinsky and informed him about the aggravation of the situation in the Balkans and the struggle within the Yugoslav leadership. Gavrilovich spoke about the dissatisfaction that is brewing in the Yugoslav government due to the fact that German troops will enter Bulgaria, occupy Thrace, which will sharply aggravate the Bulgarian situation.

Yugoslav relations.

Vyshinsky, who received Fedotov and me late at night, recounted the conversation with Gavrilovich to us and said that, with the approval of Comrade Beria, Fedotov and I were entrusted with a preliminary discussion of questions submitted by the Yugoslav ambassador for consideration by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and the government. Vyshinsky urged us to prepare for a conversation with Gavrilovich, who asked to be received in the next few days, when he would have new information about the further development of events in the Balkans.

Thus, Vyshinsky wanted to be prepared in advance for a discussion with the Yugoslav Ambassador of acute international problems, having the opportunity to talk about them with Molotov.

Beria instructed me and Fedotov to start working with Gavrilovich in view of the fact that, according to our information, he had a special relationship with the British. We regarded him as a "double", an unspoken English mediator in international consultations on the Balkans problem, knowing that Gavrilovich very often went for consultations to the British Ambassador in Moscow, S. Cripps. Listening to the British embassy, we had fairly accurate information about the topic of his communication with the British. Our listening to the apartments of the Yugoslav embassy confirmed that Gavrilovich, firstly, was interested in establishing trusting ties with us, and secondly, he raised the issue of the need for changes in the Yugoslav leadership,

since internal contradictions are aggravated and for this reason the Yugoslav military circles cannot but be interested in establishing special relations with the "Soviet military authorities."

It was at this time that Churchill secretly turned to Stalin with a proposal to abandon agreements with Germany and conclude a military agreement with London against Hitler in exchange for recognition of the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, Bessarabia, Eastern Poland and Northern Bukovina, publicly condemned by the British ruling circles. In this way, Churchill clearly confirmed that the fate of the peoples of these countries, the political structure of the western regions of the USSR, is nothing more than a bargaining chip in a big political game, and that the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union in this region are legitimate and justified. The British proposal was clearly provocative, since literally two or three weeks later the British Foreign Office made public Churchill's secret

appeal to the Soviet authorities in the open press, with the aim of exacerbating and complicating Soviet-German relations. In time, this coincided with the well-known visit to Germany by the head of the Soviet government, Molotov, in November 1940.

Under these conditions, after the return of Molotov from Berlin, the top leadership decided to use Gavrilovich's initiative for tacit coordination of the actions of England and the Soviet Union in the Balkans, invisible to the Germans. Since Gavrilovich was regarded as a "double", this operation could be carried out in Moscow only by organizing the closest cooperation between intelligence and counterintelligence of the NKVD. However, despite the excellent information support of our government and diplomacy, due to the unfavorable balance of forces for us, the Soviet Union failed to turn the course of events in the Balkans in its favor, failed to tie Hitler to a long military campaign in Yugoslavia and Greece. Fedotov and I were introduced to Gavrilovich Vyshinsky as advisers to the apparatus of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, with whom he had to meet beforehand to discuss the content of questions before officially putting

them before the Soviet government. During the second meeting with Gavrilovich in a restaurant

"Aragvi" after his proactive approach with a proposal of confidential cooperation with the Soviet representatives, we put before him problems in the line of his relations with the British. We were perfectly aware of the fact that we were approaching issues that directly affected the interests of a wide range of Balkan countries. We almost always spent our conversations with

Gavrilovich together with Fedotov. It could not be otherwise, because we were dealing with a "double". At the end of the conversations, appropriate notes were made, and if the conversation was in private, then they were compared. The information received was reported to the management. At the same time, we controlled the behavior of Gavrilovich. Unfortunately, our decryption service failed to intercept messages transmitted by him through the British to Belgrade, on proposals for military cooperation between the USSR and Yugoslavia. At the same time, the idea arose to implement the

plan, which was rejected in 1938, to overthrow the Stojadinovic government in Yugoslavia, which Beneš insisted on at one time. Quite unexpectedly, Vyshinsky's nightly call to Fedotov

intervened in our work. He called me back, and we were soon at the Deputy People's Commissar. It turned out that a week after Gavrilovich had outlined the Balkan problems to him, the British ambassador Cripps came to Vyshinsky and recounted Gavrilovich's proposals almost word for word. Thus, it finally became clear that although Gavrilovic was playing an independent game on behalf of the Yugoslav government, the British were nevertheless actively involved in this. The question arose: how fully the British control Gavrilovich. With the help of auditory control and the interception of cipher telegrams, we made sure that there is no one hundred percent control over him. Each of the parties in this game pursued its own independent goals. The Germans were suspicious of our direct contact with the British. And it was important for us to secretly exchange views on the future of the Balkan countries, on the problem of the Black Sea straits, the passage of warships of the countries through them, and on Turkey's position.

Gavrilovich actively participated in the double game. This was also confirmed in the English ciphers that fell into our hands in Turkey. In them, the British reported in a conversation with our resident that

they are aware of the negotiations that the Yugoslavs are conducting with the Soviet representative in Moscow. This unnerved and alarmed Beria, Molotov and Vyshinsky. Nevertheless, the contact with Gavrilovich was actively used by our Intelligence Department of the General Staff. When the question of the action in Belgrade was ripening, our military intelligence, in particular Golikov, who met with the Yugoslav representatives who had secretly arrived in Moscow, played a big role in this.

Vyshinsky was especially nervous. This was very noticeable when I talked about meetings with Gavrilovich before his official meetings with the ambassador. There was even an episode that he himself told me about. Keeping records of conversations with Gavrilovich, which were sent "upstairs", he forgot to indicate a number of important points of the conversation. Therefore, he was forced to make an addition to it and send it to Molotov. It was about changes in the position of the Yugoslav government.

I think, however, that the reason for Vyshinsky's excitement was the fact that information about contacts with Gavrilovich was received by Stalin and Molotov both through the NKVD and through the People's Commissariat for Foreign

Affairs. When the coup in Yugoslavia was being prepared, it was Fedotov and I who advised Vyshinsky to inform the Yugoslav military circles so that they would not give the Germans a formal pretext for an attack. Indeed, after the coup with our and British help, the Yugoslav government immediately announced that all agreements with Germany were being observed. However, we overdid it a bit. Merkulov reported future events in Yugoslavia with Stalin's sanction to the Comintern to Dimitrov. The Yugoslav Communist Party immediately announced its support for the coup. A few hours after the military took power, in Belgrade workers demonstrated with slogans: "Long live independent Yugoslavia!", "Long live Stalin!". As we soon learned, this plunged the German intelligence resident in Belgrade into a severe shock. A piquant situation arose in assessing the situation connected with the

work on Gavrilovich. Formally, Merkulov was the People's Commissar for State Security. He led the intelligence and counterintelligence departments. But as soon as it came to emergency issues that were reported directly to Stalin, Beria intervened in the work, as if removing the people's commissar

state security. Beria's authority was indisputable. He was immediately informed about contacts with Gavrilovich. I was struck that Beria did not feel absolutely confident and categorically forbade me and Fedotov to consult with Gavrilovich on the issues that he puts before the government. We were compelled to suggest to Gavrilovich that he switch over to the operational mode of daily contact with Vyshinsky. The NKID was instructed to take Gavrilovich and the Yugoslavs out of any queue.

One got the impression that the Yugoslavs were striving for full cooperation with us. Member of the Yugoslav delegation B. Simic, meeting with the head of the intelligence department of the General Staff, Golikov, noted several times that the Yugoslavs were distrustful of the British, who would not be able to provide effective assistance in the event of a German attack, and that they were inclined to work with us.

The door for secret negotiations is open

Cooperating with Gavrilovich and knowing about his "double" image, we, in fact, secretly collaborated with the British. This is a classic example of how issues in the Balkans were resolved by the great powers, an example of secret diplomacy, when officially we did not consider it necessary for ourselves to contact the British with any agreements on policy in the Balkans, with the exception of the well-known issues regarding the mouth of the Danube and other international agreements of all interested countries.

When it came to such an important side as creating a potential front against Hitler and containing him, we preferred to maintain secret relations with the British, secretly cooperating on the issue of strengthening anti-German positions in the Balkans through Yugoslavia. And if there had not been this cooperation, this intrigue with Gavrilovich, then there would not have been, accordingly, those delicate relations with Churchill that were established later.

Churchill then immediately realized that mutual understanding between Germany and the Soviet Union was deteriorating, and it was in the context of this unofficial cooperation, when both sides did not recognize each other for the common goals that they pursued in the Balkans, that immediately after the Yugoslav events he sent a well-known warning to Stalin about the attack Germany, thus considering that a tacit contact has been established.

From observing the double game of Gavrilovich, it was clear to us that on a number of questions that Fedotov and I asked him, for example, about the possibility of a future military alliance with Yugoslavia, about the threat of its dismemberment, he informed Belgrade, resorting to cipher correspondence through the British embassy. But both we and the British pretended not to notice anything, and continued to weave intrigue around this. The first initiators of our rapprochement were the Yugoslavs themselves. Although Gavrilovich had no sympathy for the Soviet regime, he came to us himself in the autumn of 1940, together with military attaché Popovich. They were interested in the question of the supply of Soviet weapons to Yugoslavia. These conversations were conducted informally, but it was absolutely clear to us that they were following the directives of their government, since this was followed by a special activity on the part of the Yugoslavs. Although the question was very fundamental and in tune with the crisis in Yugoslavia, for us it was, as they say, double-edged. We spoke quite clearly against the dismemberment of the country, which the Germans insisted on. But since the Yugoslavs cooperated with the Hungarians, we were sure that any of our agreements on the supply of weapons would become known to the Germans. Therefore, our leadership was in no hurry. In addition, another reason appeared: the Chief of the General Staff, Meretskoy, who was initially aware of these

negotiations, was replaced. Our military intelligence was in close contact with Popovich. But she could not work without relying on counterintelligence in Moscow, which serviced all these meetings. With the participation of so many people, it was hardly possible to keep everything a secret. In addition, the British really enjoyed teasing the Germans. As a result, there was a major scandal - a leak provoked by the British to American newspapers that the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were conducting secret negotiations on military cooperation. Our

a refutation, followed by a big scolding, which Fedotov and I received from Beria, Merkulov, and then from Vyshinsky.

In March 1941, we received important information from a correspondent for American newspapers in Moscow close to Cripps, an ardent anti-Soviet G. Shapiro, who at the same time worked for us and American intelligence. Shapiro was an authoritative specialist on Russia. The NKVD even arranged for him an interview with Stalin. After a conversation with Cripps, Shapiro confidentially informed Fedotov that in the event of a military conflict between the USSR and Germany in connection with the development of a crisis in the Balkans, the British would by no means agree to a peace agreement with Hitler.

Soon we were approached by Cripps on behalf of Churchill with a request to arrange for him to fly and leave to participate in important negotiations in the Middle East. The appearance of Cripps in Ankara and Istanbul did not go unnoticed by the Germans. The British drew the correct conclusion that long-term cooperation with the Soviet Union was also possible. This was already at the end of April 1941, after the defeat of Yugoslavia. They highly appreciated the fact that we agreed to an agreement with the Yugoslav government, although we knew that the Yugoslavs took advantage not only of ours, but also of their support in organizing an anti-German coup.

The rapid defeat of Yugoslavia did not come as a complete surprise to us: the weakness of the Serbian position was clear in advance. There was a need to formalize relations with Gavrilovich. He was informed that the Soviet Union would be forced to close the Yugoslav legation, but it was not discussed that he should leave the Soviet Union. This was a fundamental difference from other missions, say, Belgium, Norway. Before Gavrilovich, the question was posed: can the Yugoslavs leave Simic, an employee of the Yugoslav military intelligence, with us for responsible assignments. This was answered positively. We assisted Yugoslavia in the purchase of barges through the

People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade for the export of military personnel through Romania along the Danube. We then gave a firm assurance to

Gavrilovic, Simic and the future Yugoslav government that the Soviet Union would not

what conditions does not recognize the government of Croatia and other breakaway Yugoslav republics, although the Nazis have already rushed to announce the recognition of the independence of Croatia.

From recent conversations with the Yugoslavs, it became known that maps of the border regions of the USSR were being distributed among the Germans. There is an active

preparation for military operations. It should be noted that our General Staff, its military analysts were not up to par. The maneuverable nature of modern warfare, the offensive operations of the Germans simultaneously in several directions were not taken into account, since they contrasted sharply with the scheme of the First World War - delivering the main blow in one decisive direction.

The foreign policy activity of the British in relations with the USSR increased. We have taken appropriate precautions. After the Yugoslav events, Stalin avoided personally receiving the British Ambassador Cripps, "lowering" him immediately to the level of Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. For us, as already mentioned, it was important not to be involved in the eyes of the Germans in any serious foreign policy negotiations with Hitler's worst enemy, Churchill. The Soviet leadership began to lean towards the option of secretly working out the issue of future allies in the inevitable war with Hitler, meaning the then neutral power, but in fact an ally of England - the United States of America. Moreover, from circles close to Roosevelt's influential comrade-in-arms, Finance Minister G. Morgenthau, we received clear signals about the desire to start a secret dialogue on this issue.

In addition to purely diplomatic negotiations, their own countermeasures were also taken. We put the troops on high alert, but we did not have a clear idea of its real state. The transfer of armies from the Far East, the Caucasus, Central Asia began - the creation of the so-called second echelon. A number of directives were issued on the secret mobilization of troops and agents through the NKVD, on putting our residency in Germany on alert, and at the same time preparations were made for the mobilization of Chekist personnel who were in reserve. But military counterintelligence turned out to be

at the forefront of mobilization actions. Her leadership six months before the start of the war

developed and approved instructions and combat regulations for operations in "special" period, i.e. during the war. We are in intelligence
It was only in April May 1941 that these measures began to be put into practice in great haste.

Chapter

7. SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF OPERATION DUCK

What the dossier of Ramon Mercader is silent about

On the very eve of the war (I don't remember the exact date, but as Trotsky's last biographer D. Volkogonov told me, June 16, 1941), I. Agayants, who temporarily headed the emigration work in our intelligence department of the NKGB, issued a decree on the completion of the operation against the leadership of the Trotskyist International. It was symbolic. Stalin and Beria set before intelligence the task of completing Operation Duck by the start of the war.

On August 20, 1940, Trotsky was liquidated by Ramon Mercader. However, almost a year passed before Eitingon, who led this operation in Mexico, and Mercader's mother Caridad ended up in the Soviet Union, which made it possible to sum up the results of this operation not according to reports from agents, but during a personal exchange.

opinions.

We managed not only to decapitate the Trotskyist movement, but also to predetermine its complete collapse. Trotsky's supporters were rapidly losing the remnants of their positions in the international labor movement. Their leaders found themselves in a situation of almost hostile distrust of each other, many switched to covert cooperation with the US police agencies and the German intelligence apparatus, guided by the desire to take revenge on the US, French, and Italian communist parties in every possible way. Along with

the Mother group, Eitingon attracted trusted cadres of our agents from Spain, who had emigrated to Mexico, to liquidate Trotsky. The republican government was also in exile there. It was Eitingon, at great risk to his life, who carried out the operation to withdraw the leadership of the Spanish

Republicans and the Communist Party in the spring of 1939 to France. At the same time, in addition to the Spanish gold exported in 1936, significant funds in currency and jewelry were evacuated from Barcelona. They were then used to support the Spanish emigration and to create a conspiratorial apparatus in France, Mexico and a number of Latin American countries.

The final phase of Operation Duck began at a time when our illegal and militant groups consolidated their positions in the United States and Mexico. I remember that the winter of 1939-1940 was harsh in the literal and figurative sense. There were severe frosts outside, and in my heart there was great concern about the developments on the Finnish front. On one of these days, Beria unexpectedly summoned me to his place and ordered me to accompany him to the dacha. Evening was approaching. It was already dark outside. I wondered what was the reason for this trip. One thing was perfectly clear to me: it was about an operational meeting. And indeed, at the dacha, Beria introduced me to a young man who had some elusive property to attract and win over an interlocutor. "Meet Comrade Yuzik," Beria introduced him to me. For me, who dealt with Spanish affairs at INO, that said it all. I knew that Yuzik was one of the main special agents of our intelligence in Spain, thanks to whom our strong ties were established in the military, diplomatic and political circles of the Republicans. The contacts he acquired, the trusting relationship with the leaders of the anarchists, the ministers of the republican government, provided us with access to prominent figures in international politics, despite the tragic end of the civil war. Personally knowing our Spanish agents, "Yuzik" - Iosif Romualdovich

Grigulevich - was ideally suited for the role of Eitingon's closest assistant in the final phase of Operation Duck. By that time, Eitingon (comrade Tom) had legalized himself in the United States and moved to Mexico. After the completion of the operation, we planned that both D. Siqueiros and the "Mother" group would leave Mexico, "Tom" was waiting for important work in Moscow, and "Yuzik", turning into "Arthur", would become our main illegal resident in Latin America, previously by organizing a new intelligence apparatus in the United States. And so it happened.

In 1940, a decision was made to strengthen illegal work in America. Sometimes, for some reason, the period between 1939 and 1940 is misinterpreted as the time when intelligence work in the United States ceased. Yes, indeed, I. Akhmerov (Bil) and his assistant N. Borodin (Granite) were recalled from the USA. But at the same time, Konstantin Kukin (Igor) was sent there together with Grigulevich as an illegal immigrant, who had gone through a big school in the military apparatus of the Special Group of Y. Serebryansky, who had just been restored to intelligence personnel, Konstantin Kukin (Igor), the sharpest intersections. It was Kukin, P. Pastelnyak (Luka), G. Ovakimyan (Gennady) in 1939, 1940 and 1941, together with Eitingon and Grigulevich, who laid a solid foundation for the successful work of our intelligence on the American continent.

After August 20, 1940, Mercader's mother Caridad (Claudia), together with Eitingon, initially took refuge in Cuba, where the Mercader family had reliable family ties. Grigulevich, having changed his documents, was forced to go underground and legalize himself in the United States. Then Caridad and Eitingon also moved to the United States, first to New Mexico and then to San Francisco.

In 1941, the counterintelligence regime became very tough in the United States. At that time, we received important information from the US Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation from a source close to US government circles that the US had developed a whole program of preventive measures to isolate both pro-Nazi and pro-Communist elements in the event of war and the introduction of a state of emergency. . The program began to be actively implemented in connection with the outbreak of the Second World War. This was only part of the major events that the Americans then carried out in the 40s. Then the Japanese were deported and persons associated with the German Nazi colony were interned. Our agents, especially the "Uncle" group in California, which has strong ties

with the secret apparatus of the United States, found itself in the field of view of American counterintelligence. Therefore, it was decided to transfer Grigulevich to Latin America, as

they said, to the periphery, "to the village." Then there were two so-called villages: the nearest one is Mexico, the far one is Canada. But in Mexico, after the liquidation of Trotsky, Grigulevich's stay would have been too risky. Our connections among Spanish emigrants and trade union activists were partially tracked by local counterintelligence. True, having no evidence of involvement in the assassination of Trotsky, she could not detain anyone from the underground intelligence apparatus, but part of the Siqueiros group was nevertheless arrested by the local police. Therefore, Grigulevich, with the help of our residents in Washington and New York, was transferred to Buenos Aires. Here he was overtaken by the war. When

Eitingon and Karidad returned by train from Harbin to Moscow at the end of May 1941, I met them at the Kazan station. On behalf of Beria, who received Eitingon and Caridad with me in his office, I submitted to the Central Committee of the party a one and a half page handwritten report on the liquidation of Trotsky. Beria, apparently, this was necessary for the report to Stalin.

Almost a year before, in August 1940, two or three days after the liquidation of Trotsky, when I also sent a short report to Beria, it was decided that Eitingon would return home on his own. And the remaining money that was allocated for the operation was planned to be used to support Ramon Mercader, who was in prison, to pay lawyers.

It was then that Stalin uttered the phrase: "We will reward all participants in this case after returning home. As for the comrade who carried out the sentence, the highest award will be presented to him after his release from prison. Let's see what a professional revolutionary he really is, how he will prove himself in this difficult time for him.

The Duck file was kept in my personal safe. But after August 20, 1940, along with the report and handwritten report, Beria took all the documents. Then the "Duck" case was generally withdrawn from operational use. Only after the arrest of Beria, when the prosecutor's office became interested in the telegrams addressed to Tom on behalf of Pavel (Beria), did it become clear to me that these materials were also being verified. However, the journey of the dossier did not stop there. It

did not return to intelligence, but ended up in the general department of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and then in the presidential archive.

When Ramon went to prison, the question of his escape or early release was raised twice. Once with me in 1943, the second - in 1954, almost ten years later. Then it was about releasing him on bail, they even thought over moves about a bribe to the Minister of Justice of Mexico. But when the head of foreign intelligence of the KGB A. Panyushkin, as one of the veterans of our illegal intelligence told me, went with him to report to the chairman of the KGB I. Serov about these plans, he kicked them out, saying that they should not bother him with old Stalinist affairs. He was going to close the whole thing. But it was impossible to do this, since it was under the control of the Central Committee of the party and the leadership of the Spanish Communist Party was interested in the fate of Ramon. According to him, in any case, this was the case under Stalin, there was reporting: the fate of the intelligence officer, who was imprisoned, was reported to the top leadership.

On June 17, 1941, Eitingon, Caridad and I were invited to the Kremlin, but not to the Sverdlovsk Hall, as usual, but to Kalinin's office, where he presented us with boxes of orders. Caridad and Eitingon received the Order of Lenin. I was awarded the Order of the Red Banner. This was my second order. Eitingon's arrival almost

coincided with the birthday of my eldest son Andrei. We celebrated it at the dacha with a cheerful company. There were Melnikov and Eitingon with their wives. Caridad was also invited to the birthday party. She brought us a large Chinese dish as a gift. At meetings and in conversations, Caridad spoke of her desire to continue the revolutionary struggle. But we soberly assessed its capabilities. As before, the question of the fate of Ramon was in limbo, and her self-sacrifice was completely unacceptable for us. She was arranged in a house on Sadovaya, but she felt uncomfortable. Of course, she was understandable: although her family was financially secure, the situation in the Soviet Union could not be compared with life in the West, to which she adapted. Caridad dreamed of a different life. After arriving in Moscow, she met with Dolores Ibarruri and José Díaz. was drawn up

a large program of her study trip to the Soviet Union, and then a vacation in Georgia.

Ramon and his family - Caridad Mercader, sister Monserat, brothers Jorge and Luis - were registered in the KGB with registration cards, according to which they were paid salaries. For them it was the only source of existence. Luis has a different story. He came to the USSR at the age of 15-16, was under my personal care, graduated from the Moscow Power Engineering Institute, and became a professor. During the war years, he was in a special brigade, worked in the prisoner of war department as an interpreter during interrogations of prisoners, although there were few prisoners of war from the Spanish Blue Division. Other relatives of this extended family lived abroad. Jorge ended up in a German concentration camp and was released by us in 1945. After the death of

Ramon, Luis moved to Spain, where he received a pension as a participant in the war, benefits and salaries associated with professional activities.

Caridad was the only one of the Soviet intelligence officers who, on May 9, 1945, like Claudia, received a personal telegram from Beria signed "Pavel" with congratulations on the occasion of the Great Victory Day, to which she and her children, participating in the anti-fascist resistance, made a worthy contribution. It was also reported that Jorge was released from a Nazi concentration camp. The dispatch was delivered to Caridad by our resident in Mexico, G. Kasparov.

Intelligence, however, very late, in 1995, reached Eitingon's letters, which were filed in the dossier of Ramon Mercader. They were addressed personally to Andropov. Eitingon wrote that due to the undeserved prejudice against him, not enough attention is given to this honored worker of Soviet intelligence, who is seriously ill and needs medical care and support. Andropov's resolution is on the letter: "The meeting with the workers showed that attention is being paid, there is no reason to worry." Nevertheless, Leonid Eitingon, until the last days of his life, showed touching concern for Ramona. By the way, there are very large inaccuracies and discrepancies

in publications regarding this whole epic and the fate of Eitingon.

When Dmitry Volkogonov called me and asked me to clarify a number of issues related to the Trotskyist movement, I turned to the chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov. The KGB officers who arrived reported that the Mercader dossier was extremely meager, it did not contain any data on operational development, about his stay in Mexico, connections, etc. As it turned out, all the documents firmly settled in the personal archives of the KGB chairmen, they were not allowed to move. Therefore, even those who took care of Ramon were familiar with his biography in the most general terms. The closeness contributed to the spread of myths about his family, that the Soviet authorities allegedly held "his younger brother and sister hostage", who actually lived in Paris.

Gossip also spread about the intimate relationship between Caridad Mercader and Eitingon, that, allegedly, on this basis, Ramon took part in the operation to eliminate Trotsky. I wrote several times to Volkogonov, who was interested in this case, about the absurdity of these fabrications put into circulation by the defector N. Khokhlov. After all, few people know that Eitingon worked abroad on Trotskyist affairs with his operational wife, senior INO detective Alexandra Kochergina - Shura. And it was she who attracted Caridad to cooperate with us. Kochergina knew and maintained relations in France with Ramon. Caridad and Shura were family friends in Moscow in the 40s. The fabrications about Eitingon's "intimate" relationship with the Mercader family were deliberately launched both here and in the West in order to denigrate these outstanding people who made a significant contribution not only to the elimination of the worst enemy of the Soviet Union, but also to the fight against fascism in difficult pre-war times. It should be noted that the attitude towards an agent who

honestly fulfilled his duty, attention to him after the need for his operational use has disappeared - this is an extremely delicate issue. I was told how difficult it was to meet with Caridad Mercader in Paris when money was transferred to support this family in the mid-1950s. Our operatives, who keep in touch with the family, were often in the dark about all the circumstances, but they intuitively felt that the fate of the Mercaders was closed "to the top." And you have to give credit

leadership of the KGB in the 60s, it fulfilled its duty, its obligations as a whole. Despite the fact that Eitingon and I were imprisoned at that time, on June 6, 1961, Ramon was awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union. As for his employment, if the comrades from the Central Committee of the Spanish Communist Party, in particular, Luis Balaguer and Dolores Ibaruri, had not joined, perhaps the situation with him would have been quite complicated. However, he was employed at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU, where he conducted creative work related to the history of the civil war

in Spain. I must say that by the time Ramon was released, the pages of the history of the civil war and Soviet intelligence operations in Spain were trying to close as quickly as possible. Interest in the Spanish events arose only after 1964, when it became clear that the era of Francoism was ending and it was necessary to think about restoring our positions in this country. However, it was at the end of the 1960s, as veterans of our intelligence told me, that the decision was made to abandon the use of the old intelligence apparatus, contacts and connections. The reason was weighty: this is the story of the Spanish gold and the escape of Orlov Nikolsky, who had already testified before the commission on un-American activities. It was also necessary to take into account the fact that a significant part of the agents may have been deciphered by

the Americans. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service carried out an active operation in 1992-1994 to publish in the West and in our country a book about Orlov Nikolsky "Fatal Illusions". In it, he is portrayed as a hero, an opponent of Stalin, who did not betray the Soviet agents known to him to the enemy. For me, all this causes, to put it mildly, a skeptical reaction, which I have repeatedly told the SVR officers. What is the need for the younger generation of intelligence workers to raise a defector who stole 60 thousand dollars from our intelligence, which is now about a million US dollars. In general, for any special service, regardless of the historical conditions of its activity, it is extremely harmful for the upbringing of the younger generation to demonstrate a sympathetic attitude towards any defector, no matter what the motives and circumstances explain this. Any intelligence is irreconcilably related to such facts.

The authors of the book argue that Nikolsky's cooperation with American counterintelligence was insincere, that he did not reveal the most important agents - the "Cambridge Five". It really was not deciphered by him, but only because Nikolsky was afraid of being held accountable for using false American documents that he used when contacting Philby. At the same time, for obvious reasons, he completely denied his participation in political assassinations and terror in Spain. But the American intelligence services, who knew everything, turned a blind eye to this, because they needed Nikolsky in the political struggle against the Soviet Union and its intelligence.

Nikolsky, of course, behaved like a traitor. In exchange for citizenship and the role of a consultant, he "surrendered" to the American police authorities important agents of Soviet intelligence in the United States, who were involved in the 1940s. It seems strange to me to describe a conversation with him by an employee of our intelligence in the United States in the 1960s. It is impossible to imagine him talking to Nikolsky about my and Eitingon's rehabilitation. Firstly, this was not true, and secondly, in 1953-1990, Soviet intelligence officers were strictly forbidden to discuss the fate of Sudoplatov and Eitingon, as well as their work with any of the agents or even occasional contactees abroad. Concluding the epic "Duck", however, it should be said that

when the American counterintelligence and intelligence agencies actively engaged in the Soviet agent network in Mexico, they came to our positions and contacts with the leaders of the Spanish emigration. Perhaps, to some extent, this was due to the carelessness of the work of our intelligence apparatus. I believe that this is largely due to the treacherous actions of the defectors, who pointed out the most obvious contacts of Soviet intelligence with the Spanish Republicans, such figures as Hidalgo de Cisneiros and X. Hernandez - Minister of the Republican Government, one of the founders of the Spanish Communist Party, on whose shoulders lay down all the burdens associated with emigration in Mexico.

Checking American sources

On the eve of the war, in addition to England, the most important foreign policy information came from the United States. The change and arrests of the leadership of the INO in 1938 largely cast a shadow of suspicion on the leaders of the legal and illegal Soviet residency in the United States, as a result of which many of them were repressed. Despite the fact that communication with a number of sources was mothballed, important intelligence information continued to flow from the United States through the Comintern.

The leadership of the US Communist Party had a strong illegal apparatus that infiltrated the American foreign policy and economic departments and even the presidential administration.

After the recall of our legal resident P. Gutsayt, illegal immigrants I. Akhmerov and N. Borodin, the entire burden of coordinating intelligence work fell initially on our charge d'affaires, and then ambassador K. Umansky. Back in 1938, on the personal instructions of Stalin, he coordinated our intelligence section, which dealt with information about US-Chinese cooperation and plans for a shipbuilding program in view of the growing threat of war in the Pacific. At the same time, especially at the beginning of 1939, the question arose of placing our naval orders in the United States, for which Admiral I. Isakov, Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, arrived there. Umansky, which is a unique case in intelligence for people of his rank, personally went to California to instruct agents. Unfortunately, the American naval counterintelligence, as a source from the FBI told us, not only recorded his meetings, but also recorded an instructive conversation that it was urgent to inform the Soviet government about the possibility of purchasing one of the American aircraft carriers under construction.

In 1940, A. Graur, a senior official of the INO, whom I have already mentioned, went to the United States to inspect intelligence work. His assessment of the activities of the scientific and technical intelligence of G. Hovakimyan with his numerous sources was negative. Graur also questioned the work of the NKVD intelligence and the Red Army Intelligence Department for relations with emigration. Then our prominent employee K. Kukin, "Swimmer", helped us put everything in its place. As an illegal immigrant, he arrived in the United States, became convinced of the value of undercover connections and

prepared a conclusion on the expediency of restoring contacts with agents that had been mothballed since 1939.

Kukin, the future resident of the NKGB in England during the war years, graduated from the Institute of Red Professors, was a man of outstanding talents. He had a unique experience in political intelligence, in the creation of an illegal apparatus, worked in the Serebryansky Special Group on sabotage missions in China. And, despite poor health, he managed to restore his strength and left for the United States as an illegal immigrant.

Vitaly Pavlov (Klim), the deputy chief of the American branch of our intelligence service, also made a significant contribution to the preparation of the intelligence apparatus for work in the conditions of a future war. He was scheduled for undercover work on the American continent and at the same time he was instructed to double-check the reality of the sources and connections indicated in Mourning's certificate. It was about confirming our intelligence's access to undercover positions in the leadership of the American administration. In his memoirs, published in the News of Intelligence and Counterintelligence newspaper, Pavlov wrote that he, together with Akhmerov, carried out Operation Snow, which aimed to probe the position of the American ruling circles and the progressive public regarding the development of the Japanese-American conflict. Thus, the Soviet leadership became aware of the intention of the American government to take a "hard" line in relations with Japan, which could lead to a war in the Pacific. All the materials of Operation Snow, according to Pavlov, were reported to Beria and, on his instructions, were subsequently destroyed.

But the history of this question (as I know, who was in charge of this work at the time) is somewhat different. When the question arose of concluding a non-aggression and neutrality pact with Japan, we made great efforts to cross-check our American sources in order to find out how to influence American policy in the Far East. In addition, it was extremely important for us to know how real a military clash between the Japanese and the United States was. The fact is that both we and the Americans were involved in the military conflict

between China and Japan, and we and the Americans provided

China receives significant military assistance, secretly advising each other on these issues both in Moscow and Washington.

Pavlov was sent on a mission at precisely this time, although he was somewhat late and arrived after the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact had been signed. Pavlov's visit was of great importance for the future course of events. He met with a member of the secret apparatus of the US Communist Party, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Dexter White (Kassir), who later did a lot to establish Soviet-American economic ties.

White, or Weiss, came from a poor Jewish town in Lithuania. We carefully rechecked his relatives with the participation of the People's Commissar of State Security of Lithuania P. Gladkov. Pavlov, as I remember, went to White with the message that his Lithuanian relatives were alive and that we could help them financially or travel abroad. Unfortunately, this was not possible - at the beginning of the war they died in the Jewish ghetto in Kaunas.

White cannot be considered, even with some of our modest material support during the war years, as a paid agent of the NKVD. He was rather a confidant of the Soviet government, meeting with its high-ranking representatives in the United States. Our residency only contributed to this. Often it was important for him to meet with our employee V. Pravdin (Sergey), Deputy Resident in New York, in order to preliminarily discuss important issues of the conversation between US Secretary of the Treasury G. Morgenthau, Secretary of State K. Hell with the USSR Ambassadors to the United States Umansky, Litvinov, Gromyko and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov. In this way, during the war years, White contributed to the solution of the most important issues of economic assistance to the Soviet Union and the supply of weapons under Lend-Lease, as well as in 1944-1945, when it was about the post-war economic order in Europe and the payment of reparations to the Soviet Union in the amount of 20 billion dollars. for the damage caused by Hitler's aggression. The Soviet government

in 1945-1948 was given the opportunity to print freely convertible currency - occupation stamps for Germany and for the countries of Eastern Europe in the amount of 70 billion. These stamps, based on the American cliché brought by plane, were printed in the NKVD-MGB printing house on

Lubyanka. (The Americans in the same period printed, as is known, only 10 billion marks. Of these, our then main enemy spent 6 billion in Germany and Austria, the remaining 4 were returned to the American Treasury.) Thus, compensating for our economic losses in the war, thanks to Morgenthau and White, during the most difficult three post-war years, we issued funds that were freely exchanged for dollars and pounds sterling in Europe, which allowed us to acquire the necessary financial instrument for restoring the economy of the USSR and Eastern European countries in the zone of our political influence.

Our Western allies immediately after the war realized this circumstance and tried in every possible way to deprive us of these economic advantages. They managed to accomplish this only in 1948, when, after the merger of the American and British zones of occupation into "Bizonia", the circulation of occupation stamps in Germany was canceled. This was the economic background of the Berlin crisis of 1948, in response to our measures to blockade West Berlin. But I seem to have digressed. Let us return to the events of the spring - early summer of 1941. Speaking about the

important mission of Pavlov, it should be emphasized that no one before White, before our agents in the United States could set the task of directly pursuing a policy of provoking a Japanese-American war. It was completely out of the question. The task was completely different - to use our influence in American business circles and the government, if possible, in order to prevent Japan from armed action against the Soviet Union in case it was subjected to German aggression.

And one more important circumstance. In the United States, an exceptionally difficult agent-operational situation has been created due to the fact that structural changes have taken place in intelligence work, which was originally built within the framework of the joint residency of the Red Army Intelligence Department and NKVD intelligence. Elizabeth Bentley (Clever One) - the main liaison of the Voice, to whom he delegated many of his connections, was originally a military intelligence agent, later moved to the Voice, and then got in touch with our legal residency. Therefore, it turned out that information about the communist underground, unspoken members of the Communist Party in

the American government (an illegal circle of a native of Russia, a senior official of the US Department of Agriculture, Nathan Silvemaster), information about the agents of the NKVD and military intelligence was concentrated in the hands of the same people. And later, in connection with the betrayal of Bentley, all this turned out to be in the hands of the American counterintelligence agencies. We must pay tribute to our resident since 1944 in the USA A. Gorsky (Gromov), who, after the departure of V. Zarubin, figured out and signaled the suspicious behavior of Bentley, which was confirmed by external surveillance installed by Gorsky when he was heading to meet her.

Pavlov successfully completed the tasks assigned to him. We have received confirmation that the US-Japanese confrontation in the Pacific is slowly but definitely turning into a military confrontation. For Stalin and Molotov, this was not a revelation. A prominent analyst of the Red Army Intelligence Department before the war, and later our major international economist V. Aboltin, back in 1940, prepared a note to the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense about the inevitability of a surprise attack by the Japanese fleet on the strategic objects of England and the USA in the Far East. But information about the difficulties in reaching agreements between Japan and America and the unacceptability of an economic compromise between them against the backdrop of Hitler's military successes was

extremely valuable. Pavlov returned from the United States with important data that despite the betrayal of Krivitsky and Chambers, agents of the Comintern and the combined network of the Intelligence Agency and the NKVD really exist and continue to occupy important positions in the American state apparatus. In this regard, the information received through the US State Department about proposals to start secret peace negotiations between Germany and England with American mediation seemed reliable. It was also important to outline the spheres of a secret exchange of views through diplomatic channels and through intelligence between the United States and the USSR on a possible cessation of the war in China, as well as maintaining the neutrality of Sweden and Turkey in the conditions of the war in Europe.

On the eve of the war, a fundamental decision was made to build intelligence work in the United States on the principle of creating a main residency in America itself and two auxiliary ones - in Mexico and

In Canada. The Canadian residency at the beginning of the war was headed by Vitaly Pavlov. In 1943, L. Vasilevsky was appointed to Mexico, and already in October 1941, V. Zarubin became the main resident for the American continent. His appointment was more than natural. The American "point" for Soviet intelligence and diplomacy was especially important. Zarubin and his wife were the best fit for this job. Being experienced residents, they knew the situation in the United States well, carried out important tasks there back in 1937, being illegal.

In conclusion of this fragment of memoirs, I would like to once again focus on how important the interaction between Soviet intelligence and diplomacy in the United States and Sweden was in the prewar and war years.

K. Umansky, V. Semyonov and M. Vetrov, prominent Soviet diplomats, not being cadre workers and intelligence officers, nevertheless carried out exclusively responsible assignments of our intelligence agencies, having independent access to the leadership of the NKVD-NKGB. This also applies to G. Astakhov, whom he was charge d'affaires in Berlin. All of them had their code aliases. Their work in the intelligence line consisted mainly in establishing contacts with certain figures during official meetings. Perhaps it will seem too risky to someone - "exposure" of a person with a high diplomatic mission in relations with people who sympathize with us, attracted sources or even agents, but at a sharp turn in history, such work is inevitable. And the success of these connections depends mainly on the intellectual potential of the resident, that is, how communicative he is, whether he is fluent in a foreign language, whether he is thoroughly familiar with the circumstances, the essence of the problem. In our country, often with a change of generations in intelligence with intellectual training, not everything was up to par. It came to anecdotal cases when the heads of consular departments of embassies - nominees of the "Yezhov" party recruitment, graduates of the School for Special Purposes of 1938 sent telegrams to the Center that they had found a house where a meeting with an agent was to take place, but they could not enter it for technical reasons. The "technical reasons" were that in the West already at that time

in wealthy houses, combination locks were installed, which was not typical of Russia with doors open wide open until recently in the entrances of residential buildings.

Chapter 8

DATE OF THE START OF THE WAR UNDER QUESTION

On the deployment of troops

Unfortunately, the role of intelligence on the eve of the war, both military and political, is reduced, unfortunately, mainly to warnings about the timing of the start of fascist aggression. Meanwhile, the intelligence agencies of the Red Army and the NKVD fulfilled their historic mission in correctly orienting the leadership of the country and the military command in relation to the inevitability of future hostilities. All intelligence information about the strengthening of the German grouping of troops against the Soviet Union was implemented in the proposals of the People's Commissariat of Defense on the basics of the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in the West and the Far East, taking into account the real situation. The government drew the unmistakable conclusion that the threat of war was looming inexorably and that the main theater

of war would be the western direction. It should be noted, however, that these conclusions were drawn not on the basis of documentary data about the specific plans of the enemy, but thanks to a competent orientation in the military-economic and foreign policy situation. Therefore, the opinion that information and analytical work was poorly organized is not entirely justified. To be more precise, it should be noted that the information and analytical work was not given due attention, we did not uncover the disinformation actions of the intelligence of the enemy and his satellites on the eve of the outbreak of war. The leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff sought to prevent the enemy from creating a grouping on our borders that would have overwhelming superiority over the Red Army.

Army. Achieving at least a balance of power on the border was the most important direction of the military policy of deterring Hitler from throwing himself at Russia. I'm not talking about this. At the beginning of 1941, Merkulov ordered me and the head of military counterintelligence V. Mikheev to attend a meeting of the leadership of the Red Army Intelligence Department and the operational department of the General Staff, which discussed the military-political situation in Europe in the summer campaign. From this meeting on Gogolevsky Boulevard, a large-scale exchange of information on the state of the German and Japanese armed forces began. The main question was asked by the Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff at that time, Major General A. Vasilevsky to Golikov, the head of the Intelligence Department, and to me: does military intelligence and the NKVD suggest the simultaneous start of hostilities against the USSR both in the West and in the Far East? At the same time, he said that our conclusions and comments would be taken into account and reported to the military and political leadership. Thus, it was a question of what kind of forces we should have in the Far East to conduct active defensive operations. The threat of war on two fronts was extremely serious, since simultaneous military operations in the West and the Far East were impossible for the Red Army. According to Vasilevsky, the intelligence information reported by us was generally true, and on the basis of it the following decision was submitted for approval: to limit ourselves to active defense in the Far East and deploy the main forces and means in the western direction, which would be ready not only to repel an attack on the Soviet Union, but also to defeat the enemy in the event of his invasion of our territory. The idea was repeated several times that our grouping, having repulsed the attack, should defeat Germany and its allies, ensure a breakthrough of their front in a southerly direction by continuous bombardments, disrupt the work of the Romanian oil fields, thereby deprive the Germans of fuel, and hence the opportunity to conduct a long war. Golikov supported these considerations. At the same time, for the first time, the question was raised: is the German side capable of active actions against us without completing military operations against England. Golikov and head of department

The Dronov Intelligence Agency cited very convincing data obtained by military agents, from which it clearly followed that the Germans had no chance of defeating England in the air war they had begun and forcing her to unconditional surrender, and that the outcome of hostilities in Western Europe, despite the established dominance of Germany on land front, is not yet a foregone conclusion.

Mikheev and I reported on our participation at the meeting in the Intelligence Agency to Merkulov. Later, I learned from Mikheev that the military continues to discuss the question of the strategic deployment of our armed forces in the West and the Far East. Extremely important were the materials received from Tokyo that Japan was bogged down in a long war with China. Our agents, which had infiltrated the Japanese intelligence agencies in Manchuria, reported exhaustively on the large-scale guerrilla movement in the rear of the Kwantung Army, which we tried to support as a serious lightning rod for us in the military danger in the Far East. The Japanese were not original in their

work against us. On the one hand, they had an inevitable choice - reliance on white emigration. On the other hand, they saw Chinese and Korean resistance everywhere, since they considered the Koreans as the most unreliable element. In the struggle against the partisan movement, led, as they believed, by the Comintern, the Japanese counterintelligence made an attempt to create the so-called schools of the Comintern under their cover. We have identified a Japanese agent who was sent to create just such a school and to organize a false partisan movement on the territory of Manchuria.

They even used older agents to achieve their goals. They were mainly interested in what was happening in Manchuria and in the regions adjacent to the USSR. For this purpose, artificial supply bases were created, provocative so-called labor peasant groups, and a mass transfer of agents from the most qualified intelligence officers to partisan detachments was practiced.

In this regard, I recall one successful operation, which was personally led by the head of the UNKVD of the Primorsky Territory, M. Gvishiani. The Japanese captured the wife of the Chief of Staff of the 7th People's Liberation Army of China, Choi Senchen, a Korean woman, and recruited

her. She was given the task of recruiting her husband and withdrawing him from the detachment. She agreed to carry out this task, said that she could fulfill it, since her husband was in a desperate mood and he was dissatisfied with his stay in the partisan detachment. They organized a jailbreak for her and tried to give us a lift, but in the operational game in Khabarovsk and Manchuria, we managed to outplay the Japanese and disrupt this action. Analyzing the results

of this operation, N. Melnikov, Deputy Head of Foreign Intelligence, concluded that with a massive partisan movement in the rear, the Japanese army, which was defeated at Khalkin Gol, was not ready for active operations in our Primorye, although the Japanese generals, trying to raise their authority in Tokyo are developing such plans.

Controversy of information and its comprehension

At the beginning of the so-called perestroika, which escalated into a civil war in a hidden form, the myth was intensely fanned that we were supposedly afraid of the Germans, that Stalin was trembling in fear of the mighty fascist armada that threatened us from the West. Regrettably, the leaders of the foreign intelligence of the KGB and the GRU of the General Staff in 1960-1980, V. Kirpichenko, V. Pavlov, P. Ivashutin and others. They actually initiated the thesis that on the eve of the war, the intelligence officers "reported accurately" about the timing of the attack, and the dictator Stalin and his "satraps" Molotov and Beria criminally ignored reliable intelligence materials about the German attack.

It is surprising that the head of our military intelligence in 1963-1987, Ivashutin, operates in his notes in the Military Historical Journal with references invented by our writer and veteran of military intelligence O. Gorchakov to the mythical agent "Hawk", which Beria allegedly wanted to erase "into camp dust " behind

reliable information about the threat of war. In addition, he allegedly reported to Stalin that our ambassador to Germany, Dekanozov, was "bombing with disinformation" about an imminent war with Germany, and he, Beria, was demanding that he be recalled. All this is complete absurdity: Ambassador Dekanozov, being at that time the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,

was not subordinate to Beria. We should now find out not only whether intelligence reported "upstairs" about the date of the start of the war. This is an important question, but not the main one. It is necessary to compare the situation in 1941 and, for example, in 1967 and see how intelligence and counterintelligence information influenced the major political decisions in the USSR and how it was used. I wrote about this from

prison to Yu. Andropov on July 20, 1967. Blaming Stalin and Molotov for the miscalculations and gross mistakes made before the start of the war, their critics interpret rather primitively the motives for the decisions made on the basis of intelligence reports, pointing only to the limitedness of dictatorial thinking, self-confidence, dogmatism, imaginary sympathy for Hitler or fear of him. Thus, attention is diverted from the historical background of the events in which the current foreign and military intelligence

consultants are involved. Why am I talking about this? The fact is that the implementation of intelligence information is determined, as a rule, by the motives of the actions of the country's top leadership, unknown to intelligence officers. Stalin's goal was to avoid war at all costs in the summer of 1941. Not the last role in his miscalculations was played, perhaps, by the inconsistency of our

information. Stalin was annoyed, as can be seen from his hooligan resolution at the Merkulov report, not only with allegations of a military clash with Hitler in the coming days, but also with the fact that the Red Chapel repeatedly reported conflicting data about the intentions of the Nazi leadership and the timing of the start of the war. "You can send your source from the headquarters of the German aviation to e ... mother. This is not a source, but a disinformant," he wrote on June 17, 1941. I'm not justifying Stalin here at all. However, you need to face the truth. Not only a double "Lyceum student", but also valuable and proven agents "Corsican" and "Sergeant" reported in the spring

1941 and up to the start of the war, in June, about the false timing of the attack, about the Germans' action against the USSR, depending on the peace agreement with England, and, finally, in May 1941, the "Starshina" transmitted information that the German and Romanian command "concerned about the concentration of Soviet troops in the southwestern direction, in Ukraine and the possibility of a Soviet preventive strike against Germany and Romania in order to seize the oil fields in the event of a German invasion of the British Isles. Therefore, Stalin's reaction, in my opinion, should be regarded not only as disbelief in the German attack, but

also as extreme dissatisfaction with the work of intelligence. In any case, this is how I assessed the opinion "from above" about our work after a conversation with Fitin, and I will not hide that I was extremely depressed by this. Of course, our big mistake was to send intelligence reports "upstairs" without compiling a calendar of special messages. This was done only after

"catching up".

However, we sent all important messages to the leadership, hoping that in the Kremlin, receiving more additional data from the military services and the Comintern, they would draw the appropriate conclusions and give us instructions. War is like a watershed.

Nevertheless, it makes sense to refer to the events of 1941 in order to understand whether conclusions were drawn from these lessons on the eve of the most serious trials that our country experienced later - in the 50-60s, during periods of fierce local wars in the Middle East, threatening to escalate into a military confrontation between the USSR and the USA.

In 1988, I took part in a scientific seminar at the headquarters of our foreign intelligence in Yasenevo. I then had a chance to refresh my memory on some documents. Intelligence information about the plans of the German leadership and about considering an attack on the USSR began to arrive around May-June 1940. At the same time, it should be emphasized that erroneously "at the top" and in the NKVD believed that we were, at the very least, ready for war. Are there any explanations for what happened on the part of the

participants in the drama in May-June 1941, apart from the harsh criticism known to all? Very little. Only fragments of archival documents reach us and

separate statements of interested persons: Mikoyan, Molotov and their today's furious whistleblowers. But there are other factors that deserve to be mentioned.

June 1991 I remember how a film was shown on television about the role of intelligence before the outbreak of World War II. Analogies were made. The Soviet Union on the eve of the attack of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union on the eve of collapse. In 1991, the threat of collapse was obvious, but the country's leadership, and above all Gorbachev, who personally led the law enforcement agencies, mistakenly believed that they were keeping the situation under control. They also relied on baseless conclusions and recommendations from the state security line that public opinion generally supported Gorbachev and there was no real danger of removing him from authorities.

Here we say: Stalin's responsibility for the fate of the motherland. She is huge. We are talking about the role of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev. She is also more responsible. Because we always have the first person of the state, to a small extent the second - the head of the government - personally led the special services and law enforcement agencies. And they are primarily responsible for maintaining the integrity of the state, repelling external and internal threats to its development and existence. This should never be discounted.

And now I would like to give an example of how the erroneous implementation of our intelligence information contributed, as our prominent diplomat G. Kornienko noted, to the unleashing of the infamous six-day war in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab countries in June 1967. A number of participants in the drama in the

Middle East played an important role in intelligence operations and in the line of their provision by Soviet diplomatic departments in the 1940s. For example, the Soviet ambassador to Egypt in 1967, D. Pozhidaev, a former intelligence worker, was an officer of our residency in Paris in 1940, and during the war years, at the request of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, he switched to the diplomatic service, but at the same time continued to remain not just trusted person, but an active assistant to Soviet intelligence. The same can be said about V. Semenov - in

1960-1970s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, who during the Patriotic War carried out important assignments of the NKVD intelligence in Sweden. With their participation, without the sanction of the political leadership of the country, a KGB representative in Cairo on May 13, 1967, transferred unverified data on the concentration of Israeli troops to attack Syria to Egyptian intelligence in order to exchange information. Meanwhile, the Israeli command was preparing to deliver the main blow to the armed forces of Egypt, with the aim, first of all, to destroy its aircraft at airfields and gain air supremacy. Pozhidaev and Semyonov confirmed this false information to the Egyptians, who, following her lead, insisted on the withdrawal of UN troops from the Egyptian-Israeli border, believing that the concentration of Egyptian troops in the Sinai Peninsula would be a deterrent to the expected attack on Syria. As a result, the Egyptian leadership moved troops to the Sinai and began a blockade in the Gulf of Aqaba. This was done despite the warning of the chairman of the government of the USSR A. Kosygin not to aggravate the situation. The adverse consequences of these actions for the ally of the USSR at that time were widely known. In 1992, A. Rylov, a veteran of Soviet intelligence,

gave me a book by V. Kirpichenko "From the archive of an intelligence officer", in which he, as the curator at that time of the "Middle East" direction in the work of the KGB abroad, describes these events without a shadow of remorse for a tragic mistake, entailed major foreign policy complications for our country. Kirpichenko is one of the largest, iconic figures in the history of our security agencies and in the history of intelligence. He was the head of illegal intelligence, before that he headed the Middle East direction in the central office. This is very significant from the point of view of practical experience in organizing an illegal apparatus, which is created to work in a special period - during the period of hostilities. Read on. In his memoirs, Kirpichenko categorically

denies the involvement of the Soviet side in provoking hostilities in the Middle East, arguing that it is simply an Israeli aggression. Agree. But only in one. The main reason for the war is the confrontation and a clear position both in Israel and in the Arab world that it can be resolved

only by military force and peace is possible only on the basis of a military solution to the problem, on the conditions of achieving a military victory. It is absolutely clear that the root cause of the conflict is the aggressive aspirations of the parties. There can be

no doubt. But for some reason, Kirpichenko forgets about the circumstances of the unleashing of the war. If we turn to the transcript of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in June 1967, which took place almost immediately after the Arab-Israeli hostilities, we will see that the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. Brezhnev, who oversaw the law enforcement agencies, said that the defeat of Egypt was a great setback for us, and the country's leadership was summed up by intelligence, military and diplomats. On what is this statement of the Secretary General based? What did he mean when he talked about it? Most likely, on May 13, a representative of the KGB of the USSR in Cairo, it is not clear with whose sanction or without the sanction of the Center, exchanged with the head of Egyptian intelligence (with whom, as Kirpichenko admits, he also had friendly relations) information that an increased concentration of troops. But this information is still subject to verification. In his book, Kirpichenko, at his own discretion, declassified the document of the KGB of the USSR that on May 26, 1967, information was received about Israel's intention to start a war in the Middle East in two or three days. But this was not true. The war began ten days later. Who knows, maybe it was disinformation deliberately planted by the Israelis against the KGB in order to provoke Egypt and give Israel a pretext for a "preventive" strike against Arab countries in the eyes of world public opinion. The question arises, how dangerous is intelligence information? And can it be dangerous and undesirable when the course has already been determined by the government and the leadership of the country? Kirpichenko writes about the brilliant role of our ambassador to Cairo, D. Pozhidaev, with whom he had excellent relations. But they could not have any other relationship. And in this regard, a new white spot appears in the history of our intelligence operations, comparable to the lessons of 1941. I doubt that the SVR has drawn the appropriate conclusions from the analysis of the events of 1967 at the present time. This is unlikely, since historical generalizations on the Middle East conflict are made by people involved in obvious errors in operational work during this particular period.

But back to the events of May-June 1941. In 1992-1993, in the heat of criticism of Stalin, our ambassador to Germany, Dekanozov, was accused of being a "distributor" of disinformation about the inevitability of war with Germany. How was it in reality? In May 1941, Dekanozov was summoned to

Moscow for consultations. Then conversations took place between him and the German ambassador, Count Schulenburg. From the now declassified records of these conversations, it follows that the German ambassador in Moscow openly declared to a Soviet diplomat, in the recent past, the head of foreign intelligence of the NKVD, about his concern about the growing tension in German-Soviet relations, threatening a clash, and about the need to improve them. Dekanozov immediately reported not only

in the form of a recording of the conversation, but personally to Stalin and Molotov about the meetings with Schulenburg. And here the Soviet leadership, due to its mentality, made a serious mistake. It could not imagine that Schulenburg was talking to Dekanozov on his own initiative, without the sanction of Berlin. Even when Schulenburg emphasized to Dekanozov that he was expressing his personal point of view on the need to take steps in the form of a joint exchange of notes and the adoption of a communiqué on the stability of German-Soviet relations, the Kremlin took his words as the point of view of influential political circles in Germany. The role of Schuleburg was undoubtedly overestimated by Stalin, Molotov, and Beria. His conversations with Dekanozov were expected to start working on a possible meeting with the German leadership at the highest level. It is no coincidence that on May 1, 1941, Dekanozov stood on the podium of the Mausoleum together with the leaders of the party and the state. This told the Germans better than any words that he, Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was very close to the leaders of the Soviet Union. On May 5, Dekanozov was invited

to breakfast at Schulenburg's. On the erroneous instructions of the Kremlin, we planted disinformation that allegedly Stalin was a consistent supporter of a peaceful settlement of agreements, in contrast to the military circles of the USSR, who adhere to the rigid positions of military confrontation with Germany. Then came the infamous TASS statement from

June 14, 1941 about the groundlessness of rumors about the war with Germany.

The intentions of the Germans and the inevitability of war became even more obvious when our counterintelligence, with the help of military intelligence agent G. Kegel, with the participation of 3. Rybkina, managed to install perfect listening equipment in the premises of the German embassy, where Schulenburg and the military attache had confidential conversations with each other. This was a very great achievement of our counterintelligence apparatus and its technical units, which installed the equipment. Unfortunately, this was only possible on the May holidays of 1941.

Kobulov, Merkulov, Beria often visited Stalin in May-June 1941. They personally reported intelligence and counterintelligence materials. However, the most convincing data on the timing of the attack appeared two or three days before the start of the war. They were immediately reported to the very "top". These were recordings of Schulenburg's conversations, who directly said that he was very pessimistic about Hitler's military plans related to Russia. This note fell on the table to Stalin and finally convinced the Soviet leadership that the war would break out in the very near future. Now it is also known that when A. Shcherbakov met with the secretaries of the district party committees in Moscow on June 20, 1941, he advised not to leave Moscow on weekends, because a German attack was expected.

I have great respect for our prominent military leaders - Marshal of the Soviet Union G. Zhukov and Admiral N. Kuznetsov, but they should not reproach each other for neglecting intelligence data. For example, Kuznetsov, who in a note to Stalin outlined the naval intelligence report on the timing of the attack, is credited with misleading the leadership about the timing of the German attack. The fact is that Kuznetsov, indeed, reported on unconfirmed dates, but, unfortunately, each time citing documents in our historical and memoir literature is subject to conjuncture. Zhukov reproaches Kuznetsov for the fact that the captain of the first rank Vorontsov, our naval attache in Berlin, reported to him about the actions of the German command, relying on data from several sources that gave different

messages. But after all, the entire document was not quoted, which says that the sources of information are unreliable and the task was given to double-check them, after which this information was not confirmed. The same is said in the notes of General Golikov - that the information about the beginning of the war, received in March-April 1941, really turned out to be inaccurate.

It is also significant that the reports of Golikov and Kuznetsov were sent to Stalin in the spring of 1941 at a time when the German forces were not yet fully deployed along our border and the question of the immediate start of hostilities was not raised. The General Staff correctly assessed the capabilities of the enemy and drew the right conclusions. According to the current situation, the outbreak of hostilities seemed unlikely before June. It is impossible not to condemn the widespread phenomenon today, when many publicists arbitrarily and irresponsibly quote the most important documents of our history. And, as a rule, those who, in their previous publications, gave different "historical" assessments of the role of the CPSU, the nature and characteristics of the pre-war situation, are doing this.

However, one cannot fail to mention the major miscalculations of our intelligence. Quite often, the question is raised that Stalin ordered the deployment of the main forces of tank and mechanized formations of the Red Army to repel the enemy's main attack in the South-Western direction, since it was understood that the Germans needed oil, Ukrainian coal, grain reserves, etc. for a long war with the Soviet Union. In fact, we overestimated the grouping of German troops opposing us in the southwest, as a result of which the Southern Front was forced to withdraw in early July. Despite the very serious intelligence network that we had in Romania, mythical information was received about the significantly superior forces of the Germans and Romanians in the southern direction, consisting of 40 infantry and 13 tank and motorized divisions.

An incorrect assessment by our intelligence of the situation in Bessarabia, as the People's Commissar of State Security of Moldova, later head of the special department of the Southern Front N. Sazykin, self-critically told me, at a critical moment in the outbreak of the war, led to the low effectiveness of the actions of the troops of the Southern Front, despite the fact that the enemy, as it turned out, did not have superior forces. Undoubtedly

this had an unfavorable effect on the development of events throughout the South-West direction.

Intelligence historians still have a lot of work to do: to compare the intelligence information that came to Moscow with the picture of the actual timing of the deployment of the forces of Nazi Germany in the spring and early summer of 1941. As follows from the diaries of the Chief of the German Ground Forces, General Halder, published by us, the order of the German Supreme Commander-in-Chief to strike at the Soviet Union in accordance with the Barbarossa plan appeared only on June 10th. Only echoes reached our scouts about this. In general, we assessed the situation correctly, realizing that things were heading for war, but when it came to explaining the reasons for such conflicting intelligence data, it must be said frankly here that the leadership of the people's commissariats of internal affairs, state security and intelligence, being called to the carpet, did not find a proper answer. Unfortunately, the new generation of Soviet intelligence leaders did not learn from this, repeating similar mistakes in the course of events on the eve of the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967.

Chapter 9

The theme of repression is a special one. In this regard, I would like to draw attention to the circumstances that remain outside the field of vision of those who seek to write the history of intelligence according to ingrained patterns. It must be borne in mind that archival materials cannot give a complete picture of what happened in those years. Often in the testimonies of victims and now rehabilitated people in cases of the 30-50s, we read and draw not only unreliable information, but also find ourselves in captivity of established versions and myths, the reliability of which is believed not only by the public, incompetent in these matters, but also by the current employees and veterans of special

services. In the course of the assertion that Yezhov primarily destroyed the workers of the old school of Dzerzhinsky. This is basically true. And Beria destroyed them, and Abakumov did not like them. Many were knocked out, especially those who held senior positions in the state security and intelligence agencies. But we forget another very important circumstance. Among the old cadres of the "Dzerzhinsky school" there was a certain tension in personal relations, there was some rivalry. So it was in the intelligence agencies. Eitingon, who almost from the very beginning of the existence of the Foreign Department of the OGPU worked in it and eventually grew into a major worker, told me about tense relations between Yagoda and Trilisser, the head of counterintelligence A. Artuzov and the head of INO Trilisser did not get along with each other. Artuzov, as you know, later became the head of intelligence. Trilisser went to work in the Comintern. Artuzov, in a letter to Menzhinsky in 1931, justifies himself for some omissions in his work and even writes about "thriller perversions" in intelligence work. Not surprisingly, when these people were arrested, they testified against each other as "conspirators in the NKVD."

When my case was checked in the Party Control Committee under the Central Committee of the CPSU, it turned out that in various appendices to it, extracts from provocative testimonies and denunciations (in 1930-1961) were neatly filed as "compromising materials" against virtually all prominent Soviet intelligence officials in pre-war period and post-war years of Stalin's rule. I had an exceptionally benevolent attitude from the leadership of the CPC in the person of A. Pelshe, I. Gustov, and the head of the secretariat of the CPC G. Klimov. Therefore, having familiarized myself with these documents, I asked Gustov directly, bluntly, why the Central Committee of the CPSU, when considering rehabilitation documents, still submitted protocols of interrogations of those arrested, witnesses and convicts on falsified political cases of the 30-50s from the prosecutor's office and the KGB, however, with a monstrous and cynical proviso that "the data given in the protocols are not entirely reliable." The explanations just blew my mind. I. Gustov and G. Klimov frankly said that, unfortunately, "at the top", regardless of the rehabilitation of this or that person, it is customary to consider him compromised. This logic is still alive today. Compromising materials on cases of repression in the field of state security intelligence are subject to eternal storage and, obviously, use.

The circumstances and motives of the repressions in the state security and intelligence agencies can only be understood by understanding the false version of the mythical conspiracies in the NKVD-MGB-KGB archives. In the Stalinist version, the concept of guaranteed "non-intervention" and the subordinate role of the military in resolving political issues in the life of the country. None of the heads of power departments and special services was to have independent significance in the Soviet party-state hierarchy. Therefore, immediately following the case of the military years of 1937-1938, the Stalinist leadership initiated a new repressive cycle - the case of a conspiracy in the NKVD.

"Hedgehogs" of Stalin

The leadership of the state security organs of the USSR was almost completely updated during the total purge and show trials of 1936-1937. The execution of Heinrich Yagoda and his group cut off any possible connections between the "Chekists of the first wave" and their like-minded people in the army. Putting Yezhov at the head of the NKVD and having dealt with all the intended victims with his hands, Stalin, fearing widespread dissatisfaction with the scope of the bloody purges, placed all responsibility for what had been done on the leadership of the special services.

The "conspiracy in the NKVD" is still "packaged" in various cases of the late 30s, and, six decades later, many hundreds of volumes of criminal cases on the "liquidation of the executioners" are kept under seven seals.

Striking a blow to the second power base of the regime, Stalin, as it were, demonstrated to everyone that, despite the importance of the state security agencies, "hedgehogs" can only be in the hands of the leader. None of the Chekists should even in their thoughts try to independently raise and resolve political issues, despite the fact that the heads of the central and regional departments of the NKVD were elected deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and were members of the relevant party committees. Stalin, partly following the

instructions of Lenin, dealt blows not only to his real, but also to potential opponents. Of course, any serious politician seeks to anticipate events. The very nature of the activity of special services in any state carries some elements of violation of the law, because the work of secret departments is hidden from society and its parliamentary institutions. But Stalin always thought in terms of wartime. (A different method than in the bloody meat grinder of the 30s is used to retain power -

with the help of an extensive intelligence agency - at the end of the century. For example, the August events of 1991 look like a more "soft", but precisely calculated preventive strike of some political forces against others. This version cannot be ignored.)

With the outbreak of war, Stalin, as Supreme Commander and People's Commissar of Defense, directly supervised the military intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. In peacetime, the country's powerful defense and security system is once again being dismantled. A new purge in the armed forces and intelligence agencies,